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Past studies have found that relational transactions (i.e., relational contract norms and 
network strategies) have a positive relationship with project outcomes. These 
empirical studies, however, mainly investigated projects in general, without 
differentiating project types (i.e., whether public or private projects). In reality, the 
scenario faced by contracting parties in public projects may differ from that in private 
projects because close relationships between public officials and private 
consultants/contractors may lead to allegations of corruption. Hitherto, the research on 
relational transactions in public projects is still piecemeal and anecdotal. Drawing upon 
the Relational Contracts theory and the theory of Network Embeddedness, this study 
investigated: the relational transaction practices leading to better performance; and the 
drivers of and barriers to relational transactions in public projects.  
 
A two-pronged research design was undertaken in Singapore. A questionnaire-survey 
of 104 public projects was initially conducted. After the data were collected, the one 
sample t test and factor analysis were used to derive the critical barriers and drivers; the 
unpaired t test was applied to compare different parties’ perception of the drivers and 
barriers; and Partial Least Squares-Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) was used 
to identify the critical relational transaction practices that lead to better project 
outcomes. The main statistical results obtained were thereafter validated by the 
qualitative information gathered from the second prong of eight interviews. 
 
The results showed that information sharing gives rise to better relationships; good 
relationships further contribute significantly to time performance and satisfaction, 
indicating that public projects can benefit from good relationships. The results also 
found that public projects benefit from relational transactions as well. The main 
findings are: (i) propriety of means contributes significantly to cost performance; (ii) 
viii 
flexibility and contractual solidarity have a significant impact on time performance; 
and (iii) harmonization within the social matrix and propriety of means allow for a 
significantly higher level of satisfaction.  
 
The results also revealed that the adoption of relational transactions in public projects 
is significantly motivated by 21 drivers but deterred by 15 barriers. Three factors were 
further derived from the 21 drivers, which are: (i) increasing value proposition; (ii) 
improving business competitiveness; and (iii) improving project time and cost 
performance. The 15 barriers were further categorized into four factors. These are: (i) 
lack of capabilities; (ii) ethos of public services; (iii) lack of continuity; and (iv) 
institutional constraints. The comparison results showed that: (i) contracting parties’ 
perception of the drivers is not significantly different; (ii) the biggest challenge to 
adopting relational transactions stems from the public sector client, followed by the 
consultants; and (iii) contractors face the least number of barriers. 
 
This study contributes to the knowledge of public project management by showing 
that both the theory of Network Embeddedness and the Relational Contracts theory 
are applicable to public construction projects. Critical relational transactions, as well 
as the critical drivers of and barriers to relational transactions, are thus highlighted to 
contracting parties in public projects so that they can adopt these to improve their 
project outcomes. 
 
Key words:  
relational contracts; network embeddedness; public projects; Singapore; outcomes  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Singapore’s construction sector is plagued by poor cost and time performance (Ling, 
2004; Ling and Kerh, 2004) as well as a major problem of low productivity and 
negative productivity growth (Construction 21 Steering Committee, 1999). According 
to the Economic Strategies Committee (2010), the productivity level of Singapore’s 
construction sector is only half that of the United States and one-third that of Japan.  
 
Past studies have found that poor project performance may be attributed to 
adversarial relationships among contracting parties (e.g., Cook and Hancher, 1990; 
Dainty et al., 2001; Ng et al., 2002; Eriksson and Laan, 2007). The relationships 
among contracting parties may become adversarial for the following reasons: (i) 
clients focus too much on price and authority, and too little on trust (Eriksson and 
Laan, 2007); (ii) a purely price-dominated selection criterion entices tenderers to 
lower their bids in order to win contracts, relying on subsequent claims to recover 
their costs (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b); and (iii) firms work mainly on a 
project-by-project basis, which is detrimental to long-term relationships (Chan et al., 
2008).  
 
Adversarial relationships and their causes may be due to the heavy reliance on formal 
contracts and may be explained by the Rational Choice theory (Becker, 1976). Since 
using formal contracts highlights the rights, responsibilities and liabilities of the 
contracting parties which are spelt out in legal documents, contracting parties would 
make sure they protect and enforce their rights, and try to minimize their liabilities 
(Williamson, 1975). Participation of the contracting parties in an economic exchange 
would feature “sharp in” and “sharp out” (Macneil, 1978). These would lead parties 
to act in an “atomized” manner (Williamson, 1975). 
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In reality, aside from formal contractual relationships, contracting parties also have 
relational links with each other. The formal contract is thus complemented by 
relational contracts (Macneil, 1983; 1985), in which contracting parties adopt 
relational contracting (RC) behavior and practices. In contrast to Becker’s (1976)  
Rational Choice theory, Macneil’s (1983) theory of Relational Contracts states that 
informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct exist between contracting 
partners, and these are sustained by the value of future relationships (Macneil, 1978). 
An important attribute of relational contracts is that the relationship of exchange 
continues over a significant period of time (Bird, 2005). Over time, “exchanges made 
with long-run motivations produce norms to which the participants expect to adhere 
to and to which they expect adherence from other parties” (Macneil, 1986a:578-579). 
Prior empirical studies have found that RC practices could bring about superb project 
outcomes (e.g., Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a; Ling et al., 2006). 
 
Besides the ongoing relationships (formal and relational) that are present in a 
particular project, contracting parties may have past or possible future relationships. 
These are present because firms are embedded in a network. This may be explained 
by Granovetter’s (1985) Network Embeddedness theory which states that economic 
behaviors are embedded in a larger social context. Inter-firm networks operate on a 
logic of exchange that is different from both the logic of markets and hierarchies 
(Sydow and Windeler, 1998). In the construction context, past empirical studies have 
also found that the degree of embedded networks influences both company and 
project performance (e.g., Chinowsky et al., 2008; 2010; EI-Sheikh and Pryke, 2010; 




1.2 Research Questions  
The above brief review shows that relational transactions (i.e., RC practices and 
network strategies) have a positive association with project outcomes
 
(Chinowsky et 
al., 2008; Ling and Li, 2012; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2012)
 
and the network of 
social relationships which embeds contracting parties has an impact on their 
behaviors in economic exchanges (Granovetter, 1985). However, contracting parties 
in public projects face more constraints in adopting relational transactions as public 
clients cannot be seen to have a “hand-in-glove” relationship with private parties, 
which may imply cronyism, and the widespread practice of open tenders makes the 
possibility of future relationships remote. Therefore, the first research question that is 
addressed is:  
“Can public projects benefit from relational transactions and good 
relationships among contracting parties?” (RQ1)  
The answer to this question is important as it will inform contracting parties that 
besides formal controlling methods, relational transactions may also be a possible 
strategy to improve project outcomes.  
 
Besides eschewing close relationships, it is also possible that contracting parties are 
unable to correctly make use of relational transactions, thereby forcing them to revert 
to the more traditional routines (Akintoye et al., 2000; Glagola and Sheedy, 2002). 
One possible way to resolve this shortfall is for contracting parties to shed more light 
on the relational transaction practices that can lead to better performance (Ling et al., 
2006; Ling and Tran, 2012). Hence, the second research question is:  
“To what extent can relational transactions contribute to better public 
project outcomes?” (RQ2)  
4 
The identification of relational transaction practices that lead to better outcomes will 
provide contracting parties a framework to implement such transactions in public 
projects.  
 
The other problem is that with firms existing in the same network, past and future 
relationships would affect how they behave in current relationships (Granovetter, 
1985). However, the widespread practice of open tenders to procure services and 
products in public projects puts high priority to bidders’ merit, capability and 
tendering price rather than on previous partnerships. With open tenders called for 
most public projects, public clients generally cannot promise existing private partners 
future projects. This suggests no guarantee of future relationships, even when partners 
are embedded within the same network. This potential discontinuity in relationships 
would cause partners to act in an atomized manner, which impedes relationship 
development. This leads to the third research question:  
“Which are the relational transaction practices that can help to 
establish good relationships in public projects?” (RQ3)?  
The recognition of the determinants of good relationships would offer contracting 
parties the strategies to harmonize their relationships in public projects. Improved 
relationships would then possibly allow for better project outcomes.  
 
Although relational transactions have a positive association with project outcomes 
(e.g., Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2012; Chinowsky et al., 2008; 2010; Taylor et al., 
2010; Ling and Li, 2012) and they are also attractive to public agencies in improving 
project performance (e.g., Chan et al., 2001a; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b; 
Dewulf et al., 2012), not all contracting parties are willing to adopt relational 
transactions. This may be attributed to a series of barriers (e.g., Humphreys et al., 
2003; Ling et al., 2006) or the fact that contracting parties are not substantially driven 
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by the benefit of changing the status quo (Phua, 2006). There is therefore a need to 
identify: 
“Which are the factors that will significantly motivate or inhibit 
relational transaction practices in public projects?” (RQ4) 
It is important to identify the drivers of and barriers to relational transactions in 
public projects. A clear understanding of the drivers can help contracting parties to 
customize their relational transactions in order to reap the expected benefits. An 
awareness of the barriers would enable them to understand the challenges, and 
thereafter help them to take steps to minimize their negative impacts.  
 
Despite increasing expectations, the public sector faces more constraints in its attempt 
to adopt relational transactions because of rigid and impermeable organizational 
boundaries within government agencies (e.g., Crowley and Karim, 1995; Chan et al., 
2001; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). The preset regulations, for instance, 
restrict public officials in some activities, making them perpetuate behavioral patterns 
that go against collaborative relationships (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). By 
contrast, private parties’ boundaries are more flexible and permeable, making it an 
ideal climate for close inter-organizational cooperation in relational transactions 
(Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). This indicates that parties in public projects 
may have different perceptions of the factors motivating and deterring relational 
transaction practices. It leads to the next research question that needs to be addressed:  
“Do contracting parties have significantly different perceptions of the 
factors motivating and deterring relational transactions in public 
projects?” (RQ5) 
Understanding the differences in the contracting parties’ perception of the drivers of 
and barriers to relational transactions can help each party to craft suitable relational 
transactions to improve relationships among contracting parties. Contracting parties 
will also be aware of what their partners’ concerns are so they will avoid any action 
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that will cause the latter any concern. A good understanding of the motivating and 
deterring factors of relational transactions in public projects will also help the various 
contracting parties to fashion the appropriate approaches to meet their partners’ 
requirements should they adopt any relational transactions.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives  
The main aim of this research is to investigate relational transactions (i.e., RC 
practices and network strategies) that would improve public project outcomes in 
Singapore. Under this aim, the specific objectives are to: 
i. identify the drivers of and the barriers to adopting relational transactions in 
public projects;  
ii. compare different parties’ perceptions of the factors motivating and deterring 
relational transactions in public projects;  
iii. examine whether relationship quality could give rise to better project outcomes; 
and 
iv. explore to what extent relational transaction practices can lead to better outcomes 
and relationship quality (i.e., if they have an impact on outcomes and 
relationship quality). 
 
This research is significant because the findings could inform contracting parties that 
besides formal controls, relational transactions may also be a possible strategy to 
improve public project outcomes. The identification of relational transaction practices 
that lead to better outcomes provides parties a framework to implement such 
transactions in public projects. A good understanding of the drivers of and barriers to 
relational transactions helps contracting parties to fashion appropriate approaches to 
meet their partners’ requirements should they adopt any relational transactions. In 
addition, understanding the differences in the contracting parties’ perception of the 
7 
drivers of and barriers to relational transactions can help each party to craft suitable 
relational transactions to improve relationships among contracting parties. 
 
1.4 Research Scope  
This study focuses on relational transactions among public clients, private sector 
consultants and contractors involved in public construction projects in Singapore. 
Subcontractors are not included because: they do not interact with public clients 
directly; and the relational transactions between subcontractors and main contractors 
have been investigated (e.g., Kumaraswamy and Mattews, 2000; Zou and Lim, 2006; 
Unsal and Taylor, 2011). 
 
Public projects funded by the government (using taxpayers’ money) are targeted 
because relational transactions undertaken by contracting parties in public projects 
may differ from those in general projects. Public clients usually procure services and 
products through competitive tendering which may indicate a discontinuity of 
relationships. Besides, the public sector cannot be seen to have close relationships 
with private parties as this would imply cronyism. Yet, building embedded networks 
is the core of relational transactions. Hitherto, there is little information about 
relational transactions in public construction projects (Ling and Tran, 2012; Dewulf 
et al., 2012). Therefore, it is worthwhile to extend the current framework of relational 
transactions into the public sector.  
 
In this study, a public sector project refers to projects owned by the public sector. The 
Building and Construction Authority’s (BCA) (2008) definition of public sector is 
adopted, i.e., the owner or client of the project is the government or a statutory board. 
Specifically, public sector clients comprise ministries, departments, statutory boards, 
government-linked companies (GLCs) and government-owned companies (GOCs). 
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Main public sector bodies function as clients of the construction industry, such as the 
Housing and Development Board (HDB), Land Transport Authority (LTA) and 
Jurong Town Corporation (JTC). 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
The structure of this thesis is organized as follows. After this introduction, Chapter 2 
delivers a literature review of the theories underpinning relational transactions. Based 
on the literature review of the theory of Relational Contracts and the theory of 
Network Embeddedness, five RC norms and three network strategies are 
operationalized in the construction context.  
 
Chapter 3 presents a conceptual framework for boosting public project outcomes 
through relational transactions. It is followed by a review of the practices of RC 
norms and network strategies, the drivers of and barriers to relational transactions. 
Based on the conceptual framework and the literature review, the gaps in knowledge 
are identified and thereafter the hypotheses are proposed. 
 
Chapter 4 reports on the research methods. A two-pronged research design was 
applied. A questionnaire-survey was first adopted to collect quantitative data. In order 
to validate the statistical results from the questionnaire-survey, semi-structured 
interviews were second conducted. Associated data collection methods and data 
analysis techniques are also reported.  
 
Chapter 5 reports the profiles of surveyed projects, respondents and their firms. 
Chapter 6 describes one part of the questionnaire-survey results pertaining to the 
drivers of and barriers to relational transaction practices. The one-sample t test and 
the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) were used to identify the critical drivers of 
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and barriers to relational transactions. The unpaired t test was adopted to compare 
different parties’ ratings of the drivers and barriers. 
 
Chapter 7 presents the other part of the questionnaire-survey results regarding the 
identification of critical relational transaction practices that lead to better relationship 
quality and outcomes. Partial Least Squares-Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) 
was adopted at this stage. The statistical model obtained was validated through the 
qualitative data collected from the interviews. 
 
Chapter 8 reports the conclusion of the study. Specifically, it consists of the summary 
of this study, key results, recommendations for practices, contributions to knowledge 
and practices, limitations of the study and recommendations for future studies. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review of Relational Transactions 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews the theories underpinning relational transactions namely the 
Relational Contracts theory (see Section 2.3) and the theory of Network 
Embeddedness (see Section 2.4), which is more suitable for explaining transactions. 
By contrast, the Rational Choice theory has limitations in explaining all behaviors in 
transactions in reality (see Section 2.2).  
 
2.2 Theory of Rational Choice 
Formal contracts contain fairly explicit stipulations of proscribed and prescribed 
behaviors and risk allocation, representing promises or obligations to perform 
particular actions in the future (Macneil, 1978). They can be explained by the 
Rational Choice theory (Becker, 1976). 
 
The Rational Choice theory assumes that: (i) interests of each party are known 
(Becker, 1976); (ii) parties know perfectly all the complete information (Machina, 
1987); (iii) parties engage in transactions with minimum interdependence and little 
expectation for future interactions (Williamson, 1975); and (iv) the assumption of 
rationality can be applied with or without taking transaction costs into account, 
sweeping away all relations excepts pure competition with the broom of ceteris 
paribus (i.e., other things being equal) (Macneil, 2000b).  
 
Decision makers under such circumstances are highly sensitive to the revenues, costs, 
likelihoods associated with different courses of actions and the opportunity cost 
associated with a given investment (Bottom et al., 2006). They would thus pursue 
their interests rationally (Becker, 1976) and try to maximize utility (i.e. choosing the 
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preferred alternative) (Becker and Mruphy, 1988). They would resort to institutional 
arrangements and formal contracts to guard against troubles, ignoring the identity of 
and past relationships with individual actors.  
 
The assumptions and application of the Rational Choice theory, however, have 
received many criticisms. The basic assumptions of expected utility maximisation 
under conditions of uncertainty are especially problematic (e.g., Machina, 1987; 
Simon, 1987). Some also questioned whether decision makers have complete 
information about choice alternatives and are able to make the extensive 
computations (Simon, 1987). Aside from formal contractual relationships, contracting 
parties also have relational links (Macneil, 1983; Granovetter, 1985). These realities 
make the Rational Choice theory inadequate in explaining all behaviors in 
transactions.  
 
2.3 Relational Contracts Theory  
Relational contracts refer to informal agreements sustained by the value of future 
relationships (Baker et al. 2002). It signifies a commitment to cooperate in depth than 
a mere bargain for the allocation of risk (Bird, 2005). An important attribute of 
relational contracts is that the relationship of exchange continues over a significant 
period of time (Bird, 2005).  
 
2.3.1 Incomplete contract approach and norm-based approach  
Within the relational contract school of thoughts, two theories are pervasive 
Williamson’s (1985) incomplete contract approach and (ii) Macneil’s (2000a; b) 
norms-based approach (Blois, 2002). According to Williamson (2000), due to 
bounded rationality, contracts are usually incomplete. Contractual incompleteness 
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would pose added problems when it is paired with the presence of opportunism 
(Williamson, 2000).  
 
To resolve this problem, choice of governance structures is one important lesson 
(Williamson, 2003). The adoption of forms of organizations depends on the 
properties of three dimensions of the transaction (Williamson, 1979; Macher and 
Richman, 2008), namely uncertainty, the frequency with which transactions recur; 
and the degree to which durable transaction-specific investments are incurred 
(Williamson, 1979). Increased asset specificity and uncertainty indicate a stronger 
demand for cooperative adaptation (Williamson, 2003). If these two attributes exist in 
recurrent exchanges, relational contracts would be a suitable choice for the 
governance mechanism (Williamson, 1979). 
 
Unlike incomplete contracts, Macneil’s (1983) norm-based approach starts the 
analysis from four primal roots of contracts: (i) specialization and exchange; (ii) 
sense of choice; (iii) conscious awareness of past, present and future; and (iv) the 
social matrix. This is one distinction. Under this background, contracts are not treated 
as synonymous with exchanges themselves, nor are contracts used to refer to a 
written agreement (Macaulay, 1963). But, they are referred to as “relations among 
people who have exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to be exchanging in the future, 
in other words, exchange relations rather than as specific transactions, specific 
agreements, specific promises, specific exchanges and the like” (Macneil, 2000b:878). 
Relations here encompass all relations in which exchanges take place (Macneil, 
2000b). 
 
Contracts in this definition are fundamentally about cooperative behaviors, 
encompassing all human activities where economic exchange is only one perspective 
(Macneil, 1985; Feinman, 2000). Besides the defined monetizable exchange, 
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contracts include other interactions (Feinman, 2000), like maintaining relationships, 
sharing experiences and communicating about issues in the industry (Bird, 2005).  
 
Another distinction of Macneil’s Relational Contracts theory is the norm-based 
analytical framework. Macneil (2000b) viewed a transaction as lying on a spectrum 
ranging from as-if-discrete norms through common contractual norms to relational 
(or intertwined) norms (see Figure 2.1). These three types of norms constitute an 
abstract summary of the varied and specific norms in myriad varieties of contracts 
(Macneil, 1980; Macneil, 1983). Norms here refer to “the behavior that does occur in 
relations, must occur if relations are to continue, and hence ought to occur so long as 
their continuance is valued” (Macneil, 1980:64). Macneil labeled this approach as the 
Essential Contracts theory (Macneil, 2000a, b). 
 
2.3.2 As-if-discrete norms, common contractual norms and relational norms  
Macneil (2000b) proposed that ten common contractual norms constitute an effective 
vehicle for satisfying the core propositions of the Relational Contracts theory (see 
Figure 2.1). These common contract norms offer a checklist for isolating all elements 
of the enveloping relations that might affect transactions significantly (Macneil, 
2000b). The as-if-discrete and relational norms are particularly attributed to certain 
common contractual norms (see Figure 2.1), which are elaborated below.  
 
As-if-discrete norms are the product of an intensification of two common contract 
norms, namely implementation of planning and effectuation of consent, whose 
intensification enhances discreteness and presentiation (Macneil, 1980; Macneil, 
1986b). Macneil (2000b) suggested using “as-if-discrete” to describe such an extreme 
polar, since all discrete transactions are still embedded in relations and true 
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Figure 2.1: Spectrum of Macneil’s contractual norms 
(Source: Macneil, 1983; Blois, 2002) 
 
Planning refers to the content of the contract and to the processes followed in the 
relation (Diathesopoulos, 2010). In a discrete approach, planning is pre-defined as 
completely as possible at the beginning of the transaction; and this process is isolated 
from external changes (Macneil, 1986b). Effectuation of consent in a discrete 
approach indicates that future actions are determined in advance (Diathesopoulos, 
2010). On the contrary, planning in a more relational approach involves both 
transactional and relational characteristics and effectuation of consent depends on a 
number of factors referring to the ongoing relations (Diathesopoulos, 2010).  
 
Reciprocity and restitution, reliance and expectation in a discrete way are served by 
rigorous adherence to the contract; and future obligations of content are necessarily 
clarified in advance (Macneil, 1986b). Thus, reciprocity only involves quantified and 
measurable provisions. On the contrary, reciprocity in a relational approach calls for 
some kind of evenness rather than equality (Macneil, 1983). Besides the quantified 
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and measurable provisions, reciprocity also refers to the overall behaviors anticipated 
from one party concerning the other (Macneil, 1983). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, Macneil (2000b) proposed five relational norms: (i) 
role integrity; (ii) preservation of the relation; (iii) harmonization of the relational 
conflict; (iv) supra-contract norms; and (v) propriety of means. These five relational 
norms are transformed and intensified from five common contractual norms (Macneil, 
1983; Blois, 2002). These are role integrity (RI), contractual solidarity (SO), 
flexibility (FL), proprietary of means (PR) and harmonization within the matrix (HM). 
These five common contractual norms are elaborated and operationalized in the 
construction context below.  
 
2.3.3 Norms and practices of relational contracts 
Table 2.1 presents five norms and the respective measurement items. The 
operationalization is shown below.  
 
Table 2.1: Five norms of relational contracts and respective measurement items 
Constructs Code Measurement items 
Role integrity (RI) 
RI1 Commitment of resources to the project 
RI2 Long-term commitment  
RI3 Spirit of teamwork 
RI4 Continuous improvement 
Contractual solidarity (SO) 
SO1 Acceptance of agreed performance appraisal mechanism  
SO2 Alignment of objectives of different contracting parties  
SO3 
Collective/combined responsibilities by a pre-selected group 
comprising one person from each major party   
SO4 Joint coordination and monitoring plans  
Flexibility (FL) 
FL1 Flexibility when situations change   
FL2 Readiness to compromise on unclear issues 
Propriety of means (PR) 
FM1 Clarity of division of responsibilities  
FM2 Clarity of the terms and conditions in contract   
FA1 Clearly defined equitable risk-sharing arrangement  
FA2 Real gain-share/pain-share among contracting parties  
Harmonization within the 
social matrix (HM) 
HM1 Previous relationships among each other   




2.3.3.1 Role integrity (RI) 
Role integrity indicates that each party expects their partners to behave properly and 
fulfill their respective obligations in an adequate way (Macneil, 1983). It becomes 
more important in ongoing relations because roles grow in duration, extent of human 
contact and range of obligations (Macneil, 1986b).  
 
Contracting parties in a relational approach should be what they hold themselves out 
as being and must continue to act out this role throughout the course of the relation 
(Macneil, 1986a). They would “seek to overcome formal rationality to achieve goals” 
(Macaulay, 1985: 468) in a more functional and efficient way (Diathesopoulos, 2010). 
When unexpected events occur, they would seek to avoid reference to the contract 
(Macaulay, 1963; Blois and Ivens, 2007). This would be more likely to take place 
when contracting parties believe that counterparties are expected to behave “properly 
or adequately in all circumstances” (Misztal, 1996: 121). Expectations about the other 
party’s behaviors thus are seen to be fundamental for relationship development 
(Macneil, 1983; Misztal, 1996; Graf and Perrien, 2005). 
 
Commitment is an important aspect of performing role integrity (e.g., Black et al., 
2000; Kumaraswamy et al., 2005a). First, commitment of resources (RI1) to the 
project is conducive to relationship development (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008). 
Parties should share resources since they are working as a team. However, due to 
scarcity of resources or worry about disclosing resources to unauthorized 
organizations, some parties might be unwilling to share their resources (Cheng et al., 
2000; Chen and Chen, 2007). This tends to impede role integrity. 
 
Second, contracting parties need to commit on a long term basis (RI2) rather than 
merely focusing on present interests (e.g., Cheng et al., 2000). A long term 
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commitment may indicate parties’ expectations for entering potential collaborative 
opportunities in the future, which might facilitate the formation of a governance 
mechanism in the current project. 
 
Third, effective team building (RI3) could contribute to the achievement of role 
integrity (e.g., Black et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 2007). Project teams should be 
built towards an integrative approach (Love et al., 2010). To achieve this, it 
essentially requires team working attitudes from each participant, which would enable 
contracting parties to take more active actions and being willing to solve 
contingencies in a smooth way. As a consequence, the organizational interface among 
parties would be weakened. 
 
Fourth, parties should commit consistently (RI4) during the whole duration of the 
contract (Chan et al., 2004). Within a project, the willingness to solve problems 
continuously is important to achieve role integrity (Cheng et al., 2000). Based on the 
review, role integrity is operationalized as commitment of resources to the project 
(RI1), long term commitment (RI2), team working attitude (RI3) and continuous 
improvement (RI4). 
 
2.3.3.2 Contractual solidarity (SO) 
Contractual solidarity contributes to the relational norm of preservation of the relation, 
which could help to achieve goals at both individual and collective levels (Macneil, 
1983; Moody and White, 2003). Contractual solidarity is a norm of holding 
exchanges together and requires contracting parties to select behaviors that facilitate 
the stability of the relation and allow the relation to continue (Macneil, 1986b; 
Diathesopoulos, 2010). To keep relationship stability, contracting parties have to 
operate in accordance to a set of rules, which are accepted by the large majority 
(Macneil 1981; Diathesopoulos, 2010).  
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Solidarity is “a belief not only in future peace among those involved but also in future 
harmonious affirmative cooperation” (Macneil, 1986a:572). One critical strategy to 
attain solidarity is cooperation (Macneil, 1981). Macneil (1981) indicated that 
cooperation is the most effective way that can produce similarity of selfish interests, 
whereby what increases (decreases) the utility of one participant also increases 
(decreases) the utility of the other. It also helps to subordinate the short term interests 
to long term interests (Macneil, 1986a; Diathesopoulos, 2010) and subsequently 
contributes to relationship stability. The purpose to improve solidarity calls for more 
importance on cooperative behaviors (Macneil, 1981; Diathesopoulos, 2010).  
 
An agreed performance appraisal mechanism (SO1) is useful to facilitate cooperation 
(e.g., Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a, b; 2005a). An agreed performance 
appraisal mechanism can ensure that the performance of each party is assessed 
against the same appraisal mechanism. Before reaching an agreement on a 
performance evaluation arrangement, diverse opinions and disagreements should be 
discussed and settled (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a, b; 2005a). During the 
implementation process, constant monitoring and checking remain important (Cheung 
et al., 2003b).  
 
Besides, contracting parties could develop a common goal (SO2) (e.g., Chan et al., 
2004). Liu and Fellows (2001) proposed that goal setting at project and strategic 
levels could enhance goal attainment in partnering relationships. Under a common 
goal, potential conflicts arising from each party pursuing its own objectives 
regardless of the benefits of the project could be then largely avoided. In the face of 
contingencies, common goals could also present a set of principles for seeking for 
mutual accepted solutions.  
 
In the light with a common goal, role and responsibilities among contracting parties 
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could be collectively defined and aligned (SO3) (Thompson et al., 1998; Chan et al., 
2004). Halman and Braks (1999) proposed that a typical structure of project alliance 
consists of an alliance board with a pre-selected person from each party would be 
helpful to alignment of different parties’ objectives. This collective board could make 
decision unanimously and manage project objectives jointly.  
 
Planning and monitoring should be made on a basis of combined efforts (SO4) 
(Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a). Contracting parties could jointly share 
information at the planning stage and coordinate and monitor collectively. Rahman 
and Kumaraswamy (2002a, b) proposed using joint risk management to collectively 
identify and allocate potential risks. This strategy provides contracting parties with an 
efficient monitoring mechanism through which problems should be uncovered as 
early as possible. Bayliss et al. (2004) proposed that a questionnaire with detailed 
measurement parameters could be designed to assess the contract status and the 
project could be jointly analyzed. 
 
Contractual solidarity is operationalized as acceptance of performance appraisal 
mechanism for the project (SO1), alignment of objectives of different contracting 
parties (SO2), collective/combined responsibilities by a pre-selected group 
comprising one person from each major party (SO3) and joint coordination and 
monitoring plans among contracting parties (SO4). 
 
2.3.3.3 Flexibility (FL) 
Intensification of flexibility contributes to the relational norm of harmonization of 
relational conflicts and preservation of relations (see Figure 2.1), as it can harmonize 
clashes within the relation between its discrete and presentiated aspects (Macneil, 
1986b). Macneil (1983) noted that conflicts take place quite often between the need 
for adherence to planning and for flexibility to meet constantly changing 
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circumstances. In a discreet transaction, every future adjustment aiming at achieving 
flexibility is planned outside the actual exchange, as flexibility is achieved by 
entering or refraining from entering a contract (Macneil, 1978). Flexibility in a 
relational approach focuses on the parties’ ability to reconstruct the content of their 
relations, which runs counter to the implementation of planning (Diathesopoulos, 
2010). As the long-term exchanges have a far more relational scope and require 
necessary adjustments to achieve it, flexibility becomes increasingly important 
(Diathesopoulos, 2010).  
 
The readiness to compromise on unclear issues (FL1) is critical to the adaption to the 
changed environment (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a, b; 2005a). Due to the 
difficulty in preparing a fully complete contract, contracting parties should be 
prepared to comprise on unclear issues when unforeseen situations occur. This would 
accelerate the problem solving process and cause fewer conflicts.  
 
Flexible management styles (FL2) are also beneficial to address unclear issues and 
contingences (e.g., Akintoye and Main, 2007; Chen and Chen, 2007). As projects 
face dynamics and unforeseen risks, more flexible strategies are needed (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2008). With sufficient flexibilities in place, parties can quickly 
propose measures to cope with unclearness and contingencies. The problems could 
then be solved in a timely way with a possible lowest cost. Based on the review, 
flexibility is operationlized as flexibility when situations change (FL1) and readiness 
to compromise on unclear issue (FL2). 
 
2.3.3.4 Propriety of means (PR) 
Propriety of means refers to “the way relations are carried on as distinct from more 
substantive matters, including not merely formal and informal procedures, but such 
things as customary behavior, often of the most subtle kind” (Macneil, 2000a: 432). 
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These matters can be generally classified into two groups, i.e., the externally social 
context and the internally specific nature of every relation (Macneil, 1983). The 
internal propriety of means norms refers to those that the parties themselves generate 
in the course of the relationship, whereas the external propriety of means norms are 
those that have their source in the external social matrix (Macneil, 1986b). Two 
elements of the norm of propriety of means, namely fairness (FA) and formality (FM), 
are identifiable.  
 
(i) Fairness (FA) 
Although the notion of propriety of means has to be adapted to the specific parameters of 
each relation, fairness might provide a common standard for considering the internal 
propriety of means (Macneil, 1986b). In a particular relation, while the parties certainly 
pursue some individual goals, they are not free to accomplish them by any means without 
keeping substantial fairness (Diathesopoulos, 2010).  
 
Relational approaches could be better facilitated when construction contracts are 
prepared with clearly defined and equitable risk allocation/sharing arrangements (FA1) 
(e.g., Black et al., 2000; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008). Through this clearly 
defined and equitable risk sharing arrangement, contracting parties’ obligations are 
seen to be collective rather than individual.  
 
Fairness plays a vital role in building a win-win scenario via gain-share/pain-share 
arrangement (FA2) (e.g., Ling et al., 2006). In a real gain-share/pain-share 
arrangement, no party can really make extra profits (in the long term) by shifting 
costs to another party (Love et al., 2010). This would motivate parties to work in a 
cooperative manner, which is the core of relational contracts. Based on the review, 
fairness is operationalized as clearly defined equitable risk sharing arrangement 
among contracting parties (FA1) and real gain-share/pain-share (FA2). 
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(ii) Formalities (FM) 
A critical element of the external propriety of means is the adherence to the proper 
procedures and formalities when forming and implementing the contract (Macneil, 
1986b). This is because contracting parties may fear that, if these are not carried out, they 
would be unsure of their respective rights and duties and therefore it would be likely to 
fall into a dispute (Macneil, 1986b). Having formality and formal procedures in place 
would ensure a certainty of their partners’ behaviors. Conditions of contracts are the 
typical procedures and formalities in transactions. The alliance agreement in project 
allliancing, for instance, legally binds parties to agreed targets, risk sharing and 
reward mechanism (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2007; Halman and Braks, 1999).  
 
The division of responsibility (FM1) should be as clear as possible, which ensures an 
effective adherence to the formality. Formal contracts can serve as a framework to 
guide coordination through defining objectives of the relationship among contracting 
parties (Mooi and Ghosh, 2010). The clarity of divisions of responsibility could avoid 
misunderstanding of who is responsible for what. The use of standard form, Public 
Sector Standard Conditions of Contract (PSSCOC) for instance in Singapore’s public 
construction projects, can increase familiarity among users and help to reduce 
misunderstandings.  
 
Conditions of the contract should be as clear as possible (FM2). Woolthuis et al. 
(2005) noted that contracts can help parties in defining and aligning their expectations. 
Clarity in the contractual terms would therefore help partners to kick-start the trust 
cycle (Wong and Cheung, 2005), whereas ambiguity in the contract would result in 
potential conflicts and adversarial relationships as contracting parties try their best to 
protect their individual interests. Based on the review, formality is operationalized as 
clarity of division of responsibilities among contracting parties (FM1) and clarity of 
contract conditions (FM2). 
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2.3.3.5 Harmonization within the social matrix (HM) 
Expansion of harmonization within the social matrix contributes to the harmonization 
of relational conflicts (Macneil, 1983; Blois, 2002). Harmonization within the social 
matrix means that relations have to comply with the overall set of factors that define 
exchanges in a given society (Macneil, 1983). Every exchange is developed in the 
social matrix which permits it to happen; and the exchange is supported by the entire 
institution (Macneil, 1986b). Effective analysis of transactions therefore requires a 
recognition and consideration of all essential elements of its enveloping relations that 
might affect the transaction significantly (Macneil, 2000b).  
 
Harmonization within the social matrix also contributes to the norm of supra-contract 
(Macneil, 1983; Blois, 2002). Supra-contract norms are not uniquely contractual, but 
impinge on or enter into the relation (Macneil, 1986b). This is because relational 
norms tend to harmonize more with human relations rather than refined into the 
exchange itself and the scope of supra-contract norms is also open-ended (Macneil, 
1983). 
 
An important aspect of harmonization of relational conflicts is the necessity to deal with 
the whole person (Macneil, 1983). It thus calls for attentions to previous (HM1) and 
ongoing social relationships (HM2) of contracting parties. Previous relationships (HM1) 
can facilitate networks embedded in the current transaction (Uzzi, 1996; Laan et al., 
2012). The primary advantages in pre-existing relationships are expectations for trust 
and accumulated network resources. These furnish a basis for controlling fraud and 
benefit relationship development (e.g., Uzzi, 1996; Gulati, 1999; Zaheer and Soda, 
2009). A stock of previous relationships would help team members to save time to get 
to know each other. Contracting parties could thus avoid conflicts arising from the 
unfamiliarity at the outset of the project.  
 
24 
Prior relationships, however, may have side-effects. The negative impact is that, 
beyond certain point, additional networks between two firms start to diminish the 
likelihood of their future relationships (Gulati, 1995). It means pre-existing networks 
may constrain the formation of new networks. This is because stable networks would 
lock firms into unproductive relationships or precluding partnering with other viable 
firms (Gulati et al., 2000; Dekker and Abbeele, 2011). The situation would be 
different in public construction projects since competitive tendering is widely used to 
select consultants and contractors without consideration of prior relationships.  
 
Ongoing social ties (HM2) also influence parties’ behaviors such that they are no 
longer independent actors but are embedded in a network (Granovetter, 1985). 
Contracting parties may utilize their strong ongoing social relationships, like 
“guanxi” and friendships, to smooth the problem-solving process or share information. 
Based on the literature review, harmonization within social matrix is operationalized 
as previous relationships between each other (HM1) and ongoing social relationships 
between each other (HM2). 
 
2.4 Theory of Network Embeddedness  
Network embeddedness refers to a unique logic of exchanges, which aims to interpret 
transactions through an angle combining network and micro rational choice 
(Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996; 1997). The application of network embeddedness 
could remedy the drawbacks of both over-socialized and under-socialized 
approaches.  
 
Within the embeddedness theory, structural embeddedness refers to the extent to 
which a dyad’s mutual contacts are connected to one another (Granovetter, 1992). It 
is a function of how participants interact with others, how likely future interactions 
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are among the participants and how likely participants are to talk about these 
interactions (Granovetter, 1985; 1992). This study adopts the notion of structural 
embeddneddness which focuses on the relationship quality at the organizational level. 
 
2.4.1 Governance in network embeddedness 
Structural embeddedness emphasizes the structure of networks and the value of the 
structural position of parties in the network (Gulati, 1998). The governance 
mechanism might be reflected by the degree of embedded networks, which depends 
on the type of ties it uses to connect to its network parties as well as the type of ties 
used by firms in the network (Uzzi, 1996; Dacin et al., 1999).  
 
The level of network embeddedness in an exchange can produce both opportunities 
and constraints through which contracting parties’ expectations and behaviors would 
be shaped. These furnish the governance basis of network embeddedness. For 
opportunities, mutual expectations are inherent in relationships and represent one of 
their most fundamental properties (Granovetter, 1992). Constraints can occur when 
the network-based arrangements govern mutual behaviors and restrict them into a 
network scenario.  
 
Two types of relationship quality are typical in networks: arm’s length relationships; 
and embedded relationships. Arm’s length relationships could be explained by the 
Rational Choice theory, showing selfish and profit-seeking behaviors, whereas 
embedded relationships present social attributes, which encourage trust, information 
sharing and joint problem solving (Uzzi, 1997). The detailed comparison is 




2.4.2 Arm’s length relationships  
Networks composed of arm’s-length ties exhibit a low level of embeddedness (Uzzi, 
1996). When firms keep arm’s-length ties with one another, the pattern of exchanges 
produces a market-like structure (Powell, 1990). These arm’s-length relationships are 
characterized by: (i) non-specific asset investments; (ii) minimal informational 
exchange (i.e., prices act as coordinating devices by signaling all relevant information 
to buyers and sellers); (iii) separable technological and functional systems within 
each firm that are characterized by low levels of interdependence; and (iv) low 
transaction cost and minimal investment in governance mechanisms (Williamson, 
1985).  
 
Arm’s-length relationships are impersonal and atomistic; and actors are motivated by 
instrumental profit seeking (Uzzi, 1996; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). The transaction 
itself is limited to the exchange of data on price and quality (Uzzi, 1996). This type of 
relationship is incapable of generating relational rents because there is nothing 
idiosyncratic about the exchange relationship (Dyer and Singh, 1998). It would likely 
instead induce opportunistic actions and expectations for the distributive exchange 
(Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002).  
 
2.4.3 Embedded relationships  
Embedded relationships indicate that transactions are embedded in the social 
attachments (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). Parties within the embedded networks do not 
selfishly pursue immediate gains, but concentrate on cultivating long-term 
cooperative relationships that have both individual- and collective- level benefits 
(Uzzi, 1996). Besides, parties in an embedded network would follow heuristic and 
qualitative decision rules, rather than intensely calculative ones (Uzzi, 1997). It 
would also breed local cohesion (Granovetter 1973) and discourage malfeasance 
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(Granovetter, 1985). These actions and motives are not assumed to be due to purely 
economic behaviors and conformity to some social norms, but converge on the 
combination of both, furnishing an alternative mechanism for coordinating adaptation 
(Uzzi, 1997).  
 
The temporary nature of construction projects causes distinctive challenges for 
building embedded relationships among contracting parties. Azoulay et al. (2010) 
pointed out that when a client cannot commit to give repeat business to a contractor, 
inter-organizational transactions between them would not be highly embedded. Under 
this situation, it is possible to establish a moderate degree of embeddedness (Azoulay 
et al., 2010). But the moderately embedded relationships are fragile and subject to 
rapid degeneration into nasty relationships since the activities that support embedded 
and arm’s length relationships are actually substitutes (Azoulay et al., 2010).  
 
The format of embedded networks among project teams can be described as 
quasi-firm (Eccles, 1982), project networks (Sydow and Staber, 2002), latent 
organizations (Starkey et al., 2000), project coalitions (Pryke, 2004) and project 
social capital (Di Vicenzo and Mascia, 2012). Sydow and Staber (2002) refereed 
project networks to project organizations that are embedded in long-term 
relationships. Starkey et al. (2000) proposed the notion of latent organizations to 
represent project networks which are episodic and spread unpredictably over time.  
 
The descriptions of networks among team members indicate that besides a temporary 
attribute, networks in the project-based sector can be embedded in more permanent 
contexts (Sydow and Staber, 2002; Sydow et al., 2004), particularly in long-term 
recurrent exchanges (Dubois and Gadde, 2000). Eloranta (2007) proposed a notion of 
business networks, which have permanent traits, in comparison to project networks 
which are temporary in nature. 
28 
 
2.4.4 Strategies and practices of embedded relationships  
Three elements are essential (i.e., trust, information sharing and joint problem solving) 
in embedded networks (Uzzi, 1997) (see Table 2.2), which are elaborated and 
operationalized in the construction context below.  
 
Table 2.2: Network strategies and respective measurement items 
Constructs Code  Measurement items 
Trust (TR) 
TR1 Mutual trust among each other   
TR2 Level of interpersonal relations/cultural harmony  
Information 
sharing (IS) 
IS1 Mutual understanding among each other   
IS2 Open and effective communication among each other   
IS3 Sharing of project information among each other   
Problem 
solving (PS) 
PS1 Adjustable contracts to address uncertainties  
PS2 Commitment level of contracting parties to joint problem solving   
PS3 Presence of conducive learning climate/environment   
PS4 Acceptance of dispute resolution mechanism for the project   
 
2.4.4.1 Trust (TR) 
Trust is a critical component of embedded ties (e.g., Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1996; 1997). 
It acts as the primary governance structure, outperforming other mechanisms, like 
calculative risk and monitoring systems (Uzzi, 1997). A high level of trust facilitates 
the exchange of resources and information that are crucial for high performance (Uzzi, 
1996). Trust can create a sense of security during the knowledge sharing process, so 
that the knowledge would not be exploited beyond what is intended (Dhanaraj et al., 
2004). In addition, trust facilitates the extension of benefits to partners and invites the 
receiving partner to reciprocate when a new situation arises (Uzzi, 1996).  
 
However, trust is paradoxical in transactions as it provides the opportunity for abuse 
through opportunism (Granovetter, 1985). Granovetter (1985) indicated that the more 
complete the trust, the greater is the potential gain from malfeasance. Taking the 
relationship between main contractors and subcontractors for example, the effect of 
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relationships on the cooperation can easily turn into a managerial bottleneck in spite 
of previous long-term familiarity (Tserng and Lin, 2002). The more the main 
contractor depends on the technical skills of the subcontractor, the more difficult it 
becomes to control costs (Tserng and Lin, 2002), thereby creating a relational risk 
and making new technological skills or ideas less likely to be adopted (Tserng and 
Lin, 2002; Unsal and Taylor, 2011).  
 
The presence of mutual trust indicates no weak links among contracting parties in the 
network (Chan et al., 2004). A high level of trust could create an opportunity and 
willingness for further business collaboration, reduce the need for continuous cross 
monitoring, reduce the need for formal controls, reduce the tensions created by 
short-term inequities and cut down cost and time outlays (Rowlinson and Cheung, 
2005).  
 
Interpersonal relationship harmony is also vital aspect of trust as the development and 
maintenance of relationships are largely at the inter-personal level (e.g., 
Kumaraswamy et al., 2005a; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008). Personal 
relationships in Chinese culture form the basis of social order and correct behaviors 
(Pennet and Zhao, 1992). Based on the review, trust is operationalized as mutual trust 
between each other (TR1) and level of inter-personal relations/cultural harmony 
(TR2).  
 
2.4.4.2 Information sharing (IS) 
Another important component of embedded relationships is to disseminate tacit, more 
fine-grained and holistic information (e.g., Uzzi, 1996; Uzzi, 1997; Rowley et al., 
2000; Mariotti and Delbridge, 2012). The dissemination of tacit information enables 
contracting parties to know about partners’ actions and thus helps in shaping their 
behaviors (Granovetter, 1992). It would also facilitate beneficial types of inter-firm 
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coordination and learning (Uzzi, 1996). By contrast to embedded relationships which 
facilitate the dissemination of tacit information, arm’s-length relationships promote 
the flow of public information (Uzzi, 1999).  
 
Embedded relationships, however, may constrain information acquisition (Uzzi and 
Lancaster, 2003; Maurer and Ebers 2006). Once the relationship is embedded, parties 
can only draw from a limited pool of knowledge (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). The 
knowledge flow would become increasingly redundant if exchanges with existing 
partners repeat continuously (Maurer and Ebers 2006). In the end, acquiring novel 
information becomes increasingly difficult and existing information becomes less 
valuable. By contrast, weak ties could allow parties to access novel information 
(Mariotti and Delbridge, 2012). The implementation of information sharing can be 
facilitated by mutual understanding (IS1) (Love et al., 2010), open and effective 
communication (IS2) (Doloi, 2009) and mutual sharing of information in construction 
projects (IS3) (Cheng and Li, 2001).  
 
Mutual understanding (IS1) enables relationships to be successfully nurtured (e.g., 
Black et al., 2000; Love et al., 2010). Mutual understanding means that parties need 
to know other parties’ objectives and requirements and how these related to their own 
roles. A better mutual understanding helps parties to work well together to pursue a 
common goal instead of only focusing on individual goals. Xu et al. (2004) proposed 
that mutual understanding is required at all levels of staff rather than being restricted 
to senior and middle managers.  
 
Open and effective communication (IS2) also contributes to collaborative 
relationships (e.g., Chen and Chen, 2007; Doloi, 2009). An effective communication 
system plays an instrumental role in problem identification and conflict resolution 
(Chan et al., 2004), prevents problems from becoming disputes (Wong et al., 2005), 
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and assists in avoiding misunderstanding, rework and delays (Love et al., 2010). It 
facilitates the exchange of ideas, visions and solutions, which can nurture mutual trust 
(Cheng et al., 2000), and enable a mutually acceptable solution to be developed 
(Chen and Chen, 2007).  
 
Sharing project information with other parties (IS3) facilitates healthy relationship 
development (Cheng and Li, 2001). The exchange of high quality and private 
information is likely to takes place in the embedded networks (e.g., Uzzi, 1996; 
Rowley et al., 2000; Mariotti and Delbridge, 2012). Effective sharing of project 
information enables parties to acquire accurate progress of the project and discover 
potential problems at the early stage. It would thus facilitate inter-firm coordination 
and learning (Uzzi, 1996). By contrast, arm’s-length relationships promote the flow 
of public information (Uzzi, 1999), indicating that contracting parties are restricted to 
the formal information only. Based on the review, information sharing is 
operationalized as mutual understanding (IS1), open and effective communication 
(IS2) and sharing of project information with each other (IS3).  
 
2.4.4.3 Joint problem-solving (PS) 
Embedded networks tend to furnish joint problem-solving arrangements (Uzzi, 1997). 
Joint problem-solving arrangements could enable contracting parties to coordinate 
functions and work out problems “on the fly” (Uzzi, 1996; 1997). These arrangements 
typically consist of routines of negotiations and mutual adjustment that could flexibly 
resolve problems and effectively promote the learning process (Uzzi, 1997). Appropriate 
problem-solving mechanisms, like joint problem solving (Cheng and Li, 2002) and 
other mutually agreed resolution (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2005a), are crucial to 
build collaborative relationships (e.g., Chan et al., 2004; Chen and Chen, 2007).  
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Some studies highlighted the vital role of flexibility in contracts (PS1) in 
collaboration at post-contract stage (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002a, b). Given 
the limitation in cognition (Eisenberg, 1994) and complexity of construction projects, 
contracting parties are unable to define all the contingencies that may occur later on. 
Uncertainties are hence inevitable in construction projects. Flexibility in contracts is 
helpful to address these drawbacks (Badenfelt, 2011). 
 
Joint problem solving (PS2) plays an important role in nurturing collaborative 
relationships (e.g., Cheng and Li, 2002; Chen and Chen, 2007). Joint risk 
management, for instance, may be an alternative way to solve problems collectively 
(Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002a, b). Conflicts might frequently occur among 
parties because of potential discrepancies in goals and expectations of each party. 
Joint problem solving could be an effective way to settle such conflicts since relevant 
parties have the chance to speak out.  
 
The presence of a learning climate (PS3) is critical to relationship development 
(Cheng and Li, 2001). Cheng and Li (2001) noted that learning climate could 
encourage each party to disclose their risks and jointly propose measures to address 
them. Having learning climate in place would form up a comfortable environment for 
the execution of joint problem solutions.  
 
Contracting parties’ acceptance of the dispute resolving mechanism (PS4) is also 
conducive to relationship development (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a, b; 
2005a). The acceptance of the dispute resolving mechanism would be helpful to avoid 
the escalation of conflicts and reduce conflicts. Some dispute resolution methods are 
particularly devised for smooth relationship development, like one such method 
called “swing man process” (Hayford and Utz, 2002). In this process, disputes which 
cannot be resolved unanimously by the alliancing board are referred to an 
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independent third party, and each alliance participant makes a submission on how the 
dispute should be resolved (Hayford and Utz, 2002). The independent third party then 
chooses from these submissions, having regard to the terms of the alliance agreement 
(Hayford and Utz, 2002). Hayford and Utz (2002:85) explained that “each party will 
be discouraged from making an extreme submission, for fear that the third party will 
prefer the other's position, and this will assist in achieving a resolution which all the 
participants can live with, minimizing any ongoing damage to the alliance 
relationship”. 
 
Based on the review, joint problem solving is operationalized as adjustable contracts 
to address uncertainties (PS1), commitment of contracting parties to joint problem 
solving (PS2), presence of conducive learning climate/environment (PS3) and 
acceptance of dispute resolution mechanism for the project (PS4).  
 
2.5 Summary 
From the literature review in the preceding sections, it can be seen that transactions in 
a construction project organization range from discrete or arm’s length formal 
transaction to relational transactions. In formal transactions, parties rely on formal 
contracts to govern their rights, liabilities and responsibilities as explained by the 
Theory of Rational Choice (see section 2.2). However, due to the interdependence 
nature of the work, parties in a construction project organization are not expected to 
behave in an atomized manner nor would they regard the project as a spot contract. It 
is suggested that relational transactions would be practiced.  
 
Relational transactions in a construction organization may be explained by two 
theories, namely the theory of Relational Contracts (see Section 2.3) and the theory of 
Network Embeddedness (Section 2.4). According to the theory of Relational 
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Contracts, five norms guide and control RC practices (see Section 2.3.3), which are 
role integrity (RI), contractual solidarity (SO), flexibility (FL), proprietary of means 
(PR) and harmonization within the matrix (HM). 
 
Besides, parties’ expectations, opportunities and actions may be influenced by 
existing ties among each other, and expectation for future interactions. These may be 
explained by the theory of Network Embeddedness (see Section 2.4). According to 
this theory, actors may have different degree of embeddedness in a network (i.e., 
embedded relationships and arm’s length relationships), which could shape the 
expectations and opportunities in the current exchange, acting as a governance 
mechanism. In an embedded network, three elements, namely trust (TR), joint 
problem resolving (PS) and information sharing (IS), are essential (Uzzi, 1997) (see 
Section 2.4.4).  
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Chapter 3 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework (Section 3.2) which comprises five 
main themes: relational transaction practices (X); project outcomes (Y); relationship 
quality (Z); and drivers (C) of and barriers (D) to relational transactions. The 
operationalization of the constructs of relational transactions (X), project outcomes 
(Y) and relationship quality (Z) is shown in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. 
The operationalization of drivers (C) of and barriers (D) to relational transactions is 
covered in Section 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. This is followed by Section 3.8 that 
summarizes the characteristics of public project management and procurement. Based 
on the literature review, four knowledge gaps are identified in Section 3.9. The 
hypothetical relationships in the conceptual framework are introduced in Section 
3.10.  
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
Figure 3.1 shows the conceptual framework of this study. Formal transactions may be 
explained by the theory of Rational Choice (Becker, 1976) (see Section 2.2). As 
complete reliance on formal contract may lead to adversarial relationships, parties in 
a construction project are expected to adopted relational transactions. Under relational 
transactions, parties might adopt RC norms underpinned by Macneil’s (1978) theory 
of Relational Contracts (see Section 2.3). Besides, actors in the construction industry 
are likely to have worked with each other in the past and also possibly have 
opportunities to work together again in future projects. Granovetter’s (1985) theory of 
Network Embeddedness could be used to explain their behaviors based on past and 
possible future relationships (see Section 2.4) and parties adopt network strategies.  
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As shown in Section 1.3, this study aims to examine the relationships among 
relational transactions (X), relationship quality among contracting parties (Z) and 
project outcomes (Y). The operationalization of the constructs is presented in 
Sections 3.3 to 3.5. Figure 3.1 also shows the hypothetical relationships among them 
which are elaborated in Section 3.10. 
 
Besides, Figure 3.1 also shows the factors impeding (D) and motivating (C) the 
adoption of relational transactions. Nine drivers and nine barriers are identified. 













Drivers for relational transaction practices (C)
· 
Drivers for RC
C1-1 - Better cost outcome
C1-2 - Better time outcome
C1-3 - Better quality
C1-4 - Increased satisfaction
C1-5 - Meet client's requirements









- Information sharing (IR) 




-Harmonization within the 
social matrix (HM)
-Flexibility (FL)
-Propriety of means (PR)  
· 





D2-3-Adherence to rules 
and codes of conduct
Barriers to RC
D1-1-Lack of background in RC
D1-2-Uneven level of commitment
D1-3-Misalignment 
D1-4-Adverse environment













(-) denotes a hypothetically negative relationship, (+)denotes a  hypothetically positive relationship
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework for boosting public project outcomes through relational 
transactions 
 
3.3 Relational Transaction Practices (X) 
Figure 3.1 shows that relational transaction practices comprise five RC norms and 
three network strategies. The relevant practices were operationalized in Sections 2.3.3 
and 2.4.4 and summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. As a construction project comprises 
37 
many contracting parties, it is expected that the degree of the adoption of relational 
transaction practices by different parties could be uneven. The relational transaction 
practices identified from the literature review may be further classified as follows: (i) 
practices exhibited by individuals (e.g., role integrity (RI) and flexibility (FL)); (ii) 
practices exercised between two parties (e.g., trust (TR), information sharing (IS) and 
harmonization within the social matrix (HM)); and (iii) practices undertaken by triple 
parties (e.g., contractual solidarity (SO), propriety of means (PR) and joint problem 
solving (PS)).  
 
3.4 Project Outcomes (Y)  
Figure 3.1 shows that project outcomes are operationalized into cost performance 
(Y1), time performance (Y2), quality performance (Y31) and client’s satisfaction (Y32). 
These indicators are reviewed below.  
 
3.4.1 Cost performance (Y1) 
Table 3.1 presents the measurements of project cost performance and its description. 
Among these, the measurement of comparing contract cost to the final cost was 
preferred since it could represent the project cost performance across different 
categories of projects.  
 
Besides the measurements of cost performance, Table 3.2 shows that both Likert 
scale and specific metrics have employed in past studies. However, for the scale with 
unequal intervals (e.g., Molenaar et al., 1999; and Chan et al., 2001), the mean of all 
responses seems less meaningful since it would trim the raw data inappropriately. 
 
An objective way to measure cost performance is to compare actual cost to the budget. 
To ascertain cost performance, respondents were asked to provide information on 
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construction contract sum and final construction cost. Using these, the cost 
performance could be assessed. It was recognized that some respondents were 
unwilling to reveal contract sum. Respondents were therefore allowed to indicate the 
percentage difference between contract sum and final contract cost. 
 
Table 3.1: Measurements of cost performance 
Constructs Description References 
Overall project cost 
Final out-turn cost for overall 
project including infrastructure  
Ahadzie et al., 2008 
Cost performance of 
service  
Actual versus budget 
Ling et al., 2006; 2008; 2009; 
Chan et al., 2001; Chua et al., 
1997; Luu et al., 2008 
Unit cost (dollars/m
2
)  Final project cost/area/index  
Konchar and Sanvido, 1998; 
Ling et al., 2002; Ling, 2004 
Cost growth (%) 
[(final project cost-contract 
cost)/contract project cost]* 100  
Konchar and Sanvido, 1998; 





Unit cost of design and 
construction work put in place in a 
facility per unit time (unit cost/total 
time)  
Konchar and Sanvido, 1998; 
Ling et al., 2002 
Budget performance 
The project is completed at or 
under the contracted cost  





Final cost*100/Initial cost where 





denotes it is used for public projects  
 
Table 3.2: Measurement scales of cost performance 
Measurement scale References 
>10%, 10%-6%, 6%-3%, 3% - -3%, -3% - -10%, -10%> Chua et al., 1997 
>5%, 5%-3%, 2%-1%, on budget, -1%>- -2%, -3% - -5%, 
<-5% 
Molenaar et al., 1999 
>5%; cost same as budget; <-5% 
Ling et al., 2006; 2008; 
2009 
≥10%, 10%-6%, 6%-1%, 1%>, 0 Chan et al., 2001 
Likert scale, like 5-point or 7-point 






 denotes it is used for public projects 
 
3.4.2 Time performance (Y2) 
Table 3.3 shows that time performance can be measured in many ways. Among these, 
percentage difference between actual and planned time was selected for this study as 
it is an accurate way to measure time performance.  
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Like the review of cost performance, scales of time performance were also pooled 
(see Table 3.4). By virtue of the argument in selecting scale of cost performance, the 
way to ask respondents to provide planned duration and actual duration appears more 
accurate to assess time performance. It was thus adopted in this study.  
 
Table 3.3: Measurements of time performance 
Constructs Descriptions References 
Overall project 
duration 
Time taken to complete entire project including 
provision of infrastructure  




Actual versus planned 






Area/(as-built construction end date-as built 
construction start date)  
Konchar and Sanvido, 
1998; Ling et al., 





Area/total time  




[(Total Time -Total As-Planned Time)/total 
As-Planned Time]*100  
Konchar and Sanvido, 
1998; Ling et al., 
2002; Ling, 2004 
Schedule 
performance 
The project is completed on or before the 
contracted finish date  








Actual duration*100/programmed duration 
where the programmed duration span from the 
agreed construction commencement date to the 





Discounted construction time/(revised 
construction time)*100  
Luu et al., 2008 
Note: 
#
 denotes it is used for public projects  
 
Table 3.4: Measurement scales of time performance 
Measurement scale  References  
>5%; finish on time; -5%> 
Ling et al., 2006; 2008; 
2009 
≥10%, 10%-6%, 6%-1%, 1%>, 0% Chan et al., 2001 
>6%, 5%-3%, 2%-1%, on budget, -1% - -2%, -3% - -5%, 
-6%> 
Molenaar et al., 1999 





denotes it is used for public projects  
 
3.4.3 Quality performance (Y31) 
Table 3.5 presents the different ways used to assess quality performance. Among 
these, product quality was preferred since it could represent the project quality rather 
than individual’s quality performance. Therefore, this study operationalizes quality 
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performance as: product/output quality of the facility (1=expectations not met, 
3=expectations met, 5=exceed expectations).  
 
Table 3.5: Measurements of quality performance 
Descriptions References 
Output quality of your service e.g., technical quality, 
workmanship quality, architectural quality, functional 
quality. 
Ling et al., 2006; 2008^ 
Turnover quality (ease of starting up and extent of call 
backs)  
Ling et al., 2002^; 
System quality (performance of building elements, interior 
space and environment); 
Ling et al., 2002^; 
Equipment quality (performance of equipments)  Ling et al., 2002^; 
Both workmanship and product Cox et al., 2003; 
Defects; quality issues at available for use; quality Issues at 
end of defect rectification period  
The KPI Working Group, 2000 
Meets specifications; the completed project meets or 
exceeds all technical performance specifications provided 
by owner  
Songer and Molenaar, 1997
 #
. 
High quality of workmanship: the completed project meets 
or exceeds the accepted standards of workmanship in all 
areas  
Songer and Molenaar, 1997
 #
. 
The degree of quality management system performance Luu et al., 2008^ 
Note: #denotes it is used for public projects; ^denotes Likert scale 
 
3.4.4 Client’s satisfaction (Y32) 
In addition to the triple project objectives, satisfaction was adopted to be another 
outcome criterion (e.g., Molenaar et al., 1999; Chan and Chan, 2004; Muller and 
Turner, 2007) (see Table 3.6). Satisfaction may be from the point of view of: 
ender-users (Chan and Chan, 2004; Müller and Turner, 2007); design team (Chan and 
Chan, 2004); supplier (Muller and Turner, 2007); construction team (Chan and Chan, 
2004); customer satisfaction (Muller and Turner, 2007); other stakeholders (Muller 
and Turner, 2007); and public/community (Ling et al., 2009). Overlap may exist in 
these measurements. For instance, stakeholder satisfaction indicated by Baccarini 
(1999) may incorporate user satisfaction. Although this study did not explicitly 
measure safety performance, it is realized that project safety performance is an 
important consideration in client’s satisfaction.  
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Given the difficulty in obtaining a comprehensive response from end-users, all the 
stakeholders or participants in the project, respondents were requested to rate their 
perception of the client’s satisfaction with the project. Hence, this construct is 
operationalized as client satisfaction (1=expectations not met, 3=expectations met, 
5=exceed expectations). 
 
Table 3.6: Measurements of satisfaction 
Constructs Descriptions 
Public satisfaction  Satisfaction on the project (Ling et al., 2009^).  
Client’s 
satisfaction 
Satisfaction on services: cooperation with the owner; organization and 
administration at site; a sense of responsibility; the provision of solution 
to solve defective works (Ling et al., 2002^; Luu et al., 2008^).  
Satisfaction on product: construction schedule performance; 
construction quality; aesthetic of construction products; construction 
materials and equipment (Luu et al., 2008^).  
Satisfaction product – standard; satisfaction service – standard criteria 
headline; satisfaction – client-specified criteria (The KPI Working 
Group, 2000). 
Minimizes construction aggravation: the construction process does not 




Owner satisfaction; administration burden; conform to the user’s 
expectations (Molenaar et al., 1999^). 
Stakeholder’s 
satisfaction 





Satisfaction on time, cost, quality of design and quality of workmanship 
(Chan et al., 2001a^).  
Satisfaction on profit, getting new orders and learning possibilities 
(Westerveld, 2003).  
Users’ satisfaction 
Users are concerned with their overall influence in the project and 
functionality of the end product (Westerveld, 2003).  
The completed project meets or exceeds the user’s envisioned functional 
goals (fitness for purpose) (Songer and Molenaar, 1997
#
). 
Note: #denotes it is used on public projects; ^denotes use of Likert scale 
 
3.5 Relationship Quality (Z)  
Figure 3.1 shows adoption of relational transaction practices (X) is expected to 
enhance relationship quality among contracting parties (Z). Relationship quality 
refers to the networks created by inter-firm partnerships of groups of firms, indicating 




Past studies proposed that good relationship is an objective for adopting relational 
transactions (Dubois and Gadde, 2000; Yeung et al., 2009; Radziszewska-Zielina, 
2010). While most public clients have close working relationships with regulatory 
agencies (Minchin et al., 2010), they have relationship gaps with their private 
partners (e.g., Gibb and Isack, 2001; Smyth and Edkins, 2007). This might be because 
private parties are mostly profit oriented, whereas public clients are very conservative 
in commercial relationships due to the involvement of public funds. 
 
Poor relationships (i.e., arm’s-length relationships) are cold and atomistic, and actors 
are motivated by instrumental profit seeking (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). In contrast, 
good relationships (i.e., embedded relationships) embed the transaction into the social 
attachment (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). As this study targets three parties (i.e., public 
clients, main contractors and lead consultants) in public projects, the quality of 
relationship refers to the strength of the relationship between: (i) client and contractor 
(Z1); (ii) consultant and contractor (Z2); and (iii) client and consultant (Z3). 
 
3.6 Drivers for Adopting Relational Transactions (C) 
3.6.1 Drivers for adopting RC practices (C1) 
Figure 3.1 shows that six drivers may motivate contracting parties to adopt RC 
practices. These are better cost outcome, better time outcome, better quality, 
increased satisfaction, meeting clients’ requirements and increased competitiveness. 
These constructs are operationalized below.  
 
3.6.1.1 Better cost outcome (C1-1) 
Parties adopt RC practices because of the aim to accomplish better cost (e.g., Larson, 
1995; Chan et al., 2008). RC Practices can give rise to a reduction in total project cost 
because partners are able to purchase at the lowest possible cost (Beach et al., 2005) 
and control cost more effectively (Larson, 1995; Chan et al., 2008). Based on a 
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European case, Kumaraswamy and Matthews (2000) found that despite longer and 
costlier selection process, subcontractors’ pricing levels were reduced by about 10% 
due to the efficiency arising from the partnering.  
 
RC practices also give rise to better cost outcome through the reduction of risks 
(Cheatham, 2004; Akintoye and Main, 2007). Cheatham (2004) argued that under 
collaborative arrangements parties have mutual interests in sharing and spreading 
risks associated with long-term contracts.  
 
Better cost outcome is operationalized as the reduction of total project cost (Akintoye 
and Main, 2007) (C1), the reduction of risks or the mitigation of their influence (Li et 
al., 2001) (C2), and the reduction of the cost of changing partners (Black et al., 2000) 
(C3). 
 
3.6.1.2 Better time outcome (C1-2) 
Contracting parties are motivated to adopt RC practices since they hope to achieve 
better time outcome (e.g., Akintoye and Main, 2007; Bresnen and Marshall, 2000c). 
Based on a study of 280 construction projects, Larson (1995) found that 
partnership-based projects reaped better results in time performance compared with 
those projects managed in an adversarial manner. The adoption of RC practices 
would facilitate the development of an easier and smoother decision-making process 
(Chan et al., 2008). Timely response and fast decision making process in public 
projects tend to reduce clients’ administration burden. Better time outcome is 
operationalized as the reduction in time needed to deliver the project (Black et al., 





3.6.1.3 Better quality (C1-3) 
Contracting parties that adopt RC practices are motivated by the benefits of better 
quality product (Black et al., 2000; Chan et al., 2003a). The improved performance 
can be attributed to superior design (Black et al., 2000), fast response to technology 
changes (Akintoye and Main, 2007), improved buildability (Bresnen and Marshall, 
2000c), improved design (Chan et al., 2003a) and better safety performance (Chan et 
al., 2003a). Better quality performance is thus operationalized as the improvement in 
the quality of project (Black et al., 2000) (C6), improvement in the design (Black et 
al., 2000) (C7) and the achievement of better safety performance (Chan et al., 2003a) 
(C8). 
 
3.6.1.4 Increased satisfaction (C1-4) 
Contracting parties that adopt RC practices are driven by the increased satisfaction 
(e.g., Akintoye and Main, 2007; Chan et al., 2003a). Besides, contracting parties 
adopt RC practices with the aim to achieve higher efficiency of resource utilization 
(Black et al., 2000) and to design an integrated problem solving arrangement (Chan et 
al., 2003a). The use of an integrated solution allows conflicts to be resolved in a 
smooth manner and help to cultivate a collaborative culture (Akintoye and Main, 
2007). Consequently, contracting parties would be more satisfied with the results.  
 
The satisfaction related motivation is operationalized as the maximization of resource 
utilization (Black et al., 2000) (C9), the response to a collaborative culture in a 
project (Akintoye and Main, 2007) (C10) and the provision of an integrated solution 
to improve efficiency (Chan et al., 2003a) (C11).  
 
3.6.1.5 Meeting clients’ requirements (C1-5) 
Contracting parties adopt RC practices because of the responsiveness to users’ 
requirements (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000c) and clients’ requirements (Akintoye and 
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Main, 2007). Akintoye and Main’s (2007) study discovered that the most important 
reason identified by contractors for a collaborative relationship is its impacts on the 
response to a client’s need. Likewise, Swan and Khalfan (2007:119) summed up the 
key driver as “because they have been told to”.  
 
The growth of partnerships within the public sector has been driven by policies from 
central governments, for example, in countries such as Australia, Denmark, and the 
UK (Ng et al., 2002; Kadefors et al., 2007; Eriksson et al., 2008). Meeting clients’ 
requirements is thus operationalized as the response to public needs (Akintoye and 
Main, 2007) (C12). 
 
3.6.1.6 Increased competitiveness (C1-6) 
Contracting parties adopt relational approaches with the aim to increase 
competitiveness (e.g., Love et al., 2002; Lu and Yan, 2007). Lu and Yan (2007:166) 
found that “to increase bidding advantages” and “to improve long-term competitive 
advantages” are the top two partnering incentives. The competitiveness related 
motive is operationalized as the response to competitors’ actions (Akintoye and Main, 
2007) (C13), the improvement in an organization’s competency (Black et al., 2000) 
(C14), and the enhancement of an organization’s reputation (Ross, 2003) (C15). 
 
3.6.2 Drivers for adopting network strategies (C2)  
Figure 3.1 shows that three drivers are expected to influence the adoption of network 
strategies. These are better relationships, future relationships and facilitating 





3.6.2.1 Better relationships (C2-1) 
Contracting parties adopt network strategies because of the aim to improve 
relationship quality (e.g., Dubois and Gadde, 2000; Radziszewska-Zielina 2010). 
Better relationships could further produce project-based benefits (Black et al., 2000). 
The construct of better relationships is operationalized as the reduction of disputes 
during a project (Dubois and Gadde, 2000) (C16) and the building of closer 
relationships with contracting parties (Black et al., 2000) (C17). 
 
3.6.2.2 Future relationships (C2-2) 
Contracting parties that adopt network strategies are driven by the expectation of 
having future cooperation. The expectation of future relationships can affect current 
transactional behaviors, even relationships in certain projects are confined to the 
contract duration (e.g., Tempest and Starkey, 2004; Levin et al., 2010). Black et al. 
(2000) found that this impact of future relationships on current behaviors would be 
differently perceived by different parties. Contractors and consultants, for example, 
believed that they should build good relationships with clients when they are fairly 
dependent on a client for business. Securing a long-term relationship with this client 
would enhance the possibility of securing future contracts (Black et al., 2000). 
However, clients do not believe that consultants and contractors should enter into 
partnerships with them to maintain a long term business relationship as they “prefer 
the traditional power they have over their suppliers” (Black et al., 2000:431). The 
future relationship related motive is operationalized as the seizing of new market 
opportunities (Black et al., 2000) (C18) and the achievement of continuity for past 
relationships (Dubois and Gadde, 2000) (C19). 
 
3.6.2.3 Facilitating innovation efficiency (C2-3) 
The adoption of network strategies in projects might be attributed to the purpose to 
facilitate innovation efficiency. Embedded networks promote creativity by facilitating 
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common identity, promoting free exchange of knowledge, thereby accessing to new 
technology and reducing the costs of acquiring knowledge (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; 
Akintoye and Main, 2007). However, Dubois and Gadde (2000) stated that little 
benefits could be gained from shared learning if the relationship is confined to the 
duration of a single project. This is common in the construction sector, because 
projects are temporary in nature. As a consequence, contracting parties might reduce 
their enthusiasm in adopting network strategies to enhance innovation efficiency. The 
driver of facilitating innovation efficiency is operationalized as the response to 
technology changes (Akintoye and Main, 2007) (C20) and the facilitation of creative 
and innovative approaches (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) (C21). 
 
3.7 Barriers to Adopting Relational Transactions (D) 
Figure 3.1 shows that the adoption of relational transaction practices may also 
simultaneously face nine obstacles. These are reviewed below.  
 
3.7.1 Barriers to RC practices (D1) 
Figure 3.1 shows that six barriers might impede the adoption of RC practices. These 
are: (i) lack of background in RC practices, (ii) uneven level of commitment, (iii) 
misalignment among contracting parties, (iv) adversarial environment among 
contracting parties, (v) cost and time to conduct RC practices; and (vi) resistance to 
changes. These are operationalized below. 
 
3.7.1.1 Lack of background in RC practices (D1-1) 
A lack of background in RC practices would undermine the effectiveness of RC 
practices. A lack of RC experience, for example, engenders a negative impact on RC 
success (Chan et al., 2003b). Two situations may be the reflection for the lack of RC 
experience. First, people have never adopted RC practices before and therefore not 
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seen the full impact of RC practices (Akintoye et al., 2000). Second, people who have 
the relevant experience but do not fully understand RC practices (Glagola and Sheedy, 
2002). Both might cause RC practices to be incorrectly applied and hence probably 
contribute to the failure of the project.  
 
Past adversarial relationships and experiences also hinder the current implementation 
of RC practices (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002). Failure to reap benefits from past RC 
experiences may lead to ego and self-interest in the present project (Glagola and 
Sheedy, 2002). The lack of background in RC practices is operationalized as the lack 
of knowledge of relational approaches (Kumaraswamy et al., 2005) (D1), the lack of 
training and guidance in a relational arrangement (Ng et al., 2002) (D2), past negative 
experience of a relational arrangement (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002) (D3), misgivings 
about future relationships (Akintoye and Main, 2000) (D4) and the lack of experience 
in relational arrangements (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002) (D5). 
 
3.7.1.2 Uneven levels of commitment (D1-2) 
A lack of commitment to RC practices is detrimental to the use of RC practices (Cook 
and Hancher, 1990). For example, unenthusiastic participation in RC practices 
contribute to RC failure (e.g., Drexler and Larson, 2000; Ng et al., 2002), like failure 
to perform as expected in preset arrangements (Ng et al., 2002) and an unwillingness 
to compromise (Akintoye and Main, 2000; Drexler and Larson, 2000). Clients’ 
unwillingness to initiate RC development might force the contract into the traditional 
adversarial route (e.g., Hayford and Utz, 2002; Ng et al., 2002).  
 
A lack of top management support also impedes the adoption of RC practices 
(Akintoye et al., 2000; Eriksson et al., 2008). It would deter individual decision 
maker from trying new approaches regardless of the potential advantages (Eriksson et 
49 
al., 2008). As the top management commitment wanes, the commitment at the project 
level follows suit (Akintoye et al., 2000).  
 
A lack of acceptance of relational approaches as a long term way to do business is 
also a barrier to adopting RC practices (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000b; Ng et al., 
2002). This lack of acceptance would further have a negative effect on parties’ 
commitment levels and lead to passive participation in the implementation of RC 
practices. 
 
Uneven levels of commitment is operationalized as the unenthusiastic participation of 
contracting parties (Eriksson et al., 2008) (D6), the lack of top management support 
(Akintoye et al., 2000) (D7), the lack of acceptance by contracting parties of 
relational approaches as a long-term way of doing business (Ng et al., 2002) (D8), 
and the lack of client's initiative in RC practices (Akintoye et al., 2000) (D9). 
 
3.7.1.3 Misalignment among project team members (D1-3) 
A lack of common goals is a barrier to the implementation of RC practices (Glagola 
and Sheedy, 2002), such as the goals of the client are substantially different from 
those of the contractor (Cook and Hancher, 1990) and self-interest of each party 
(Drexler and Larson, 2000; Packham et al., 2003). A lack of common goals would 
lead contracting parties to pursue their own objectives regardless of the overall 
project performance which might lead to conflicts. As a result of conflicts, 
relationships would worsen. Misalignment among project team members is 
operationalized as the lack of common goals among contracting parties (Drexler and 





3.7.1.4 Adversarial environment among project team members (D1-4) 
Adversarial environment impedes the implementation of RC practices. For example, 
inter-personal clash would impede RC practices (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008). 
This clash may occur because of an extreme position dominated by self-interest 
(Drexler and Larson, 2000) and indifference (Drexler and Larson, 2000; Glagola and 
Sheedy, 2002). As a consequence of the cultural clash, conflicts might easily take 
place, which would further inhibit the formation of unwritten agreement among 
contracting parties.  
 
Opportunistic behaviors of one or more contracting parties are a barrier to RC 
practices (Kumaraswamy et al., 2005a; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008). Relying 
heavily on extensive and formal contracts may increase opportunism, since the 
standard contracts are too rigid and do not emphasize collaboration and sharing of 
responsibilities and risks (Lazar, 2000; Eriksson et al., 2008). This would result in 
higher transaction cost incurred by monitoring each party closely.  
 
Adversarial culture is also an impediment to RC practices (e.g., Bresnen and Marshall, 
2000c). The adversarial culture might emerge from the parties’ incompatible culture 
and adversarial attitudes (e.g., Eriksson et al., 2008; 2009; Ng et al., 2002). 
Adversarial culture would lead contracting parties to work against each other, 
pursuing their own objectives which might be inconsistent with the overall project 
targets.  
 
This construct is operationalized as inter-personal/cultural clash (Ng et al., 2002) 
(D11), concerns about the opportunistic behaviors of other contracting parties 
(Kumaraswamy et al., 2005) (D12), and incompatible organizational cultures among 
the contracting parties (Ng et al., 2002) (D13). 
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3.7.1.5 Cost and time to conduct RC (D1-5) 
Additional cost is incurred in practicing RC practices, which is one of the reasons to 
avoid use of RC practices. Money needs to be spent to establish, develop and 
maintain the collaborative relationships (Ross, 2003). Glagola and Sheedy (2002) 
indicated that the cost of partnering is approximately 0.15% of the total project cost, 
according to a survey by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Public projects that need 
to achieve transparency would have difficulties in justifying the additional expense 
incurred. 
 
Additional time needed in implementing RC practices is a barrier to the adoption of 
RC practices (Cook and Hancher, 1990). A significant amount of time is required to 
find right partners, build the team, establish and implement procedures and rules 
(Cook and Hancher, 1990). Personnel in each party also need to spend time on 
nurturing close working relationships between each other. An integrative and 
collaborative culture is difficult to be cultivated without these efforts. This construct 
is operationalized as the high cost in adopting relational approaches (Glagola and 
Sheedy, 2002) (D14) and the time required to develop a relationship (Cook and 
Hancher, 1990) (D15). 
 
3.7.1.6 Resistance to changes (D1-6) 
Compared to the private sector, the public sector shows greater reluctance to rapid 
changes (Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000), which might deter them from 
embracing RC practices. Public clients usually prefer to the traditional routines even 
if they agree with the RC practices in principle (Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 
2000; Clifton et al., 2004; Læ dre et al., 2006). This construct is operationalized as 
“conservative industry culture inhibits changes and encourages preservation of the 
status quo” (Clifton et al., 2004) (D16). 
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3.7.2 Barriers to network embeddedness (D2) 
Figure 3.1 shows that three barriers might inhibit network strategies. These are lack 
of trust, one-off nature of projects and adherence to rules and codes of conducts. 
These are operationalized below. 
 
3.7.2.1 Lack of trust (D2-1) 
A lack of trust is a serious barrier for collaborative relationships (e.g., Drexler and 
Larson, 2000; Akintoye and Main, 2007). Once trust has been broken, it would be 
difficult to salvage the relationship (Drexler and Larson, 2000). It would then inhibit 
project success (Packham et al., 2003). 
 
A lack of mutual trust might be due to a lack of empowerment (Ng et al., 2002). A 
lack of empowerment on part of the client’s representatives would also inhibit 
efficiency of the problem resolution process (Ng et al., 2002). The inefficiency in 
problem solving process might further hamper the commitment of contracting parties. 
This construct is operationalized as the lack of empowerment in the client's 
representatives (Ng et al., 2002) (D17) and the lack of trust among contracting parties 
(Akintoye and Main, 2007) (D18). 
 
3.7.2.2 One-off nature of projects (D2-2) 
Many clients demand built products irregularly. This lack of continuity of 
relationships frequently undermines attempts to secure the full benefits of 
collaboration (Tookey et al., 2001). Packham et al., (2003) noted that relational 
transactions are unlikely to have a significant impact upon the decisions of suppliers 
unless they are convinced by the fact that the adoption of relational transactions can 
improve their chances of survival. Hence, clients would face more constraints in 
implementing relational approaches if they only demand for projects on an occasional 
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basis. The construct is therefore operationalized as “client only has occasional need 
for project development” (Packham et al., 2003) (D19). 
 
3.7.2.3 Adherence to rules and codes of conduct (D2-3) 
The public sector needs to adhere to numerous codes of conduct (Ng et al., 2002), 
stringent public rules, regulations and laws (e.g. Ross, 2003; Minchin et al., 2010). It 
also has accountability concerns (Ross, 2003), which should be managed carefully. 
Public procurement legislation mainly aims to facilitate competition and non-biased 
procurement decisions, which are often seen as working against collaborative 
relationships (Ng et al., 2002; Eriksson et al., 2008). 
 
Due to these pre-set regulations, public clients would face relatively more constraints 
on the form and substance of their internal operations and contractual relationships 
(e.g., Crowley and Karim, 1995; Chan et al., 2001b). Within the internal organization, 
public sector would be burdened by a tedious stepwise decision-making system 
(Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). Their organizational boundaries are usually 
rigid and impermeable since employees and their departments have well-defined 
jurisdictions, responsibilities and a hierarchy of authority (Crowley and Karim, 1995).  
 
In addition to the internal restrictions, contracting parties may spawn on close 
relationship activities with their partners because of the avoidance of possible 
allegations of corruption. There is a possibility that a close relationship may lead to 
decisions being made in an unfair and unethical manner (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002).  
 
Adherence to rules and codes of conduct is operationalized as public sector 
accountability concerns (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b) (D20), bureaucratic 
public client organization (Ng et al., 2002) (D21), stringent public rules, regulations 
and laws (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b) (D22), and the need to avoid possible 
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allegations of corruption arising from close relationships between the client and other 
contracting parties (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002) (D23). 
 
3.8 Public Project Procurement and Management  
Construction projects may be initiated by private clients or the public sector. This 
study focuses on public construction projects. Past studies showed that the public 
sector faces more challenges than private sector clients in an attempt to adopt 
relational transactions. This might because the project procurement and management 
routes in public sector are different from the private sector, like adherence to 
regulations and strict project delivery principles. 
 
3.8.1 Adhere to rules and regulations 
Public project procurement and management are constrained by preset rules, 
regulations and statute. In general, government procurement activities in Singapore 
are decentralized to individual ministries, departments and statutory boards (Jones, 
2002). However, they must conform to central procurement guidelines issued by the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF). MOF is entitled to establish regulations regarding a wide 
scope of procurement aspects, such as the prequalification and awarding procedures 
or the technical specifications for procurement. The strict rules and regulations in 
public procurements have been devised because of the fear of cronyism and other 
corruption practices to which the Singapore government is resolutely opposed (Jones, 
2002). Yet, the emphasis on strict rules also precludes the adoption of collaborative 
procurement in Singapore’s public sector (Jones, 2002).  
 
The strict adhere to rule and regulations also create an opportunity to embrace more 
relational transaction practices in the public sector. For example, the public sector 
faces enormous pressure to deliver high performance projects as tax payers’ money is 
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involved in public projects. This pressure might force public clients to seek for 
various solutions to improve project outcomes. Relational transactions, advocated as 
an effective approach to improve project outcomes, may indicate strong interests to 
the public sector. This may is an opportunity to attract public clients to adopt 
relational transactions. In addition, the public sector may also have the advantage of 
disseminating the successful experience into the whole industry, which may facilitate 
the diffusion of relational transactions (Kumaraswamy et al., 2005). 
 
3.8.2 Strict project delivery principles 
Three principles, namely fairness, openness and competitiveness, are fundamental for 
Singapore government procurement policies (MOF, 2011). The key principles 
governing Government Procurement are: transparency; open and fair competition; 
and value for money (MOF, 2011).  
 
Several measures are adopted to widen the scope for competition and to enhance 
transparency for the public procurement. For example, government procurements in 
Singapore are made through the online Government Electronic Business (GeBIZ) 
platform, where procurement information and documentation are publicized. The use 
of open competition may be because there are a limited range of local suppliers for 
certain goods and services, thereby expelling government procurement entities to 
outsource among overseas suppliers (Jones, 2002).  
 
All government procurement of above S$70,000 must adopt tendering procedures in 
Singapore. Three methods are available: (i) open; (ii) selective or (iii) limited 
tendering procedures. Under an open tender, any supplier may participate by 
responding to Tender Notices. An open or selective tender will be called unless the 
circumstances allow for a limited tender to be called. The use of a Limited Tender has 
to be approved by the Permanent Secretary (for Ministries) or the CEO (for a 
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statutory board). A limited tender may be used in the following instances: (i) when no 
responsive tender is received from an earlier open or selective tender; (ii) when it 
concerns national security; or (iii) when it is not feasible/practical to call for open 
tenders (e.g., because of intellectual property rights or for works of art) (GeBIZ, 
2011). 
 
Open competition for procurement contracts enables all tenders who have the 
capacity to provide goods and services required to compete on equal terms with each 
other (Jones, 2002). Owing to a limited range of suppliers available locally for certain 
goods and services, the public sector is impelled to out-source amongst overseas 
suppliers, which would be more effectively undertaken through competitive tendering 
(Jones, 2002). 
 
Any construction firm wishing to undertake public projects in Singapore must register 
with the BCA under Contractors Registry System (CRS) (BCA, 2010). There are 
seven major registration categories, namely Construction Workhead (CW), 
Construction Related Workhead (CR), Mechanical & Electrical Workhead (ME), 
Maintenance Workhead (MW), Supply Head (SY), Trade Head (TR) and Regulatory 
Workhead (RW) (BCA, 2013a). Four requisites are essential for the registration, 
which are track record and performance, financial capacity, personal resources and 
company status with the Accounting & Corporate Regulatory Authority (BCA, 
2013a). Under each category, firms are placed under “work heads” indicating the type 
of work they have the capability to undertake and financial grades denoting their 
tendering limits.  
 
Contractors who wish to undertake both public and private construction projects need 
to be licensed, according to the Building Control (Amendment) Act 2007. The 
Licensing of Builders Scheme is part of BCA’s long-term plan to upgrade the safety 
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and quality standards of the construction sector. The aim of licensing of builders is to 
raise professionalism among builders by requiring them to meet minimum standards 
of management, safety record and financial solvency (BCA, 2010). 
 
Firms that wish to provide consultancy services to public works should first be 
emplaced on the list of Public Sector Panels of Consultants (PSPC). This list is 
categorized by different disciplines (i.e., Architectural, Civil and Structural, 
Mechanical and Electrical, Quantity Surveying and Project Management) and 
different project cost ranges (BCA, 2013b).  
 
Value for money does not necessarily mean that a tender must be awarded to the 
lowest bidder (MOF, 2011). It requires a holistic approach. A Price-Quality Method 
(PQM) is adopted to assess the builders in the tendering for public projects. Public 
clients have the flexibility to: (i) adopt a price:quality ratio of between 80:20 and 
60:40 (with safety making up a minimum of 10% of the quality points); (ii) select the 
relevant quality attributes; and (iii) determine their relative weightings. The quality 
attributes comprise: (i) past and/or on-going project performance; (ii) relevant track 
record; and (iii) project-specific requirements.  
 
In addition, Quality-Fee selection Method (QFM) is adopted in conjunction with the 
PSPC for the evaluation of building and construction consultancy tenders in the 
public sector (BCA, 2013b). It is primarily quality-based with a higher weightage 
given for quality. The Q/F weighting ranges from 60/40 to 80/20. Besides the overall 
quality:fee weightages, the weightages of the various quality criteria could be made 
known at tender stage. Quality scoring will be carried out before fee proposals are 
opened (BCA, 2013b). 
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3.9 Gaps in Knowledge  
The first knowledge gap is that it is still not known whether public projects can 
benefit from relational transactions and close relationships (knowledge gap 1). 
Formal contracts contain fairly explicit stipulations of proscribed and prescribed 
behaviors and risk allocation (Macneil, 1978) (see Section 2.2). However, Macneil’s 
(2000a) Relational Contracts theory and Granovetter’s (1985) Network 
Embeddedness theory state that contracts involve relationship exchanges rather than 
the feature of “sharp in” and “sharp out” in the transaction. Prior studies have found 
that relational transactions have a positive relationships with project outcomes
 
(e.g., 
Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a; 2012; Chinowsky et al., 2008; Ling and Li, 
2012). These empirical studies, yet, mainly investigated projects in general, without 
differentiating project types (i.e., whether public or private projects). In reality, the 
scenario faced by contracting parties in public projects differs from that in private 
projects due to the characteristics of public project procurement and management (see 
Section 3.8). Hitherto, the research on relational transactions in public projects is still 
piecemeal and anecdotal.  
 
The second knowledge gap is that it is still not known which relational transaction 
practices could contribute to good relationship quality (knowledge gap 2). The use of 
open tenders to procure services and products in public projects means that there is no 
guarantee for future relationships, even when partners have been embedded within 
the same network (see Section 3.8). The potential discontinuity in relationships may 
cause partners to act in an atomized manner, which is a deterrent to relationship 
development. However, there is little information about how to cultivate embedded 
networks through relational transactions in public projects.  
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The third knowledge gap is that it is still not known which barriers and drivers have 
significant impacts on the adoption of relational transactions in public projects 
(knowledge gap 3). Sections 3.6 and 3.7 show that the drivers of and barriers to 
relational transactions have been studied on construction projects in general without 
distinguishing between public and private projects (see Section 3.8). Hitherto, there is 
still little information about the drivers of and barriers to relational transactions in 
public projects.  
 
The last knowledge gap is that it is still not known whether this difference in different 
parties’ perceptions of factors motivating and deterring relational transaction in 
public projects is significant (knowledge gap 4). Despite the potential benefits, the 
public sector likely faces more difficulties in adopting relational transactions 
(Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). On the contrary, private parties’ boundaries are 
more flexible and permeable, making it more suitable for close cooperation in 
relational transactions (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). This might indicate that 
contracting parties in a public project may differ in the attitude towards the adoption 
of relational transactions. However, there is still little information about comparing 
different parties’ perceptions of the factors motivating and deterring relational 
transactions in public projects.  
 
In the context of Singapore, fieldwork was therefore undertaken to fill the knowledge 
gaps identified, which specifically investigated: (i) whether relationship quality could 
give rise to better project outcomes; (ii) to what extent relational transaction practices 
can lead to better outcomes and relationship quality; (iii) the drivers of and barriers to 
adopting relational transactions in public projects; and (iv) the difference in different 
parties’ perception of factors motivating and deterring relational transactions in 




Based on the literature review, conceptual framework (see Figure 3.1), knowledge 
gap (see Section 3.9), research questions (see Section 1.2) and research objectives 
(see Section 1.3), the research hypotheses are set out. Table 3.7 explains the link 
between these. 
 
Table 3.7: Linking research questions, objectives and knowledge gaps 






“Which are the factors that 
will significantly motivate or 
inhibit relational transaction 
practices in public projects?”  
1. identify the drivers of 
and the barriers to 
adopting relational 
transactions in public 
projects;  
 
It is not known which barriers 
and drivers have significant 
impacts on the adoption of 
relational transactions in public 
projects (knowledge gap 3).  
“Do contracting parties have 
significantly different 
perceptions of the factors 
motivating and deterring 
relational transactions in 
public projects?”  
2. compare different 
parties’ perceptions of 
the factors motivating 
and deterring relational 
transactions in public 
projects;  
 
It is not known whether there is 
significant difference in different 
parties’ perceptions of factors 
motivating and deterring 
relational transaction in public 
projects (knowledge gap 4). 
“Can public projects benefit 
from good relationships 
among contracting parties?”  
3. examine whether 
relationship quality could 
give rise to better project 
outcomes;  
It is not known whether public 
projects can benefit from 
relational transactions and close 
relationships (knowledge gap 1). 
“To what extent can 
relational transactions 
contribute to better public 
project outcomes?”  
4. explore to what extent 
relational transaction 
practices can lead to 
better project outcomes  
It is not known whether public 
projects can benefit from 
relational transactions and close 
relationships (knowledge gap 1). 
“Which are the relational 
transaction practices that can 
help to establish good 
relationships in public 
projects?” 
4. explore to what extent 
relational transaction 
practices can lead to 
better relationship quality 
It is not known which relational 
transaction practices could 
contribute to good relationship 
quality (knowledge gap 2).  
 
To address the knowledge 1, it is hypothesized that (see Table 3.8 column 2 to 4):  
“Public projects in which contracting parties adopt more relational 
transaction practices achieve significantly better outcomes than those 
that do not.” (See Table 3.8 column 2 to 4, H1.1 to H8.1, H1.2 to 
H8.2 and H1.3 to H8.3.) 
 
61 
“Public projects in which contracting parties have better 
relationships achieve significantly better outcomes than those that do 
not.” (See Table 3.8 the last row, H9.1, H9.2 and H9.3) 
 









Joint problem solving 
(PS) 
H1.1 (+) H1.2 (+) H1.3 (+) H1.4 (+) 
Information sharing (IS) H2.1 (+) H2.2 (+) H2.3 (+) H2.4 (+) 
Trust (TR) H3.1 (+) H3.2 (+) H3.3 (+) H3.4 (+) 
Contractual solidarity 
(SO) 
H4.1 (+) H4.2 (+) H4.3 (+) H4.4 (+) 
Propriety of means (PR) H5.1 (+) H5.2 (+) H5.3 (+) H5.4 (+) 
Harmonization within 
the social matrix (HM) 
H6.1 (+) H6.2 (+) H6.3 (+) H6.4 (+) 
Flexibility (FL) H7.1 (+) H7.2 (+) H7.3 (+) H7.4 (+) 
Role integrity (RI) H8.1 (+) H8.2 (+) H8.3 (+) H8.4 (+) 
Relationship quality (Z) H9.1 (+) H9.2 (+) H9.3 (+)  
Note: (+) denotes the hypothesized sign.  
 
To investigate knowledge gap 2, it is hypothesized that: 
“Greater adoption of relational transaction practices leads to 
significantly better relationship quality among contracting parties.” 
(see Table 3.8 column 5, H1.4 to H8.4). 
 
Based on knowledge gap 3, the hypotheses are set out: 
H10: there exist factors that significantly drive contracting parties 
to adopt relational transactions in public projects; and 
H11: there exist factors that significantly impede contracting 
parties from adopting relational transactions in public projects. 
 
In order to address knowledge gap 4 the hypotheses are set out: 
H12: contracting parties have significantly different perceptions of 
the drivers of adopting relational transactions in public projects. 
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H13: contracting parties have significantly different perceptions of 




This chapter centers on the establishment of the conceptual framework (see Figure 
3.1) and operationalization of constructs (see Sections 3.3 to 3.7). Relational 
transaction practices comprise three network strategies (i.e., joint problem solving 
(PS), information sharing (IS) and trust (TR)) and five RC related norms, namely 
contractual solidarity (SO), propriety of means (PR), harmonization within the social 
matrix (HM), role integrity (RI) and flexibility (FL) (see Section 3.3). The indicators 
of project outcomes derived comprise cost performance (Y1), time performance (Y2), 
quality performance (Y31) and client’s satisfaction (Y32) (see Section 3.4). Another 
variable obtained is the relationship quality among contracting parties at the end of 
the project (Z) (see Section 3.5). Besides, nines drivers of and nine barriers to 
relational transactions are also incorporated in the framework (see Sections 3.6 and 
3.7).  
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Chapter 4 Research Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter deals with research design, methods of data collection and data analysis 
techniques. A two-pronged research design was applied. Questionnaire-survey was 
initially applied to test hypotheses (see Sections 4.2 to 4.6), followed by 
interview-survey used to validate the statistical results (see Section 4.7).  
 
4.2 Research Design 
The first prong was a questionnaire survey. Given that the results regarding critical 
relational transaction practices, drivers and barriers are expected to be applicable to 
the whole population rather than to one specific project, survey is capable to achieve 
this. Survey could provide a quick and efficient way to obtain responses to explore 
particular issues (Tan, 2008). It is good at: (i) establishing the target phenomenon; (ii) 
detecting patterns among a huge amount of information; (iii) measuring the unique 
effects of factors (Babbie, 2002; Yang, 2010). The second prong of semi-structured 
interviews aimed to validate statistical results through qualitative data (see Section 
4.7). 
 
4.3 Data Collection Method  
Questionnaire survey was administrated to professionals who have had experience in 
public projects, particular to public clients, private consultants and contractors. They 
were requested to provide data of a completed public project that they had been 
involved in.  
 
The survey packages were sent out by mail (i.e., postal and email). The mail package 
contains: (i) a cover letter to explain the purpose of the research (see Appendix 1); (ii) 
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a self-administrated questionnaire (see Appendix 2); and (iii) a self-addressed and 
stamped envelope for returning the questionnaire (only in the postal survey package). 
To lessen resistance to the survey and motivate people to reply, respondents could 
request for a summary of the findings.  
 
Since response rate of mail survey is likely to be low, supplementary face-to-face 
interviews were also conducted. In order to facilitate the interviews, some strategies 
proposed by Babbie (2002) were adopted. These are: interviewers should be familiar 
with the questionnaire; they should follow question wording and record responses 
exactly; and they should try to probe for a response, especially when the respondents 
answer inappropriately (Babbie, 2002).  
 
4.4 Data Collection Instrument  
A structured questionnaire was designed as the data collection instrument. 
Close-ended questions can provide a uniformity of responses and are easily processed 
(Babbie, 2002). The complete questionnaire is shown in Appendix 2.  
 
To enhance questionnaire content validity and reliability, a pilot study was conducted 
before full scale questionnaire survey. Purposive sampling method was adopted to 
select interviewees (Babbie, 2002). Four practitioners who had experience in public 
projects in Singapore were targeted. The framework and objectives of this study were 
first introduced and another one week time was left to them. After this, a face-to-face 
interview was then carried out which enabled an instant feedback on the drawbacks of 
the questionnaire. Four participants expressed that the questionnaire is comprehensive 




4.5 Sampling  
Two possible ways were the candidates for selecting sample elements: selecting 
respondents who had experience in public projects before; or sampling public projects 
first and then approaching each party involved in the identified projects. Given the 
difficulties in contacting respondents from one completed case in the later way, the 
former approach was preferred to the latter. This approach was also used by other 
researchers in construction research domain (e.g., Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a; 
Chan et al., 2004).  
 
The population comprised public officials who had developed construction projects 
and private consultants and contractors who had designed and constructed public 
projects. Since there is no national registry of such official/firms, the size of the 
population is not known. The sampling frame for public officials was obtained from 
government directories categorized under estate development, planning and 
engineering. As the number of people in this group is not likely to be overwhelming, 
questionnaires were sent to all identified public officials.  
 
The sampling frames for private consultants and contractors were obtained from the 
respective professional and trade institutions. Architects, engineers, and quantity 
surveyors (QS) were randomly selected from the directories of the Singapore Institute 
of Architects, Association of Consulting Engineers Singapore, and Singapore Institute 
of Surveyors and Valuers, respectively. Contractors were randomly selected from the 
BCA’s database of Registered Contractors and Licensed Builders.  
 
The reason for adopting random sampling is that it enables each element to have an 
equal chance of selection independent of any other event (Babbie, 2002). This 
probability sampling could ensure that a sample of individuals from the sample frame 
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is likely to contain essentially the same variations that exist in the sample frame 
(Babbie, 2002).  
 
Probability sampling needs a good sampling frame. It would be ideal if every case to 
be studied is included in the list and all ineligible cases are excluded (Yang, 2010). 
As the private group included those who have not handled public projects before, the 
questionnaire clearly stated that only those who had completed public projects should 
fill up the questionnaire. It is worth noting that this study was not to investigate the 
projects which adopted an arrangement called relational transactions, but to probe 
into the extent to which relational transactions practices (see Sections 2.3.3 and 2.4.4) 
were implemented in public projects. 
 
Snowball sampling was adopted when conducting the face-to-face interviews. The 
selection of snowball sampling was because the introduction by acquaintances would 
remove respondents’ concerns and help to enhance response rate. However, it is 
worth noting that snowball sampling is a non-random means of obtaining samples, 
which may involve biases. Hence, the samples should be scrutinized and the data test 
for bias (Fellows and Liu, 2003).  
 
4.6 Data Analysis Techniques  
Data analysis began with the t test, followed by the Exploratory Factor Analysis 
(EFA) which aimed to extract latent factors from the significant drivers (C) of and 
barriers (D) to relational transactions. To test the hypothetical relationships among 
relational transactions (X), relationship quality (Z) and project outcomes (Y), Partial 
Least Squares-Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) was adopted. Prior to such 
three-step analysis, characteristics of the sample were first illustrated.  
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4.6.1 Assumptions of measurement scales and statistical techniques  
Owing to a debate over whether ordinal data can work with parametric methods, 
Jakobsson (2004) suggested examining the assumptions of the measurement scales 
and candidate statistical methods before carrying out statistical analysis. 
 
Three types of measurement scales are presented in the questionnaire: (i) nominal; (ii) 
interval; and (iii) ordinal scales. Nominal data consist of the number of observations 
that fall into specific categories and the categories are mutually exclusive (Roscoe, 
1975). An example that requests for nominal data is question A1 asking about the 
type of the facility (e.g., public housing, school and hospital). For interval data, the 
magnitude between each two adjacent values is assumed to be equal (Roscoe, 1975). 
Examples of interval data are “construction cost in dollars” and “project duration in 
months”. 
 
The ordinal scale is used to measure direction (by agree/disagree) and intensity (by 
strongly or not) of attitude (Albaum, 1997). It is worth noting that: the distance 
between these ordered categories is unknown; and these ordered categories could 
denote respondents’ attitude which is continuous in nature (Winship and Mare, 1984). 
Questions designed with the use of ordinal scales are the 5-point Likert scales in 
Sections C and D. The anchors for the Likert item in Section B are: 1=very Low; 
3=neutral; and 5=very High. The Likert items in Section C and D are anchored as: 
1=strongly disagree; 3=neither; and 5=strongly agree.  
 
Ordinal scales are distinguished from nominal scales by the additional property of 
orders among the categories (Roscoe, 1975) and differ from interval data by 
following a monotonic transformation (O'Brien, 1983). Interval data on the contrary 
are subject to a linear transformation (O'Brien, 1983). They follow different 
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transformations because the distance between two adjacent scores on an ordinal scale 
is assumed to be unknown, whereas interval data assume an equal distance (Harwell 
and Gatti, 2001; Jakobsson, 2004; Corder and Foreman, 2008).  
 
Past studies debated on the adequacy of performing parametric methods on ordinal 
data (e.g., Jakobsson, 2004; Allen and Seaman, 2007). The opponents claimed that 
the selection of statistical methods is constrained by the scale type (e.g., Forrest and 
Andersen, 1986; Velleman and Wilkinson, 1993; Fellows, and Liu, 2003; Jakobsson, 
2004). In the strictest propriety, parametric methods would be invalid when data are 
on an ordinal scale (e.g., Forrest and Andersen, 1986; Fellows, and Liu, 2003; 
Jakobsson, 2004). This is because the assumptions of parametric methods are rarely 
met by ordinal data. If the assumptions required by a parametric test, for instance, 
cannot be reasonably met, the parametric test could be worthless (Jakobsson, 2004). 
The results would be invalid or distorted. Another explanation is the interpretation of 
data meaningfulness. It is claimed that linear transformation is admissible for interval 
data, while it does not hold for ordinal data (Knapp, 1990). 
 
Another stream of studies, however, argued that statistical methods are not supposed 
to hold hostage to measurement scales (e.g., Labovitz, 1971; Harwell and Gatti, 2001). 
The meaningfulness of using the mean rather than the median on an ordinal scale is a 
measurement problem (Armstrong, 1981). The selection of data analysis techniques, 
on the other hand, is a statistical issue. In fact, the meaningfulness of the scale and 
appropriateness of a parametric statistic method are separate considerations 
(Armstrong, 1981).  
 
Despite this argument, there seems a preference for using parametric methods on 
ordinal data in applied fields because of the following reasons: (i) parametric methods 
are normally more powerful than nonparametric alternatives (Norman, 2011); (ii) 
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conclusions and interpretations of parametric methods might be considered easier and 
provide more information (Allen and Seaman, 2007); (iii) while Likert items may be 
ordinal, Likert scales consisting of sums across several measurements are interval 
(Likert, 1932; Carifio and Perla, 2008); (iv) the results from parametric tests with 
ordinal data are reasonably reliable (e.g., Nunnally, 1975; Carifio and Perla, 2008; 
Norman, 2011); and (v) parametric methods incorporate many modern statistical 
methods, like factor analysis, hierarchical linear moderns and structural equation 
modeling, which are rare for nonparametric methods (Norman, 2011).  
 
Some researchers argued that it seems to matter very little even when assumptions are 
violated (Armstrong, 1980; Norman, 2011). Stevens (1968:856) also admitted that 
“the widespread use on ordinal scales of statistics appropriate only to interval or ratio 
scales can be said to violate a technical canon, but in many instances the outcome has 
demonstrable utility”. Parametric statistics can be used with ordinal data, with small 
sample sizes, with unequal variances and with non-normal distributions, with no fear 
of ‘‘coming to the wrong conclusion’’ (Norman, 2011:632). “There is no need to 
replace parametric statistical tests by nonparametric methods when the scale of 
measurement is ordinal and not interval” (Zumbo and Zimmerman, 1993:390). The 
opponents against the use of parametric statistics with ordinal data is: “(i) not sound 
theoretically; (ii) not necessary empirically; and (iii) can have negative consequences 
if needlessly followed” (Armstrong, 1980:62).  
 
Overall, using parametric methods appears tenable. Instead of the sole reliance on 
parametric methods, the results drawn from quantitative data analysis should be read 
with cautions. Stevens (1946) indicated that “when only the rank-order of data is 
known, we should proceed cautiously with our statistics, and especially with the 
conclusions we draw from them”. One strategy to avoid pitfalls and to obtain reliable 
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and valid results of data analysis is to make use of a profound exploration and 
knowledge of the data (Schoder et al., 2006).  
 
With the these considerations in mind, three strategies were adopted during the 
quantitative data analysis stage: (i) assumptions of each adopted statistical method 
were examined with care; (ii) results from quantitative analysis were first compared 
with previous findings; and (iii) then validated by qualitative information. 
 
4.6.2 Statistical tests of significance  
After the data were collected, the one sample t-test with a significance level set at 
0.05 was undertaken against a test value of 3 (center value on a 1-5-point scale) to 
find out whether each indicator is significantly important for the whole sample. The 
indicators comprise outcomes (Y), relationship quality (Z), relational transaction 
practices (X), drivers (C) and barriers (D). Besides, the one sample t-test was also 
carried out for individual group of public clients (CL), private sector contractors (CT) 
and consultants (CS) when examining drivers and barriers. The null hypothesis H0 is 
that the indicator is not important. If p<0.05 and t value is positive, the decision is to 
reject H0 and accept H1. It is then concluded that the population would regard the 
indicator to be significantly important (i.e., drivers (C) and barriers (D)) or the 
relational transaction practices (X) are implemented to s significant extent.  
 
In order to find out whether different groups have different perceptions of the relative 
importance of drivers (C) and barriers (D) and different parties implemented 
relational transaction practices (X) to a different level, the unpaired t test at the 95% 
confidence level was carried out between each two groups of respondents (i.e., 
CL-CT, CL-CS and CS-CT). The null hypothesis (H0) is that the two groups of 
respondents have significantly similar perceptions toward certain indicator. If p<0.05, 
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the decision is to accept H1 and reject H0. To accept H1 for a specific indicator is to 
conclude that respondents from different groups had significantly different 
perceptions of that indicator (i.e., drivers (C) and barriers (D)) or different parties 
implemented relational transactions practices (X) to a significantly different level.  
 
4.6.3 Exploratory factor analysis (EFA)  
4.6.3.1 Purpose of using EFA 
Given a lack of strong theories about the number and nature of the underlying factors 
pertaining to the drivers (C) of and barriers (C) to relational transactions and outcome 
indicators and relationship quality (i.e., Y and Z), EFA was performed. EFA as an 
exploratory method has advantages of generating theories (Conway and Huffcutt, 
2003) and arriving at more parsimonious understanding of a set of measurement 
items (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Prior to operating EFA, it postulated that the 
relationship between the measurement items and the derived factors are linear and the 
ordinal data approximate continuous data.  
 
4.6.3.2 Procedures of conducting EFA 
Performing EFA comprises five stages, namely data preparation, extraction, factor 
retention, rotation and evaluation. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996:636) stated that “one 
of the problems with factor analysis is that there is no criterion variable against which 
to test the solution”. The interpretation of results at each stage mainly centers on a 
series of subjective judgments. The critical parameters are elaborated below.  
 
One critical step was to check whether the data set could meet the requirements to 
carry out EFA. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 
examined. The KMO value would be greater than 0.5 when there is an adequacy of 
the sample size (Field, 2000). Another parameter is the value of the elements on the 
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diagonal of this matrix. Based on an anti-image matrix of covariance and correlation, 
these elements should be greater than 0.5 if the sample is adequate (Field, 2000). 
Lastly, the extent to which the measurement items correlated was examined by using 
Bartlett’s test of spherity, which “tests the null hypothesis that the original correlation 
matrix is an identity matrix” (Field 2000: 457). When the correlation matrix is an 
identity matrix, there would be no correlations between the measurement items. There 
is no multicollinearity if the determinant is greater than 0.00001 (Field, 2000).  
 
Another critical step was to evaluate the results through assessing: (i) communality 
value; (ii) factor loading; (iii) reliability (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha coefficients and 
item-total correlation scores). Communality values in social science domain usually 
range from 0.4 to 0.7 (Costello and Osborne, 2005). If an item has a communality 
value less than 0.4, it may either not be related to the other items, or suggest an 
additional factor that should be explored (Costello and Osborne, 2005).  
 
Factor loadings of 0.45~0.54, 0.55~0.62, 0.63~0.7 and >0.7 are considered as fair, 
good, very good and excellent respectively (Comrey, 1973). In addition, it is worth 
noting that a factor with fewer than three items is generally weak and unstable; then a 
factor loading of 0.5 or more are desirable (Costello and Osborne, 2005). 
 
Measurement reliability was examined through the Cronbach’s alpha and 
item-to-total correlation. Measurement items with low Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 
(<0.7) and low item-total correlation (<0.3) were candidates for removal (Nunnally, 
1978). A high alpha coefficient indicates that the measurement items of a construct 
are highly correlated, and vice versa (Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991). Item-to-total 
correlation was used to identify inconsistent measurement items in each factor; and 
the inconsistent items should be eliminated if the removal may considerably increase 
the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of the factor.  
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Overall, measurement items exhibiting low communality value (<0.4), low factor 
loadings (<0.45), low item-total correlation (<0.3), contributing to a low Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient (<0.7) were candidates for elimination (Comrey, 1973; Nunnally, 
1978; Costello and Osborne, 2005).  
 
4.6.4 Partial Least Squares-Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) 
4.6.4.1 Purpose of using PLS-SEM 
In order to detect the relationship among relational transactions (X), relationship 
quality (Z) and project outcomes (Y), PLS-SEM was adopted. The result of 
PLS-SEM comprises a set of measurement models and a structural model. The 
measurement model deals with the relations between measurement items and the 
respective latent construct; the structural models deal with the relations among latent 
constructs.  
 
The preference of PLS-SEM was also attributed to its advantage of: identifying key 
driving constructs or theory development (Hair et al., 2011; 2012); dealing with 
non-normality data set (Hair et al., 2011; 2012; Ringle et al., 2009); applicability for 
formative mode (Hair et al., 2011; 2012; Ringle et al., 2009); and minimum demand 
for sample size (Reinartz et al., 2009).  
 
4.6.4.2 Procedures of PLS-SEM 
The steps consist of: (i) examining data characteristics, like sample size and 
distribution of the data set; (ii) specifying the measurement models and structural 
model; and (iii) evaluating the results. Since the estimation is undertaken by the 
selected software SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005), the specific algorithm is not 
presented. Instead, Hair et al. (2011) suggested that parameters settings for the 
software are more important to report.  
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(i) Data characteristics 
This stage mainly examined the characteristics of sample size and data distribution. 
Since SEM-PLS is capable to handle highly skewed distribution, there are no 
distributional requirements (Fornell and Bookstein 1982; Ringle et al. 2009; Hair et 
al., 2011; 2012). In addition, PLS-SEM is also able to reach robust results when 
sample size is small, even as low as 20, as indicated by Chin and Newsted’s (1999) 
Monte Carlo simulation result.  
 
If the sample is small, two remedy measures could be undertaken: increasing the 
number of measurement items or choosing measurement items with higher loadings 
(Reinartz et al., 2009). With these in mind, this study prioritized to using multiple 
measurement items and accepted a relatively high threshold value. In addition, 
properties of measurement models and the property of missing data were examined. It 
was also presumed that ordinal data approximate to be continuous and the construct is 
a linear combination of the measurement items. 
 
(ii) Model specification 
Model specification refers to the process to build measurement models and the 
structural model. The structural model specification was examined at length in the 
framework building stage (see Section 3.2); and the theoretical underpinnings make it 
tenable. Major concerns stem from the measurement model specification due to an 
argument of using formative or reflective modes. The following section thus aimed to 
elaborate this argument.  
 
Table 4.1 shows the criteria used to determine the mode of measurement models and 
one example is depicted in Figure 4.1. The typical distinction between reflective and 
formative mode is the underlining relationship between the construct and 
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measurement items. Reflective modes indicate causality from constructs to 
measurement items, whereas formative modes show otherwise. Another critical 
criterion is whether the measurement items are correlated. For formative mode, it is 
not essential for one scale of measurement items to be highly correlated, whereas the 
measurement items in a reflective mode are supposed to have a high level of 
correlation. As exampled in Figure 4.1, the correlation among measurement items and 
causality between constructs and measurement items are apparently distinguished 
from each other. 
 
Table 4.1: Comparison between reflective and formative modes 
Reflective mode Formative mode 
Latent construct is existing, the realist 
interpretation of a latent construct 
Latent construct is formed, constructivist, 
operationalist, or instrumentalist 
interpretations 
Causality from constructs to indicators Causality from indicators to constructs 
Indicators are manifested by the construct; 
they are interchangeable, share a common 
theme; dropping an indicator does not alter 
the meaning of the construct 
Indicators define the construct; they need not 
share a common theme; they are not 
interchangeable; dropping an indicator may 
alter the meaning of the construct 
Measures have high correlation, as they are 
all dependent on the same unobservable 
variable 
Measures have positive, negative, or zero 
correlation with one another 
Measures have similar sign and significance 
of relationships with the 
antecedents/consequences as the construct 
Measures may not have similar significance 
of relationships with the 
antecedents/consequences as the construct 
Taking measurement error into account at the 
measure level; error term in indicators can be 
identified 
Take measurement error into account at the 
construct level; error term cannot be 
identified if the formative measurement 
model is estimated in isolation 
(Source: Chin, 1998; Hulland, 1999; Jarvis et al., 2003; Borsboom, 2005; Coltman et al., 
2008)  
 








· Accommodation of last minute requests
· Punctuality in meeting deadlines
· Speed of returning phone calls





Figure 4.1: Reflective versus formative indicators 
(Source: Haenlein and Kaplan, 2004) 
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Relational transaction practices in this study were classified into three groups (see 
Section 3.2). The first two groups reported the relational transactions exercised by 
individuals or bilateral parties. Regarding the model specification, it was common to 
collapse three parties’ practices into a one-dimensional construct, like using three 
parties’ practices to measure one construct. However, Petter et al. (2007) noted that 
this approach should be carried out with cautions, because the construct measured by 
three parties’ practices in fact composes of several different aspects. Collapsing them 
into one-dimensional construct would adversely impact the construct validity as the 
construct itself is not uni-dimensional (Petter et al., 2007). 
 
Alternatively, hierarchical constructs distinguished from single dimension constructs 
can be manifested by multiple dimensions (Netemeyer et al., 2003). For example, the 
construct “role integrity (RI)” can be measured by three dimensions (i.e., RI-CL, 
RI-CS and RI-CT). Each party’s role integrity was further manifested by a scale of 
measurement items. Another reason of preference to hierarchical constructs is its 
ability to keep theoretical parsimony. For example, if the construct of each party’s 
role integrity (i.e., RI-CL, RI-CS and RI-CT) was directly related to the outcomes, it 
would generate a too complex model. Instead, using a hierarchical construct where 
the second order construct “role integrity (RI)” linked to the outcomes allowed for 
more theoretical parsimony and reduced model complexity (Edwards 2001).  
 
Given that there are two types of measurement modes (i.e., reflective and formative 
mode), four types of hierarchical modes are identifiable. These are 
formative–reflective, formative-formative, reflective-formative and 
reflective-reflective (Ring et al., 2012). Criteria used to identify the first and second 




The conceptualization of a hierarchical model in PLS-SEM was processed through 
repeating the measurement items (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). For instance, the 
measurement items of first order construct “RI-CT”, “RI-CS” and “RI-CL” were 
re-specified to the second order construct “Role integrity (RI)”. In this manner, the 
measurement items were used twice: first for the first-order construct; and second for 
the second-order construct (Wetzels et al., 2009). An example is shown in Figure 7.1 
in Section 7.2. 
 
(iii) Evaluating results 
This stage aimed to evaluate the measurement, hierarchical and structural models. 
Regarding evaluating reflective measurement models, four parameters were examined: 
(i) internal consistency reliability; (ii) indicator reliability; (iii) convergent validity; 
and (iv) discriminating validity (Hair et al., 2011; 2012). 
 
In order to assess internal consistency reliability, composite reliability (CR) was 
adopted. It prioritizes measurements according their reliability during model 
estimation rather than assuming that all measurements are equally reliable, making it 
suitable for PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2011). The threshold value of 0.7 was adopted 
(Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). 
 
With respect to indicator reliability, Churchill (1979) suggested that the 
measurements with a loading smaller than 0.4 could be eliminated. For the 
measurements with loadings between 0.40 and 0.70, a removal from the scale could 
be taken into account if the deletion could lead to an increase in composite reliability 
above the threshold value (Hair et al., 2011). Notwithstanding this, weaker 
measurements (loadings<0.7) were sometimes retained because of their contribution 
to content validity (Hair et al., 2011).  
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For convergent validity, the average variance extracted (AVE) should be higher than 
0.5 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; Hair et al., 2011). For discriminating validity, the AVE of 
each construct should be higher than the construct’s highest squared correlation with 
any other latent construct (Fornell-Larcker criterion) or, measurement item’s loading 
should be higher than all of its cross loadings (Cenfetelli and Bassellier 2009; Hair et 
al., 2011).  
 
When assessing hierarchical model assessment, Bollen and Lennox (1991) suggested 
testing sub-dimension validity by examining whether each first order construct is 
significantly related to the second-order construct. This could be achieved by 
estimating the significance of their weights. Furthermore, the weights could be used 
to assess the relative impact of the first-order constructs on the second-order 
constructs (Wetzels et al., 2009). When assessing the significance of the weights, 
MacKenzie et al. (2011) noted that it is rare to drop an entire sub-dimension without 
eliminating an essential aspect of the construct. It is because “reliability is not an 
issue of debate when a multidimensional construct and its dimensions are treated as 
latent variables that contain no measurement error” (Edwards, 2001:160).  
 
The structural model results were evaluated by using coefficient of determination (R
2
) 
(Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2011), path coefficients (Chin 1998; Henseler et al., 2009) 
and predictive relevance through the Stone-Geiser Q
2
 test (Stone, 1974; Geiser, 
1975).  
 
The judgment of what R
2
 level is appropriate depends on the specific research 
discipline (Hair et al., 2011). Falk and Miller (1992) suggested that the value of R
2
 
more than 0.1 is acceptable. In construction research, many studies did not report the 
R
2
 value if SEM is mainly used to test hypotheses rather than making prediction, like 
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Eriksson and Pesämaa (2007), Jin et al. (2007), Wong et al. (2008), Doloi (2009) and 
Maurer (2010). 
 
The significance of path coefficients was calculated with the aid of bootstrapping 
(Gefen et al. 2000; Henseler et al., 2009). Bootstrapping is a re-sampling procedure 
in which the original sample serves as the population. An empirical sampling 
distribution can be relied upon to describe the actual distribution of the population on 
which the parameter estimates are based (Brown, 2006). Critical t-values for a 
two-tailed test are 1.65 (significance level = 10 percent), 1.96 (significance level = 5 
percent), and 2.58 (significance level = 1 percent). 
 
Stone-Geisser’s Q2 was adopted to assess predictive relevance (Stone, 1974; Geisser, 
1975). A value of Q
2
 greater than zero is indicative of predictive relevance 
(Tenenhuas et al., 2005). Q
2
 can assess an individual construct’s predictive relevance 
for the model by omitting selected structural relationships (Hair et al., 2011; 2012). It 
is a kind of cross-validated R
2
 between indicators of an endogenous latent constructs 
and all indicators associated with the latent constructs explaining the endogenous 
latent constructs, using the estimated structural model (Tenenhuas et al., 2005). The 
technique represents a synthesis of function fitting and cross-validation (Henseler et 
al., 2009).  
 
4.7 Research Methods in Validation Phase  
To validate statistical results, the second prong of semi-structured interviews was 
adopted using qualitative data. The selection of semi-structured interviews is because: 
qualitative research can inform theory and model development (Connolly, 1998); and 
it could offset the weakness of the statistical results. For example, the instrument for 
semi-structured interviews could form the “how” and “why” questions, which are 
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rarely widely applied in questionnaire-survey. A mix of methods would be thus more 
effective to triangulate the findings.  
 
4.7.1 Sampling interviewees  
The population comprised the professionals who have had experience in public 
projects before. The sample frame at this stage was similar to that of questionnaire 
survey (see Section 4.5). Snowball sampling was used to target participants. It began 
with a few respondents who are the acquaintance of the interviewer. They were 
requested to provide referrals for additional respondents (Tan, 2008). The 
interviewees involved in this stage were those who did not participate in the phase 
one of the study.  
 
4.7.2 Data collection methods  
Semi-structured interviews were adopted to collect data because it could ensure 
sufficient qualitative data to triangulate the findings. Other advantages include: (i) it 
is more flexible and practical to probe into the underlying motives of a particular 
phenomenon; (ii) direct contacts with interviewees enables instant observation of 
interviewees’ attitude towards certain issues; (iii) it allows instant clarification of 
ambiguities and thus enhances the reliability of information obtained; and (iv) it 
enables rapport-building with interviewees (Noor, 2008). 
 
However, one disadvantage of face-to-face interviews is that interviewees might 
modify their behaviors in a variety of ways, such as modifying their speech and 
behaviors to appear more respectable (Babbie, 2002). To address this disadvantage, 
the following steps were taken (Robson, 2002): (i) interviewees were encouraged to 
talk freely and openly without interruption; (ii) interview questions were formulated 
in a straightforward and non-aggressive manner in order to minimize the possibilities 
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that interviewees become confused and defensive; and (iii) interview questions were 
formulated in a neutral manner so as to eliminate cues that might lead interviewees to 
respond in a particular way. These measures improve the reliability and validity of 
interview findings. Interviews were digitally recorded, if interviewees allowed it. To 
motivate the interviewees, a summary of the main findings was promised to them. 
 
4.7.3 Data instruments for interviews  
Semi-structured questions regarding the appropriateness of the statistical results were 
designed. The interview questions were developed from the survey result (see 
Appendix 3). The questions were piloted with one practitioner in Singapore, which 
aimed to identify ambiguities and help to clarify the wording of the questions.  
 
4.7.4 Qualitative data analysis  
Thematic analysis was adopted whereby the data was analyzed according to the 
different themes (Creswell, 2009). The theme of this study was the significant paths 
identified in the statistical results. Coding guided by the interview questions was 
adopted (Neuman, 2007). Through the coding process, a large amount of data could 
be organized into smaller segments as a means of reduction and simplification 
(Bailey, 2006). The grouped data were given a label to aid in discussion of how they 
might be important to the understanding of a setting (Bailey, 2006).  
 
4.8 Summary  
A two-pronged research design was devised to test the conceptual framework. 
Questionnaire-survey was initially conducted (see Section 4.2). During this process, 
mails were sent out to the randomly selected samples (see Section 4.5). It was 
complemented by face-to-face interviews using snowball sampling method. After the 
data was collected, three data analysis techniques, namely t test, EFA and PLS-SEM, 
82 
were adopted (see Section 4.6). To validate the survey findings, a second prong of 
interview-survey was conducted and data was collected via semi-structured 
interviews (see Section 4.7); the snow sampling was adopted to select participants. 
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Chapter 5 Survey Results  
 
5.1 Introduction 
1440 survey packages were sent out between 13 June and 30 November, 2011. Of 
these, 104 responses were received with varying degrees of completeness, giving a 
response rate of 7.2%. It is acknowledged that the sample size is relatively small. This 
is because Singapore is a small country with about 4 million citizens and hence 
correspondingly, the samples are limited. Notwithstanding this, one sample t test and 
factor analysis could still be performed because in accordance with the generally 
accepted rule, central limit theorem holds true when the sample size is no less than 30 
(Ott and Longnecker, 2001). It is also acknowledged that the response rate is low. 
This may be because survey packages were sent to a mix bag of consultants and 
contractors who had and have not handled public projects (see Section 4.5). As those 
who have not handled public projects were instructed not to fill up the questionnaire, 
they dropped out of the study, thereby causing the response rate to be low. While the 
low response rate may cause some bias in the responses, a check of the returned 
questionnaires showed that respondents have rated on a wide range of the scale and 
ratings were not skewed. The following data analyses are based on such returns. 
Owing to missing data, the response number of some questions is less than 104.  
 
5.2 Missing Data Analysis  
Missing data is not uncommon in research data sets. The approach to deal with them 
was based on the randomness of the missing data (Little and Rubin, 1986). In order to 
detect the pattern of missing data on the measurement items, Little and Rubin’s (1986) 
Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test was performed whereby the pattern of 
the current data set could be compared with the pattern that is expected for a random 
missing data. If the differences are not significant, the missing data can then be 
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treated as MCAR (Hair et al., 1998). By contrast, if the pattern of missing data is 
related to the observed data, it is called Missing at Random (MAR) (Hair et al., 
1998). 
 
The result of MCAR test in Table 5.1 does not show a significant difference, 
indicating that the pattern of missing values does not depend on value. Therefore, 
listwise, pairwise and regression estimation are permitted in the course of data 
analysis (Little and Rubin, 1987).  
 
Table 5.1: Results of Little’s MCAR test 
Section Chi-Square Df Sig. Result 
Drivers 116.290 110 .322 MCAR 
Practices 2169.945 2248 .879 MCAR 
Barriers 161.465 189 .927 MCAR 
Performance 81.262 72 .213 MCAR 
 
5.3 Profiles of Respondents 
Table 5.2 shows that more than half of the respondents are in management level with 
designations like directors, general managers and senior contract managers. Within 
the professional category, many of them are senior QS and senior resident engineers. 
The respondents’ mean number of years of experience in the construction industry is 
16.1, with a standard deviation of 10.3, indicating that respondents were experienced.  
 
Table 5.2: Profiles of respondents 
Descriptions Number Percentage 
Respondents’ designations 
Top managers (e.g., directors, general managers) 30 30.3 
Middle managers (e.g., project managers) 28 28.2 
Professionals (e.g., engineers, QS) 41 41.4 
Total 99 100 
Years of experience 
<5 24 24 
6-15 27 27 
16-25 31 31 
>26  18 18 
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Descriptions Number Percentage 
Total  100 100 
Mean 16.1 
Std. D 10.3 
Minimum 2 
Maximum 42 
Note: owing to missing data, the response number of some questions is less than 104 
 
5.4 Profiles of Respondents’ Firms 
Table 5.3 shows that there are nearly same proportions of contractors, consultancy 
firms and government entities, being 32%, 39% and 28% respectively. This 
composition could ensure an equal consideration of three parties’ perceptions.  
 
Over half are private owned and 39% are owned by public firms or organizations. The 
mean number of workforce of respondents’ firm is nearly 2179 and the majority of 
respondents’ firms (63.5%) have less than 1500 staff, indicating that the results would 
be more applicable to medium sized organizations.  
 
Table 5.3: Profiles of firms 
Descriptions Number Percentage 
Organization type 
Consultancy firm (e.g., QS, architecture firm) 41 39.8 
Contractor 33 32.2 
Government entity 29 28.2 
Total 103 100 
Ownership of organization 
Private 61 59.2 
Public 40 39.8 
Public-Private JV 1 1.0 
Total 103 100 
Workforce 
<100 16 16.8 
100-500 34 35.8 
600-1500 14 14.7 
> 1500 31 32.6 
Total  95 100 
Mean 2178.7 
Std. D 4506.6 
Minimum 5 
Maximum 28000 
Note: owing to missing data, the response number of some questions is less than 104 
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5.5 Profiles of Projects  
5.5.1 Type of facility  
Table 5.4 shows that respondents reported a spread of public projects. 45.9% are 
infrastructures; the rest are building projects and plants.  
 
Table 5.4: Profiles of projects 
Descriptions Frequency Percentage 
Type of facility 
Infrastructure (e.g., MRT, road, bridge) 45 45.9 
Public Housing 24 24.5 
School 12 12.3 
Plant (e.g., water, chemical plant) 10 10.2 
Other buildings 7 7.1 
Total 98 100.0 
Types of client 
Ongoing client 71 68.3 
On-off client 24 23.1 
One-off client 8 7.7 
Total 103 100.0 
Note: owing to missing data, the response number of some questions is less than 104 
 
5.5.2 Types of clients 
Table 5.4 also shows that the majority of the clients (68.3%) undertake project 
development on an ongoing basis. This suggests that private consultants and 
contractors have future cooperation opportunities with their public partners. 
 
5.5.3 Procurement of main contractors and lead consultants’ services 
Table 5.5 illustrates that open competitive bidding was the main method used to select 
main contractors (87.6%). The use of competitive tendering indicates that there is no 
guarantee of future cooperation. The price/non-price ratio in Table 5.5 indicates that 




Table 5.5: Methods for procuring construction services 
Descriptions Frequency Percentage 
Bidding method for selection of main contractors 
Open competitive bidding 85 87.6 
Selective bidding 10 10.3 
Negotiation 2 2.1 
Total 97 100.0 
Price/non-price ratio 
20:80 14 17.5 
30:70 10 12.5 
35:65 1 1.3 
40:60 6 7.5 
50:50 2 2.6 
60:40 6 7.5 
70:30 9 11.3 
80:20 25 31.3 
90:10 2 2.6 
100:0 5 6.3 
Total  80 100 
Note: owing to missing data, the response number of some questions is less than 104 
 
The main method to select lead consultants was also open competitive bidding, 
accounting for 49.5%, followed by using government in-house professionals (24.1%) 
(see Table 5.6). Unlike the critical role of price in selecting main contractors, 
non-price factors were given more consideration when evaluating lead consultants. In 
64% of the projects, non-price criteria were given more weights than the price 
criterion. 
Table 5.6: Methods for procuring consultancy services 
Descriptions Frequency Percentage 
Biding method for selection of main consultants 
Open competitive bidding 45 49.5 
Government in-house consultant 22 24.1 
Selective bidding 16 17.6 
Negotiation 6 6.6 
Total 91 100.0 
Price/non-price ratio 
20:80 11 25.0 
30:70 8 18.2 
40:60 9 20.5 
50:50 6 13.6 
60:40 4 9.1 
70:30 4 9.1 
80:20 2 4.5 
Total 44 100 
Note: owing to missing data, the response number of some questions is less than 104 
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5.5.4 Contractual arrangement 
Table 5.7 provides that over half used traditional DBB with lump sum and 83.2% 
respondents indicated that their projects used PSSCOC or modified PSSCOC.  
 
Table 5.7: Contractual arrangement 
Description Number Percentage 
Contractual arrangement 
Traditional DBB with lump sum 58 63.7 
Traditional DBB with bills of quantities 17 18.7 
Design and Build 16 17.6 
Total 91 100.0 
Form of contract 
PSSCOC 69 72.6 
Modified PSSCOC 10 10.6 
SIA 8 8.4 
FIDIC 8 8.4 
Total 95 100.0 
Note: owing to missing data, the response number of some questions is less than 104 
 
5.5.5 Complexity of projects 
The results in Table 5.8 show that respondents agreed that the projects they 
participated in are significantly complex (p<0.05, t-value>0). A high level of project 
complexity might indicate more difficulties in managing time and cost.  
 
Table 5.8: Project complexity 
Descriptions Mean Std. t-value Sig 
Level of integration required 3.88 .840 10.744 .000 
Level of construction complexity 3.81 .893 9.223 .000 
Level of specialization required 3.77 .791 9.916 .000 
Level of design complexity 3.72 .960 7.661 .000 
Level of technological advancement 3.39 .918 4.379 .000 
 
Table 5.9 illustrates the cost and time metrics of the investigated projects. The results 
show that 80% of the projects cost more than S$50 million and almost 2/3 of the 
projects had a planned duration of more than 24 months, indicating that there were 
sufficient opportunities for relationships to develop in these projects. 
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Table 5.9: Construction cost and duration 
Description Number Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Cost (Million) 
1≤Cost<50 21 21 21.0 
50≤Cost<100 26 26 47.0 
100≤Cost<250 26 26 73.0 
250≤Cost<500 19 19 92.0 
Cost≥500 8 8 100.0 
Mean 314.12 




9≤Duration<24 37 36.3 36.3 
24≤ Duration <36 30 29.4 65.7 
36≤ Duration <48 10 9.8 75.5 
Duration ≥48 25 24.5 100.0 
Mean  34.92 




5.5.6 Project outcomes and relationship quality 
The formula to calculate time and cost performance is given below: 
Time performance = (Actual project duration – Planned project duration)/ Planned 
project duration x 100%  
 
Cost performance = (Final construction cost – Original contract sum)/ Original 
contract sum x 100% 
 
By definition of the formula above, negative values indicate good time and cost 
outcomes while positive values means delays and cost overruns, and zero indicates 
planned and actual performance are the same.  
 
Table 5.10 shows that both time and cost performance is poor. Nearly two third 
projects suffered from a cost overrun, compared to 25.6% projects with cost savings 
and 9.3% projects just fulfilled their cost objectives. Besides, in contrast to 46.1% 
projects reached time objectives, more than half of the projects were delayed.  
 
Table 5.10: Time and cost outcomes 
Categories Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage 
Cost performance    
Cost variation < -10% 5 5.8 5.8 
-10% ≤ Cost variation < 0% 17 19.8 25.6 
Cost variation = 0% 8 9.3 34.9 
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Categories Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage 
0% < Cost variation ≤ +5% 27 31.4 66.3 
+5% < Cost variation ≤ +10% 14 16.3 82.6 
Cost variation > +10% 15 17.4 100.0 
Time performance    
Time variation < -10% 2 2.3 2.3 
-10% ≤ Time variation < 0% 5 5.6 7.9 
Time variation = 0% 34 38.2 46.1 
0% < Time variation ≤ +10% 13 14.6 60.7 
+10% < Time variation ≤ +20% 18 20.2 80.9 
Time variation > +20% 17 19.1 100.0 
Note: + denotes a cost or schedule overrun 
 
Table 5.11 presents the detailed project outcome information. The mean project time 
and cost overrun is 9.89% and 5.43% respectively. The t-test results show that cost 
and time overrun are significantly more than 0%, suggesting poor performance. This 
result indicates urgencies that public sector should propose and implement more 
effective means to improve the time and cost performance. The quality performance 
and client satisfaction, relationship quality at the end of the project are seen to be 
significantly good (p<0.05, t-value>0).  
 
Table 5.11: t test of project outcomes 
Descriptions Mean Std.  t-value Sig. 
Time and cost performance 
Cost variation (%)  5.43 12.75 3.95 .000 
Time variation (%) 9.89 15.09 6.18 .000 
Project quality and satisfaction 
Product/output quality 3.99 .675 14.953 .000 
Client Satisfaction 3.90 .679 13.495 .000 
Relationship quality  
Relationship between CL&CT at the end 3.67 .894 7.456 .000 
Relationship between CS&CT at the end 3.46 .936 4.881 .000 
Relationship between CL&CS at the end 3.73 .852 8.386 .000 
Note: + denotes a cost or schedule overrun  
 
5.6 Summary 
104 of the 1440 survey packages were received, giving a response rate of 7.2% (see 
Section 5.1). The profile of the respondents indicates that most of them were 
experienced. The results of the survey would be more applicable to medium sized 
organizations. A spread of public projects was investigated, which were significantly 
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complex. The majority of the clients undertake project development on an ongoing 
basis; the public clients mainly adopted open competitive bidding to select main 
contractors and lead consultants; and nearly two thirds suffered from cost overrun and 
more than half were delayed (see Section 5.5).  
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Chapter 6 Drivers of and Barriers to Relational 
Transactions 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Objectives one and two of this study are to identify the drivers of and the barriers to 
adopting relational transactions and to compare different parties’ perceptions of the 
factors motivating and deterring relational transactions in public projects respectively 
(see Section 1.3). This chapter reports: the identification of the critical drivers (see 
Section 6.2.1) and barriers (see Section 6.3.1); and the comparison of different 
parties’ attitudes towards the drivers of (see Section 6.2.2) and barriers to (see Section 
6.3.2) relational transactions. The EFA was used to identify critical factors. Before 
that, the t test has been undertaken in order to detect the significant barriers/drivers. 
In order to compare each party’s responses, the unpaired t test was used.  
 
6.2 Drivers for Adopting Relational Transaction Practices 
6.2.1 Critical drivers for adopting relational transaction practices 
Objective one of this study is to identify drivers for adopting relational transaction 
practices in public projects. In Section C of the questionnaire, respondents were asked 
to rate the drivers for adopting relational transactions. Table 6.1 shows that all drivers 
are significantly important (column 2), supporting H10 (see Section 3.10). After the 
first stage t test, the 21 drivers which are significantly important were subjected to FA 
(see Table 6.2).  
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Table 6.1: Drivers for adopting relational transactions 
Code 
Overall Clients (CL) Consultants (CS) Contractors (CT) CL-CS CL-CT CS-CT 
Rk Mean Sig. Rk Mean Sig. Rk Mean Sig. Rk Mean Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. 
C1 14 3.660 0.000 11 3.750  0.000  14 3.650  0.000  16 3.610  0.001  0.596 0.515 0.832 
C2 3 3.850 0.000 3 4.040  0.000  6 3.730  0.000  5 3.840  0.000  0.182 0.429 0.614 
C3 21 3.460 0.000 18 3.500  0.017  19 3.510  0.001  21 3.340  0.046  0.960 0.542 0.453 
C4 4 3.820 0.000 3 4.040  0.000  8 3.700  0.000  8 3.790  0.000  0.094 0.218 0.669 
C5 16 3.560 0.000 14 3.680  0.000  16 3.580  0.000  20 3.420  0.007  0.608 0.250 0.404 
C6 2 3.950 0.000 2 4.110  0.000  4 3.830  0.000  2 3.970  0.000  0.128 0.453 0.337 
C7 12 3.720 0.000 9 3.790  0.000  8 3.700  0.000  13 3.700  0.000  0.668 0.690 0.988 
C8 1 4.070 0.000 1 4.180  0.000  1 3.930  0.000  1 4.150  0.000  0.173 0.894 0.186 
C9 8 3.780 0.000 7 3.890  0.000  6 3.730  0.000  10 3.760  0.000  0.389 0.507 0.854 
C10 18 3.550 0.000 15 3.640  0.000  20 3.500  0.000  18 3.530  0.002  0.450 0.607 0.871 
C11 8 3.780 0.000 6 3.930  0.000  8 3.700  0.000  11 3.740  0.000  0.202 0.383 0.810 
C12 8 3.780 0.000 3 4.040  0.000  13 3.680  0.000  14 3.690  0.000  0.070 0.092 0.947 
C13 19 3.520 0.000 21 3.360  0.030  18 3.560  0.000  17 3.590  0.001  0.303 0.288 0.881 
C14 4 3.820 0.000 12 3.710  0.000  1 3.930  0.000  6 3.790  0.000  0.241 0.727 0.404 
C15 4 3.820 0.000 9 3.790  0.000  3 3.880  0.000  6 3.790  0.000  0.639 0.992 0.623 
C16 11 3.770 0.000 8 3.860  0.000  8 3.700  0.000  6 3.790  0.000  0.447 0.735 0.636 
C17 7 3.800 0.000 12 3.710  0.000  4 3.830  0.000  3 3.850  0.000  0.563 0.517 0.886 
C18 15 3.590 0.000 19 3.460  0.017  16 3.580  0.001  12 3.730  0.000  0.656 0.268 0.505 
C19 13 3.710 0.000 16 3.570  0.001  8 3.700  0.000  4 3.840  0.000  0.490 0.216 0.450 
C20 20 3.510 0.000 20 3.390  0.005  21 3.480  0.001  15 3.670  0.000  0.680 0.140 0.321 





Three factors arise from the FA. All measurement items load considerably (ranging 
from 0.460 to 0.814) on their corresponding factors, suggesting a high convergent 
validity of individual measurement items within the three factors (see Table 6.2). 
 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of these three factors range from 0.804 to 0.911; 
the overall reliability is 0.856. These exceed the threshold level of 0.7 (Nunnally, 
1978), indicating a high degree of internal reliability of the factors. 
 







F1 F2 F3 
C8 .814 .077 -.238 .526 .560 
Increase value 
proposition  
C7 .688 -.107 -.127 .499 .645 
C6 .677 -.166 .026 .614 .752 
C11 .635 -.128 .208 .659 .764 
C21 .633 -.003 .117 .474 .641 
C20 .603 -.070 .009 .414 .626 
C16 .556 -.025 .229 .477 .642 
C10 .505 -.180 .325 .642 .735 
C9 .503 -.167 .211 .510 .661 
C17 .501 -.126 .176 .441 .616 
C12 .482 -.269 .076 .478 .631 
C18 .021 -.917 -.091 .818 .794 
Improve business 
competitiveness 
C19 -.002 -.812 .066 .693 .784 
C13 .091 -.791 -.036 .688 .748 
C14 .356 -.499 .126 .637 .709 
C15 .340 -.460 .131 .568 .769 
C3 .192 .058 .718 .625 .536 
Improve project 
time and cost 
performance 
C1 -.219 -.129 .711 .477 .627 
C4 .100 -.063 .694 .580 .669 
C2 .450 .234 .573 .600 .647 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
.911 .903 .804   
 
Eigen-values 8.615 1.628 1.176    
Explained 
variation (%) 
43.075 8.141 5.881   
 
Notes:  
a: Extraction Method: principal axis factors; Rotation Method: direct oblique with Kaiser 
Normalization; 
b: Rotation converged in 13 iterations; 
c: Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.899; Bartlett’s test of sphericity: 
Approx. chi-square: 1208.968; df: 190; Sig.:.000; 
d: There are 47 (24.0%) non-redundant residuals with absolute value>0.05;  
e: Missing data treatment: listwise. Little and Rubin’s (1986) Missing Completely at 
Random (MCAR) test was performed, and the result shows that pattern of missing values 
does not depend on value; 
f: Cumulative percentage of variation explained=57.097%; and 
g: Public client’s administration burden (C5) was removed due to a low loading of 0.31 on 
factor 1, which is less than minimum loading of 0.40 (Costello and Osborne, 2005). 
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Factor 1 is labeled “increase value proposition”. Public projects seeking to increase 
their value propositions may adopt relational transactions because they are driven by 
the need to improve project quality (C6) and meet public needs (C12). Projects can 
add value with better design (C7), better safety performance (C8), integrated 
solutions of efficiency improvement (C11), creative and innovative approaches (C21) 
and new technologies (C20). 
 
Table 6.2 shows that the adoption of relational transactions is driven by the potential 
benefits of higher efficiency of resource utilization (C9) and collaborative culture 
(C10). This is because these measures would benefit project outcomes. Relational 
transaction practices involve substantial relationship exchanges and require alignment 
of different parties’ objectives, and these practices can benefit from efficiency in 
resource utilization and a collaborative culture (Akintoye and Main, 2007; Black et 
al., 2000). 
 
It is found that contracting parties’ relational transaction practices are motivated by 
the attainment of fewer disputes (C16) and better relationships (C17). Parties that are 
involved in more relational transactions would resolve conflicts in a non-adversarial 
way, giving rise to fewer disputes (C16) and better relationships (C17). Better 
relationships between parties can further produce project-based benefits (Black et al., 
2000), which would then generate greater motivation to contracting parties. 
 
Factor 2 is labeled “improve business competitiveness”. This might confirm that 
competitive capabilities often rest on RC practices (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012). 
The desire to enhance business competitiveness drives contracting parties to adopt 
relational transactions. Compared to poorly connected actors, firms that are better 
connected to the network by having a continuity of past relationships (C19) can forge 
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a competitive advantage (C13) (Uzzi, 1996; Rowley et al., 2000). Competitiveness 
can further enhance organizations’ competency (C14) to improve the effectiveness of 
their business operations (Love et al., 2002; Gittell et al., 2010). This can in turn 
enhance organizations’ reputation (C15), ultimately enabling them to seize new 
market opportunities (C18) (Gulati et al., 2000; Starkey et al., 2000).  
 
Factor 3 is labeled “improve project time and cost performance”. Firms that are 
driven to achieve better time (C4) and cost (C1) performance, to mitigate risks and 
their influences (C2), and to reduce the cost of changing partners (C3) are likely to 
adopt relational transactions in public projects. Good performance can provide 
contracting parties with market advantages based on a proven track record, thereby 
motivating contracting parties to adopt relational transactions (Bresnen and Marshall, 
2000c). 
 
Table 6.2 shows that the aim to achieve superior cost performance can motivate 
contracting parties to adopt relational transactions (C1). This may be because RC 
practices can result in a reduction in total project cost since partners are likely able to 
purchase at the lowest possible price (Beach et al., 2005) and control cost more 
effectively (Larson, 1995; Chan et al., 2008).  
 
Table 6.2 also shows that a desire to gain better time performance (C4) can drive 
contracting parties to adopt relational transactions. This may be because relational 
transactions can enable the demand for speed (Powell, 1990) and give rise to 
economies of time (Uzzi, 1997). Such speed in responding can then help achieve 
outstanding time performance.  
 
The need to reduce construction development risks (C2) can drive contracting parties 
to adopt relational transactions. This finding agrees with Akintoye and Main (2007), 
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who noted that the reduction of construction development risks is a crucial driver for 
parties to adopt collaborative activities. This may be because for construction projects 
which involve customization, complexities and uncertainties (Eriksson, 2008), 
relational transactions can be a suitable governance mechanism (Williamson, 1975). 
The informal agreement and unwritten codes of conducts provide a more effective 
mechanism to cope with risks (Brown et al., 2004). Furthermore, the capability to 
mobilize relational transactions to benefit from risks would become a source of 
competitive advantage (Comet, 2009), which would significantly motivate 
contracting parties to adopt relational transactions. 
 
6.2.2 Comparing different parties’ perceptions of drivers 
Objective two of this study is to compare different parties’ perceptions of drivers for 
adopting relational transaction practices. The unpaired t test results in Table 6.1 show 
that the ratings of three parties are not significantly different, rejecting H12 (see 
Section 3.10). It also shows that all drivers are significantly important for individual 
groups (i.e., CL, CS and CT). 
 
The results show that all three parties are significantly driven to adopt relational 
transactions because of the aim to achieve better project safety (C8) and quality 
performance (C6). Three parties’ top emphasis in safety is to ensure compliance with 
laws and regulations and to pass inspections conducted by the Building Construction 
Authority (BCA) and the Ministry of Manpower. Public clients also have a strong 
impetus to ensure that their projects achieve high standards of safety because public 
projects are highly visible and the government must be seen to care for the lives of 
people working on the construction projects.  
 
The results show that parties are also significantly driven to adopt relational 
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transaction practices because of the need to improve project quality (C6). This is 
because taxpayers’ money is involved and the contracting parties are obligated to 
deliver satisfactory products to end users. Delivering a high standard of quality in 
public projects would also help to enhance public confidence and support. Private 
parties also wish to build a sound track record of quality and safety performance as it 
accounts for at least 20% (for contractors) and 60% (for consultants) of the overall 
score of bid evaluation in public projects (BCA, 2012).  
 
6.3 Barriers to Adopting Relational Transaction Practices 
6.3.1 Critical barriers to adopting relational transaction practices 
Objective one of this study is also to identify barriers to adopting relational 
transaction practices in public projects. In Section D of the questionnaire, respondents 
were requested to rate the factors deterring relational transactions. The t test results 
show that 15 of the 23 barriers significantly impede the adoption of relational 
transactions (see Table 6.3). Therefore, H11 is not rejected (see Section 3.10). This 
result departs from those of previous studies that did not differentiate between public 
and private projects. For example, Kumaraswamy et al.’s (2005) study found that for 
projects in general, bureaucratic client organization (D21), stringent public client 
sector rules and regulations (D22), and public sector accountability concerns (D20) 
do not significantly deter the adoption of RC practices and building of integrated 
teams. In this study that focuses on public projects, these variables now become 
significant barriers.  
 
After deleting 8 non-significant barriers, the remaining 15 barriers were subjected to 
FA (see Table 6.4). The result of the KMO test is 0.803, and Bartlett’s test is 
significant at the 0.000 level. These results indicate the factorability of the data 
matrices (Hair et al., 1998). 
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All of the measurement items load considerably (ranging from 0.511 to 0.907) on 
their corresponding factors, indicating a high convergent validity of individual 
measurement items within each factor. Four factors emerge from the FA (see Table 
6.4). These four factors explain 63.71% of the variance. Three of the four factors have 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients below 0.7 (i.e., Factors 2, 3 and 4). However, in the 
field of construction research, Leung and Chan’s (2007) study accepted factors with 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of 0.5. In this research, the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients are above 0.5 and they also have a high level of reliability with a high 
item-total correlation (>0.3) (Nunnally, 1978). 
 
Factor 1 is labeled “lack of capabilities”. The lack of capabilities diminishes the 
possibility of adopting relational transactions. For example, a lack of experience (D5) 
and training (D2) in relational arrangements may impede the adoption of relational 
transactions. This result agrees with Ng et al. (2002) who noted that a lack of 
experience in RC practices may lead to a failure to implement appropriate training 
and guidance measures. When contracting parties have little or no experience in RC 
practices, they may fear the unknown (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002) and have 
misgivings that long term relationships are too ‘cosy’ and uncompetitive (Bresnen 
and Marshall, 2000a). These uncertainties may prevent parties from reaping the 
potential benefits of adopting RC and fully committing to RC practices.  
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Table 6.3: Barriers to adoption of relational transactions practices 
Code 
Overall Clients (CL) Consultants (CS) Contractors (CT) CL-CS CL-CT CS-CT 
Rk Mean Sig. Rk Mean Sig. Rk Mean Sig. Rk Mean Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. 
D1 18 3.150  0.099  12 3.360  0.030  14 3.150  0.262  20 2.930  0.678  0.330  0.069  0.298  
D2 11 3.250  0.003  12 3.360  0.022  8 3.260  0.067  11 3.110  0.477  0.622  0.237  0.467  
D3 19 3.140  0.169  12 3.360  0.077  19 3.080  0.608  13 3.070  0.663  0.248  0.276  0.990  
D4 20 3.110  0.167  19 3.210  0.161  16 3.130  0.324  19 3.000  1.000  0.663  0.335  0.533  
D5 14 3.220  0.019  12 3.360  0.039  12 3.180  0.213  13 3.070  0.678  0.417  0.245  0.641  
D6 21 3.080  0.374  21 3.140  0.404  21 3.030  0.872  18 3.040  0.813  0.619  0.636  0.965  
D7 17 3.180  0.088  9 3.390  0.039  17 3.100  0.562  13 3.070  0.691  0.264  0.210  0.904  
D8 7 3.310  0.000  7 3.480  0.013  12 3.180  0.090  5 3.300  0.043  0.162  0.420  0.516  
D9 8 3.280  0.004  9 3.390  0.039  7 3.310  0.044  13 3.070  0.663  0.715  0.191  0.291  
D10 13 3.230  0.029  7 3.480  0.030  17 3.100  0.512  10 3.140  0.460  0.142  0.236  0.869  
D11 16 3.180  0.075  19 3.210  0.326  19 3.080  0.571  3 3.370  0.039  0.581  0.572  0.185  
D12 10 3.260  0.002  5 3.570  0.002  8 3.260  0.031  21 2.890  0.376  0.111  0.002  0.036  
D13 15 3.210  0.023  17 3.250  0.199  10 3.240  0.060  13 3.070  0.678  0.952  0.501  0.435  
D14 22 2.940  0.434  22 3.070  0.678  23 2.950  0.644  22 2.850  0.294  0.530  0.323  0.592  
D15 6 3.330  0.000  17 3.250  0.109  6 3.490  0.001  8 3.180  0.259  0.243  0.742  0.134  
D16 5 3.380  0.000  16 3.290  0.118  4 3.590  0.000  11 3.110  0.477  0.154  0.443  0.016  
D17 8 3.280  0.009  9 3.390  0.025  11 3.230  0.202  6 3.250  0.244  0.523  0.595  0.944  
D18 12 3.240  0.012  6 3.500  0.011  14 3.150  0.295  8 3.180  0.232  0.137  0.174  0.907  
D19 23 2.820  0.049  23 2.570  0.050  22 3.000  1.000  22 2.850  0.294  0.083  0.268  0.429  
D20 1 3.710  0.000  2 4.000  0.000  1 3.850  0.000  7 3.230  0.136  0.426  0.001  0.003  
D21 2 3.640  0.000  3 3.750  0.000  2 3.670  0.000  1 3.430  0.026  0.702  0.189  0.302  
D22 3 3.610  0.000  1 4.040  0.000  5 3.510  0.005  4 3.320  0.107  0.044  0.009  0.465  













F1 F2 F3 F4 
D2 .785 .060 .066 -.055 .636 .720 
Lack of 
capabilities 
D5 .774 .073 .105 -.066 .556 .667 
D18 .730 .005 -.204 .085 .556 .583 
D17 .729 -.044 .102 -.014 .557 .628 
D9 .714 .052 -.064 .109 .578 .637 
D10 .525 -.463 .122 .462 .740 .545 
D12 .511 .409 .216 -.126 .583 .509 
D23 .112 .755 -.085 .144 .665 .541 
Ethos of public 
service 
D16 .128 .654 .305 -.047 .648 .489 
D20 -.047 .596 -.034 .396 .573 .445 
D15 -.107 -.044 .907 .024 .780 .462 Lack of 
continuity  D13 .247 .079 .680 .151 .712 .462 
D22 -.178 .140 .197 .853 .773 .490 
Institutional 
constraints 
D21 .411 -.050 -.010 .568 .645 .494 
D8 .176 .191 -.077 .540 .468 .428 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
.850 .665 .630 .654 
  
 









a: Extraction Method: Principal component analysis; Rotation Method: direct oblique with 
Kaiser Normalization; 
b: CM: communality 
c: Rotation converged in 12 iterations;  
d: Missing data treatment: Replacement with mean value; Little and Rubin’s (1986) 
Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test was performed, and the result shows that 
pattern of missing values does not depend on value; 
e: Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.803; Bartlett’s test of sphericity: 
Approx. chi-square: 538.301; df: 105; Sig:.000; 
f: there are 65 (61.0%) non-redundant residuals with absolute value>0.05; and  
g: Cumulative percentage of variation explained=63.708%. 
 
Table 6.4 also shows that the lack of empowerment in public clients’ representatives 
(D17) and the lack of clients’ initiative in RC practices (D9) can impede the adoption 
of relational transactions. A lack of empowerment on the part of the client’s 
representatives inhibits the efficiency of the problem resolution process (Ng et al., 
2002). This inefficiency in the problem solving process may further hamper 
contracting parties’ commitment to relational transactions. Other studies have also 
found that clients’ unwillingness to fully commit to RC practices also impedes the 
adoption of RC practices (e.g., Hayford and Utz, 2002; Ng et al., 2002). Their 
unwillingness puts RC development at a low priority, thus forcing the contract on the 
traditional adversarial route. 
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It is found that fear of partners’ opportunistic behaviors (D12) and mistrust (D18) can 
hinder the adoption of relational transactions. This may be due to the heavy reliance 
on formal contracts which are too rigid and which do not emphasize collaboration and 
sharing of responsibilities and risks (Eriksson et al., 2008). This may consequently 
lead to a higher level of mistrust and higher transaction costs incurred by monitoring 
each party closely.  
 
Factor 2 is labeled “ethos of public service”. Public projects face more constraints 
from public accountability (D20) and public clients cannot be seen to have a 
‘hand-in-glove’ relationship with private parties (D23). These findings agree with 
Ross (2003), who stated that audit issues should be managed carefully in public 
projects. By contrast, boundary permeability along with minimal internal regulations 
in private projects gives rise to higher possibilities of implementing relational 
transactions (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). 
 
A conservative culture (D16) is quite prevalent in the construction sector. As 
Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy (2000:285) have noted, government officials may 
have the attitude where ‘there is no need to change current approaches/practices that 
are good enough (or even better than others)’, or may manifest the ‘not invented here’ 
syndrome. 
 
Factor 3 is labeled “lack of continuity”. Parties who tend to adopt relational 
transactions need to spend more efforts understanding the soft principles (D15) and 
establishing a compatible culture (D13). Personnel also need to spend time nurturing 
close working relationships with each other. A significant amount of time is also 
required to find the right partners, build the team, and establish and implement 
procedures and rules (Cook and Hancher, 1990). Without these efforts, an integrative 
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and collaborative culture is difficult to be cultivated. If the culture is incompatible 
(D13), contracting parties may work against each other, pursuing their own objectives 
which may be inconsistent with the overall project outcomes.  
 
Factor 4 is labeled “institutional constraints.” Parties in public projects are expected 
to strictly adhere to rules, regulations and laws (D22). Due to these pre-set regulations, 
public clients are likely to face more constraints in their internal operations and 
contractual relationships (e.g., Crowley and Karim, 1995; Chan et al., 2001). In 
addition, strong commitment to fairness and transparency in public procurement may 
preclude the adoption of alternative relationship-based approaches (D8) (Jones, 
2002).  
 
In public projects, large bureaucratic organizations (D21) are likely to face more 
difficulties when adopting relational practices. This finding agrees with Ng et al. 
(2002) who found that the large amount of administrative requirements and the less 
flexible approach associated with large organizations are likely to decrease the 
efficiency of open communication among contracting parties. This then undermines 
parties’ faith in their clients’ ability to implement relational transactions.  
 
6.3.2 Comparing different parties’ perceptions of barriers 
Objective two of this study is also to compare different parties’ perception of barriers 
to adopting relational transaction practices. Table 6.3 shows that 14, eight and three of 
the 23 factors are significant barriers faced by public clients, private consultants and 
contractors respectively. Unpaired t test results show several instances (i.e., D12, D16, 
D20 and D22) where the rating of one party is significantly different from other 
parties. Therefore, H13 is not rejected (see Section 3.10).  
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Among the 23 possible barriers, five (i.e., D3, D4, D6, D14 and D19) are not 
significantly barriers faced by any party. On the other hand, only one barrier namely 
bureaucratic public client organizations (D21) significantly deter all three parties 
from adopting relational transactions. This finding confirms presence of a large 
amount of administrative requirements and less flexible approaches in public projects. 
The differences in barriers faced by each group of respondents are discussed in the 
next sections.  
 
6.3.2.1 Barriers faced by public clients only  
The results show that seven barriers are significantly encountered by public clients 
only. The results show that, from public clients’ stance, contracting parties hesitate to 
adopt relational transactions because of the lack of background in the form of lack of 
knowledge of relational approaches (D1), training and guidance in relational 
arrangement (D2) and experience in relational arrangements (D5) (see Table 6.3). 
Public clients expressed this significant concern because the absence of such 
background may lead to a lack of confidence among team members (Ling et al., 
2006). It would furthermore cause parties not to commit fully to relational 
transactions. To strengthen such background, contracting parties can draw more 
relational transaction related lessons from successful cases; attend RC workshops and 
training courses.  
 
Table 6.3 shows that the lack of top management support (D7) is a significant barrier 
for public clients. This agrees with previous findings that a lack of top management 
support impedes the adoption of relational transaction practices (e.g., Akintoye et al., 
2000; Eriksson et al., 2008). As top management’s commitment wanes, the 
commitment to RC practices at the project level follows suit (Akintoye et al., 2000). 
Consequently, it would deter individual decision makers from trying new approaches 
regardless of the potential advantages (Eriksson et al., 2008).  
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Besides a lack of top management support from each party, the lack of empowerment 
in client's representatives (D17) is significant barrier for public clients. A lack of 
empowerment on part of the client’s representatives would inhibit efficiency of the 
problem resolution process (Ng et al., 2002). This inefficiency in problem solving 
process might further hamper contracting parties’ commitment to relational 
transactions.  
 
The results in Table 6.3 show that public clients are the only party that regarded the 
lack of common goals among contracting parties as a significant barrier (D10). This 
confirms Cook and Hancher’s (1990) finding that clients and contractors have the 
substantially different goals and each party has self-interest (Drexler and Larson, 
2000; Packham et al., 2003). Without common goals, contracting parties would 
pursue their own objectives regardless of the overall project performance which 
might lead to conflicts. As a result of more conflicts, relationships would worsen. It is 
suggested that communication of objectives and expectations during the formative 
phase might be helpful for parties to adopt common goals (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2004a; Love et al., 2010). 
 
It is also found that public clients are the only party that rated the lack of trust among 
contracting parties (D18) as a significant barrier. The trust issue is only faced by 
clients because they need to rely on contractors and consultants to supply their 
services to a high level of quality at the agreed price. For consultants and contractors, 
trust is not a problem because the public sector can be relied on to make payment 
promptly. Clients might be also aware that their price-dominated selection criterion 
entices tenderers to lower their bids to win contracts, relying on subsequent claims to 
recover their costs (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). This would make their 
relationships adversarial at the start of the project and trust difficult to develop. It is 
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suggested that a key person in each party be identified to work closely with the others 
as the development and maintenance of trust are largely at the inter-personal level. 
 
6.3.2.2 Barriers faced by contractors only  
Contractors are the only party who considered interpersonal clash as a significant 
barrier (D11). Being lower than clients and consultants on the value chain, contactors 
are not in any position to ask for clients’ representative or consultants to be replaced 
if they have interpersonal clashes with contractors. Interpersonal barriers, originating 
from individual people’s working attitude or previous contractual relationships, are 
the hardest to overcome (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002). To avoid interpersonal clashes, 
it is suggested contractors appoint amiable site management staff who possess 
superior soft skills, like effective negotiation and communication.  
 
6.3.2.3 Barriers faced by consultants only  
The results in Table 6.3 show that consultants are the only ones who felt that D15 and 
D16 are significant barriers to relational transactions. Consultants felt time required 
to develop relationships (D15) is a significant barrier. This might be because 
consultants would much prefer to get on with the project rather than to spend a 
significant amount of time to find right partners and build the team (Cook and 
Hancher, 1990).  
 
The results in Table 6.3 show that consultants are the only party who rated 
“conservative industry culture inhibits changes and encourages preservation of the 
status quo” (D16) as a significant barrier. In addition, their rating is significantly 
higher than contractors. This may be because consultants’ behaviors are significantly 
influenced by the stance adopted by public clients. For public clients, traditional 
contracting is often perceived as less risky (Kadefors, 2004), which discourages them 
from relational transactions. Another reason may be that private consultants still lack 
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experience in relational transactions. For example, they may not know how to handle 
a situation where they need to waive legal rights (Ross, 2003). This would lead them 
to fall back on the formal contractual governance.  
 
It is acknowledged that transforming such a conservative culture within a short period 
would be extremely challenging. Nevertheless, it is suggested that contracting parties 
attach more importance to the early post-contractual phase. For example, upon 
signing a contract, contracting parties could adopt joint learning processes and use 
interpretive flexibility to signal trust and commitment (Dewulf and Kadefors, 2012). 
It is also suggested that public clients take the initiative in relational transactions, 
which would in turn influence consultants’ regards for relational transactions.  
 
6.3.2.4 Barriers faced by two parties  
The results in Table 6.3 show that six barriers (i.e., D8, D9, D12, D20, D22 and D23) 
were significantly accorded by two parties. Both public clients and contractors felt 
that “lack of acceptance of relational approaches as a long-term way of doing 
business (D8) is a significant barrier to relational transactions. The lack of acceptance 
from the public sector might be because public clients show greater reluctance to 
adopt changes (Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000) and they prefer to select the 
traditional routines even if they agree with the RC in principle (Clifton et al., 2004; 
Læ dre et al., 2006). On the other hand, the reason contractors did not accept 
relational transactions as a long term way of doing business (D8) might be their 
awareness that public clients need to have transparency. Due to the wide use of open 
tendering, a well-performing contractor may not improve its chances of winning the 
next contract, even with the same public client (Weston and Gibson, 1993). Without 
expectations of future business opportunities, contractors would be less motivated to 
adopt relational transactions in a long run. Consultants did not see D8 as a significant 
barrier because selection of consultants to undertake public projects are less 
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dependent on submitting the lowest price, but more on consultants’ experience and 
track record.  
 
The results show that both public clients and private consultants considered the lack 
of client’s initiative in relational practices as a significant barrier (D9). This might be 
because, compared to private parties’ practices, the public sector has rigid and 
impermeable organizational boundaries within government agencies (Crowley and 
Karim, 1995; Chan et al., 2001; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). The 
pre-existing systems would force them to focus on the formal controls, which might 
deter public clients from initiating relational transactions.  
 
The results indicate that both public clients and consultants rated concerns about 
opportunistic behaviors of other contracting parties (D12) to be a significant barrier. 
Their ratings are significantly higher than contractors. Opportunism arises due to 
bounded rationality-that the formal contract could not completely spell out what is to 
be done in all situations. Yet, both public clients and consultants still prefer the formal 
controlling tools. For example, one respondent from the public sector indicated that: 
“relational transactions must be done within the contract and laws”. “Clients need to 
select a contractor with devotion and passion to execute the works as per contractual 
provision”. As a result of the incompleteness of formal contracts, the preference for 
formal controlling tools would inevitably lead to opportunism. In addition, in the 
traditional design-bid-build arrangement, the “us-and-them” syndrome causes clients 
and consultants to be wary of contractors trying to outfox them.  
 
The results in Table 6.3 show that public clients and private consultants face a 
significant barrier to implement relational transactions because of concerns about 
public accountability (D20). Their ratings are significantly higher than contractors. 
Public clients and consultants have converging perceptions because consultants 
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represent clients and are responsible for ensuring rules and procedures are complied 
with. Public clients are obligated to fulfill the fundamental delivery principles and 
meet public service ethos; thus they would eschew activities involving close 
relationships. A respondent from the public sector indicated that “relational 
transactions are difficult to implement in the public sector due to sensitivity in work 
functions and possible allegations of corruption”.  
 
Table 6.3 shows that public clients and private consultants face a significant barrier of 
stringent rules, regulations and laws (D22). The rating of public clients is 
significantly higher than private consultants and contractors. This confirms that the 
Singapore government’s strong commitment to transparency and accountability 
through various policies in public sector procurement would preclude the adoption of 
collaborative approaches (Jones, 2002). Since all matters in public projects are open 
to internal and external audits, public clients would accord a higher priority to the 
formal controlling approaches rather than relational transactions. The findings 
indicate that the adoption of relational transactions should be subjected to compliance 
with the stipulated rules and regulations.  
 
The results show that both public clients and consultants rated that the need to avoid 
possible allegations of corruption arising from close relationships between client and 
other contracting parties (D23) significantly impedes the adoption of relational 
transactions. Allegations may arise if decisions are made in an unfair and unethical 
manner (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002). However, this is not to say that contracting 
parties cannot build good working relationships. One respondent from the public 
sector commented that: “It is very often that the success of a mega-infrastructure 
public project is achieved because trustworthy and good working relationships were 
developed”.  
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6.4 Summary  
The t test results show that the adoption of relational transactions in public projects is 
significantly motivated by the 21 drivers but deterred by the 15 barriers (see Tables 
6.1 and 6.3). Three factors were detected from the 21 drivers: (i) increasing value 
proposition; (ii) improving business competitiveness; and (iii) improving project time 
and cost performance (see Table 6.2). The 15 significant barriers were reduced into 
four factors: (i) lack of capabilities; (ii) ethos of public service; (iii) lack of continuity; 
and (iv) institutional constraints (see Table 6.4). 
 
The comparison results show that 21 drivers significantly motivate three parties to 
adopt relational transactions; three parties’ perceptions of the drivers are not 
significant different (Table 6.1). It shows that 14, eight and three of the 23 barriers 
significantly deter public clients, consultants and contractors from relational 
transactions respectively. Unpaired t test for barriers shows that parties’ perceptions 
are not significantly different except for D12, D16, D20 and D22 (Table 6.3). 
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Chapter 7 Relational Transaction Practices and Project 
Outcomes  
 
7.1 Introduction  
Objectives three and four of this study are to examine whether relationship quality 
could give rise to better project outcomes and to explore to what extent relational 
transaction practices could lead to better outcomes and relationship quality (see 
Section 1.3). This chapter aims to identify relational transaction practices that lead to 
better relationships and project outcomes and to examine whether relationship quality 
can contribute to project outcomes (see Section 7.5). PLS-SEM was adopted, which 
comprises two stages: model specification (see Section 7.2) and model evaluation 
(see Section 7.4). Before that, the t test on relational transactions practices was 
conducted (see Sections 7.3). After obtaining statistical results, experts’ views were 
used to validate the framework (see Section 7.6). In the end, how to apply the 
empirically tested model in construction is presented (see Section 7.7). 
 
7.2 Model Specification for PLS-SEM 
This section specifies the measurement models (see Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2) and the 
structural model (see Section 7.2.3). Lohmoller (1982) presented examples where a 
model with 96 indicators, and 26 constructs was estimated with 100 data cases. In this 
study, there are 12 constructs and 104 samples, which is enough for performing 
PLS-SEM. 
 
7.2.1 Measurement model specification for independent constructs 
The measurement items and constructs (see Table 7.1) were specified using 
reflective-formative hierarchical models (see Table 4.2). The first and second order 
constructs are reflective and formative respectively. For example, the second-order 
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construct “information sharing (IS)” is manifested by three first-order constructs 
which is the information sharing between each two parties (i.e., IS_CL&CS, 
IS_CL&CT and IS_CT&CS) (see Figure 7.1). The reason to use formative mode for 
the second-order constructs is that each dyad’s communication is not assumed to 
correlate with others. However, removing any pair would violate the validity of the 
second-order construct. These fit the characteristics of formative modes (see Section 
4.6.4.2). In addition, the measurement items used to measure the first order constructs 
are reflective, as there is conceptual correlation among the measurements and 





IS2_CL&CT open and effective 
communication 
IS3_CL&CT sharing of project information 
IS1_CL&CS mutual understanding 
IS1_CS&CT mutual understanding
IS2_CL&CS open and effective 
communication
IS2_CS&CT open and effective 
communication 
IS3_CS&CT sharing of project information 
IS3_CL&CS sharing of project information 




IS2_CL&CT open and effective 
communication 
IS3_CL&CT sharing of project 
information 
IS1_CL&CS mutual understanding 
IS1_CS&CT mutual understanding
IS2_CL&CS open and effective 
communication
IS2_CS&CT open and effective 
communication 
IS3_CS&CT sharing of project 
information 
IS3_CL&CS sharing of project 
information 
IS1_CL&CT mutual understanding 
 
Figure 7.1: An example of hierarchical construct model of information sharing (IS) 
 
The next reason to adopt reflective-formative hierarchical models is that when 
multiple first order constructs are able to fully capture the entire domain of the second 
order construct, making a formative relationship between second order and first order 
constructs suitable (Petter et al., 2007). The final reason is that each first order 
construct represents some portion of the second construct, making 
reflective-formative hierarchical model relevant (Law and Wong 1999:144). This 
method of specifying the independent constructs was also adopted by other 
researchers (see Ring et al., 2012). 
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Based on the reflective-formative methods for hierarchical model specification, eight 
independent constructs were input in to the PLS-SEM model (see Table 7.2). These 
are trust (TR), joint problem solving (PS), information sharing (IS), flexibility (FL), 
contractual solidarity (SO), harmonization within the social matrix (HM), role 
integrity (RI) and propriety of means (PR). The former three constructs are 
underpinned by the theory of Network Embeddedness and the latter five are 
supported by the theory of Relational Contracts (see Figure 3.1 in Section 3.2).  
 
7.2.2 Measurement model specification for dependent constructs 
The dependent constructs comprise cost performance (Y1), time performance (Y2), 
satisfaction (Y31 and Y32) and relationship quality (Z1 to Z3). These dependent 
variables were subject to factor analysis (see Table 7.1). Given a lack of strong 
theories about the number and nature of the underlying outcome indicators and 
relationship quality (i.e., Y and Z), EFA was performed.  
 
Three components were initially derived from seven indicators. Component 1 and 2 
are labeled as relationship quality and satisfaction respectively. Considering the low 
Cronbach’s alpha value of component 3 (less than 0.7) (Nunnally, 1978), a decision 
was made to keep Y1 and Y2 separate. This decision was based on the suggestion by 
Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007; 2009) that using single-item measurement is sensible if 
the scope of the construct is narrow, uni-dimensional and unambiguous. In the end, 
four components were attained: cost performance (Y1); time performance (Y2); 
satisfaction (Y3); and relationship quality (Z).  
 
Table 7.1: Factor analysis of outcome indicators 
Code Measurement items 
Component 
CM 
1 2 3 
Z1 Relationship between CL&CS at the end .839 -.002 .097 .828 
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Code Measurement items 
Component 
CM 
1 2 3 
Z2 Relationship between CS&CT at the end .801 .090 -.039 .760 
Z3 Relationship between CL&CT at the end .718 .294 .218 .649 
Y31 Product/output quality .007 .909 .045 .652 
Y32 Client Satisfaction .259 .812 .181 .713 
Y1 Cost -.094 .131 .855 .757 
Y2 Time .321 .073 .754 .678 
Cronbach’s alpha .803 .718 .529 
 
Eigen-values 2.643 1.323 1.069 
 
Percentage of variation explained (%) 37.76 18.902 15.277 
 
Note:  
a. Extraction Method: principal component analysis; Rotation Method : direct oblique 
with Kaiser Normalization 
b. Rotation converged in 4 iterations;  
c. CM: communality 
d. Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.661; Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity: Approx. chi-square: 106.082; df: 21; Sig.:.000; 
e. Missing data: listwise; and 
f. Cumulative percentage of variation explained (71.941%). 
 
7.2.3 Structural model specification 
Figure 7.2 shows that the structural model regarding the relationships among 
relational transactions (X) (see Section 3.3), relationship quality (Z) (see Section 3.5) 
and project outcome (Y) (see Section 3.4). The hypothesized relationships are 





















































Cost Time Satisfaction Relations
H9.3 (+)H9.2 (+)H9.1 (+)
Note: (+) denotes a positive relationships
 
Figure 7.2: Proposed structural model for boosting outcomes through relational transactions 
 
 115 
Table 7.2: Measurement models for relational transaction practices and outcomes 





TR1 Mutual trust among each other   
TR2 Level of interpersonal relations/cultural harmony (individual level)  
Problem solving (PS)  
PS1 Adjustable contracts to address uncertainties  
PS2 Commitment level of contracting parties to joint problem solving   
PS3 Presence of conducive learning climate/environment   
PS4 Acceptance of dispute resolution mechanism for the project   




IS1 Mutual understanding among each other   
IS2 Open and effective communication among each other   
IS3 Sharing of project information among each other   
Flexibility (FL) CL 
CS 
CT 
FL1 Flexibility when situations change   
FL2 Readiness to compromise on unclear issues 
Contractual solidarity (SO)  
SO1 Acceptance of agreed performance appraisal mechanism for the project  
SO2 Alignment of objectives of different contracting parties   
SO3 Collective/combined responsibilities by a pre-selected group comprising one person from each major party   
SO4 Joint coordination and monitoring plans among contracting parties  





HM1 Previous relationships among each other   
HM2 Ongoing social relationships among each other   




RI1 Commitment of resources to the project 
RI2 Long-term commitment  
RI3 Spirit of teamwork 
RI4 Continuous improvement 
Propriety of means (PR) 
Formality 
(FM) 
FM1 Clarity of division of responsibilities among contracting parties   
FM2 Clarity of the terms and conditions in contract   
Fairness 
(FA) 
FA1 Clearly defined equitable risk-sharing arrangement among contracting parties   
FA2 Real gain-share/pain-share among contracting parties  
Cost (Y1)  Y1 Cost performance 









Y31 Project quality 




Z1 Relationships between clients and contractors at the end of the project 
Z2 Relationships between consultants and contractors at the end of the project 
Z3 Relationships between clients and consultants at the end of the project 






7.3 Descriptive Analysis of Relational Transaction Practices  
7.3.1 Significant relational transaction practices 
In Section B of the questionnaire, the extent to which relational transaction practices 
are adopted in public projects was investigated. The t test results in Table 7.3 show 
that 46 out of the 51 relational transaction practices are implemented to a significant 
extent (T-value>0; p<0.05).  
 
The results show that five practices are not implemented to a significant extent, which 
relate to ongoing social relationships among contracting parties (i.e., HM2_CT&CS, 
HM2_CL&CS and HM2_CL&CT), pre-existing familiarity between contractors and 
consultants (HM1_CT&CS) and real gain-share/pain-share arrangement (FA2). 
 
The results in Table 7.3 indicate that the extent to which contracting parties have 
ongoing social relationships (i.e., HM_2CT&CS, HM_2CL&CS and HM2_CL&CT) 
is not significant. This might be because the strict regulations precluded high level of 
social networks among participants. For example, in the public procurement, “where 
officers administer the allocation of government contracts in which they or their close 
relatives have any interest at all, or where they hold dual appointments in the 
company interested in the contract, they should declare these interests and disqualify 
themselves from handling the matter altogether” (GeBIZ, 2011). 
 
The results in Table 7.3 also show that public projects exhibit a non-significant level 
of previous familiarity between contractors and consultants (HM_1CT&CS). This is 
mainly because of competitive tenders used to procure both consultancy and 
construction services, which would significantly reduce the possibility to assemble a 
team where consultants and contractors have previous relationships.  
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The results also indicate that public projects do not adopt real gain-share/pain-share 
arrangement to a significant extent (FA2). This might be because the contract is 
usually designed by public clients which tend to protect the interests of the public 
sector.  
 
Table 7.3: t test of relational transaction practices 
Code Mean T-value Sig. 
IS1_CL&CT 3.42 5.061 0.000  
IS2_CL&CT 3.64 7.571 0.000  
IS3_CL&CT 3.67 7.849 0.000  
IS1_CL&CS 3.71 9.091 0.000  
IS2_CL&CS 3.72 8.571 0.000  
IS3_CL&CS 3.79 9.988 0.000  
IS1_CT&CS 3.47 5.432 0.000  
IS2_CT&CS 3.67 9.456 0.000  
IS3_CT&CS 3.76 10.613 0.000  
TR1_CL&CT 3.36 3.677 0.000  
TR2_CL&CT 3.55 6.141 0.000  
TR1_CL&CS 3.64 7.979 0.000  
TR2_CL&CS 3.62 8.111 0.000  
TR1_CT&CS 3.37 3.845 0.000  
TR2_CT&CS 3.48 5.661 0.000  
PS1 3.23 2.697 0.008  
PS2 3.79 9.726 0.000  
PS3 3.37 4.296 0.000  
PS4 3.55 7.517 0.000  
FL1_CL 3.43 4.361 0.000  
FL2_CL 3.35 3.525 0.001  
FL1_CT 3.77 9.876 0.000  
FL2_CT 3.53 6.04 0.000  
FL1_CS 3.56 5.966 0.000  
FL2_CS 3.39 4.759 0.000  
RI1_CT 3.98 12.129 0.000  
RI_CT2 3.84 8.555 0.000  
RI_CT3 3.97 12.11 0.000  
RI_CT4 3.8 9.985 0.000  
RI_CL1 3.81 8.337 0.000  
RI_CL2 4.04 9.664 0.000  
RI_CL3 3.97 11.31 0.000  
RI_CL4 3.96 11.28 0.000  
RI_CS1 3.41 4.206 0.000  
RI_CS2 3.78 8.426 0.000  
RI_CS3 3.77 8.502 0.000  
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Code Mean T-value Sig. 
RI_CS4 3.75 10.7 0.000  
HM1_CL&CT 3.33 2.715 0.008  
HM2_CL&CT 3.02 0.188 0.851  
HM1_CL&CS 3.55 5.475 0.000  
HM2_CL&CS 3.13 1.365 0.176  
HM1_CT&CS 3.14 1.34 0.183  
HM2_CT&CS 2.99 -0.111 0.912  
FM1 3.93 14.317 0.000  
FM2 3.83 9.777 0.000  
FA1 3.38 4.509 0.000  
FA2 3.16 1.833 0.070  
SO1 3.73 11.828 0.000  
SO2 3.6 7.793 0.000  
SO3 3.45 5.851 0.000  
SO4 3.65 8.006 0.000  
Note: see Table 7.2 for detailed description of relational transaction practices  
 
 
7.3.2 Comparing different parties’ relational transaction practices 
The next step is to investigate if there is significant difference in the extent to which 
individual contracting parties adopt relational transaction practices. The unpaired t 
test results in Table 7.4 show that both public clients and contractors commit 
significantly more resources (RI1) to the project than consultants. It seems reasonable 
because consultancy services essentially involve less physical resources.  
 
Table 7.4: Unpaired t test of individual practices 
Code 
CL CT CS CL-CT CL-CS CT-CS 
Mean Mean Mean t-value Sig. t-value Sig. t-value Sig. 
FL1 3.43  3.77  3.56  -2.70  0.01  -0.94  0.35  1.73  0.09  
FL2 3.35  3.53  3.39  -1.39  0.17  -0.32  0.75  1.18  0.24  
RI1 3.81  3.98  3.41  -1.33  0.19  2.89  0.00  4.48  0.00  
RI2 4.04  3.84  3.78  1.39  0.17  1.84  0.07  0.43  0.66  
RI3 3.97  3.97  3.81  -0.01  1.00  1.31  0.19  1.36  0.17  
RI4 3.96  3.80  3.75  1.38  0.17  1.87  0.06  0.43  0.67  
 
 
The results in Table 7.4 also show that in contrast to contractors, public clients are 
seen to be significantly less flexible when situation changes (FL1). Public clients 
usually have less room for flexibility because of bureaucracy (Ross, 2003). Their 
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works are also subject to audits by both internal organizations and external 
government agencies. Any decision made by the public officer needs to be 
sufficiently supported by evidence and reasonable justifications.  
 
Table 7.5 shows that clients and consultants are more likely to trust (TR1) and 
understand (IS1) each other. This might be because consultants are the representatives 
of the public clients and they are supposed to stand with each other.  
 














Mean Mean Mean t-value Sig. t-value Sig. t-value Sig. 
HM1 3.33  3.55  3.14  -1.44  0.15  1.14  0.25  2.79  0.01  
HM2 3.02  3.13  2.99  -0.75  0.45  0.21  0.83  1.05  0.30  
TR1 3.36  3.64  3.37  -2.17  0.03  -0.03  0.98  2.19  0.03  
TR2 3.55  3.62  3.48  -0.64  0.52  0.49  0.62  1.19  0.24  
IS1 3.42  3.71  3.43  -2.46  0.01  -0.07  0.94  2.25  0.03  
IS2 3.64  3.72  3.67  -0.69  0.49  -0.29  0.78  0.46  0.64  
IS3 3.67  3.79  3.76  -1.06  0.29  -0.80  0.43  0.32  0.75  
 
The comparison results in Table 7.5 show that consultants have significantly higher 
familiarity with public clients as compared to contractors (HM1). This might be 
because consultancy services are procured from the PSPC list with a limited number 
of entities and some public clients even have in-house consultancy services (see Table 
5.6). Therefore, it gives rise to a higher possibility to continue previous relationships. 
On the contrary, contractors are generally procured through open bidding (see Table 
5.5), thereby giving a lower likelihood of familiarity between contractors and 
consultants.  
 
7.4 Model Evaluation Results  
The proposed measurement models and structural model was input to the software 
SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005). The model evaluation comprises assessment of 
measurement models (see Section 7.4.1), hierarchical models (see Section 7.4.2) and 
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structural model result (see Section 7.4.3).  
 
7.4.1 Evaluating measurement models  
Table 7.6 presents the measurement model evaluation result. It shows that: (i) all 
loadings are greater than 0.4 with t-values greater than 2.58, indicating an acceptable 
indicator reliability (Churchill, 1979); (ii) the values of composite reliability (CR) are 
over 0.7, suggesting a satisfactory level of reliability of internal indicators within 
each construct (Bagozzi and Yi 1988); (iii) the values of AVE are more than 0.5, 
showing a satisfactory level of convergent validity of the constructs (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). The weights in Table 7.6 are used to estimate the score of constructs 
through the measurement items.  
 
In addition, each latent construct’s AVE is higher than its squared correlation with any 
other construct and each measurement is loaded the highest on the corresponding 
construct (see Appendix 4). These are an indication of discriminate validity of the 
constructs (Cenfetelli and Bassellier 2009; Hair et al., 2011; 2012).  
 
Based on the results above, it can be concluded that the measurement models are 
valid in terms of measuring the first order constructs through the measurement items. 
The next step is to evaluate hierarchical models, aiming to examine the validity of 
measuring the second order constructs using the first order constructs.  
  
Table 7.6: Overview of measurement model evaluation 
Direction Loading Weight T-value AVE CR 
FL1_CL← FL_CL 0.8926 0.5074  37.8192 
0.7906 0.8830 
FL2_CL← FL_CL 0.8857 0.4926  31.6667 
FL1_CS←FL_CS 0.8519 0.5277  17.5955 
0.6916 0.8176 
FL2_CS←FL_CS 0.8108 0.4723  6.9301 
FL1_CT←FL_CT 0.7753 0.4689  5.6966 
0.6451 0.7841 
FL2_CT←FL_CT 0.8301 0.5311  15.0181 
RI1_CL←RI_CL 0.7239 0.2312  14.1678 
0.6823 0.8952 
RI2_CL←RI_CL 0.8298 0.2171  15.6062 
 122 
Direction Loading Weight T-value AVE CR 
RI3_CL←RI_CL 0.8558 0.2581  22.3716 
RI4_CL←RI_CL 0.8854 0.2936  42.7175 
RI1_CS←RI_CS 0.7623 0.2258  17.8824 
0.6860 0.8969 
RI2_CS←RI_CS 0.7886 0.2406  16.8869 
RI3_CS←RI_CS 0.8708 0.2661  28.9236 
RI4_CS←RI_CS 0.8845 0.2675  40.8471 
RI1_CT←RI_CT 0.6306 0.1788  6.4761 
0.5855 0.8474 
RI2_CT←RI_CT 0.6933 0.2357  11.3584 
RI3_CT←RI_CT 0.8576 0.3067  31.9485 
RI4_CT←RI_CT 0.8533 0.2788  27.5349 
HM1_CL&CS←HM_CL&CS 0.8308 0.4511  12.9313 
0.7405 0.8507 
HM2_CL&CS←HM_CL&CS 0.8892 0.5489  29.2197 
HM1_CL&CT←HM_CL&CT 0.8397 0.4854  23.1290 
0.7213 0.8381 
HM2_CL&CT←HM_CL&CT 0.8588 0.5146  28.5964 
HM1_CS&CT←HM_CS&CT 0.8436 0.5072  23.5821 
0.7031 0.8257 
HM2_CS&CT←HM_CS&CT 0.8334 0.4928  17.7240 
TR1_CL&CS←TR_CL&CS 0.9060 0.4742  35.8595 
0.8375 0.9115 
TR2_CL&CS←TR_CL&CS 0.9242 0.5258  51.2835 
TR1_CL&CT←TR_CL&CT 0.8902 0.4816  29.7084 
0.8067 0.8930 
TR2_CL&CT←TR_CL&CT 0.9060 0.5184  46.3482 
TR1_CT&CS←TR_CT&CS 0.8581 0.4453  21.4025 
0.7832 0.8784 
TR2_CT&CS←TR_CT&CS 0.9111 0.5547  50.3083 
IS1_CL&CS←IS_CL&CS 0.9473 0.3499  62.8446 
0.8284 0.9354 IS2_CL&CS←IS_CL&CS 0.9062 0.3350  30.9267 
IS3_CL&CS←IS_CL&CS 0.8756 0.3151  26.2282 
IS1_CL&CT←IS_CL&CT 0.8596 0.3205  17.1693 
0.7050 0.8776 IS2_CL&CT←IS_CL&CT 0.8143 0.3124  11.7448 
IS3_CL&CT←IS_CL&CT 0.8444 0.3671  21.3179 
IS1_CT&CS←IS_CT&CS 0.7997 0.2897  8.0288 
0.6328 0.8379 IS2_CT&CS←IS_CT&CS 0.8146 0.3347  14.5435 
IS3_CT&CS←IS_CT&CS 0.7716 0.3756  11.8363 
FM1←FM 0.7850 0.4184  8.2136 
0.7088 0.8290 
FM2←FM 0.8953 0.5816  35.581 
FA1←FA 0.9073 0.5556  59.6573 
0.7735 0.8722 
FA2←FA 0.8507 0.4444  12.9699 
SO1←SO 0.7588 0.3055  6.3896 
0.6344 0.8737 
SO2←SO 0.7408 0.1448  7.0731 
SO3←SO 0.8218 0.1968  10.3340 
SO4←SO 0.8590 0.3529  10.7131 
PS1←PS 0.7893 0.2355  7.1722 
0.6286 0.8703 
PS2←PS 0.9105 0.3555  8.2218 
PS3←PS 0.7233 0.1593  5.0479 
PS4←PS 0.7341 0.2497  5.7513 
Y1←Y1 1.0000 1 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Y2←Y2 1.0000 1 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Y31←Y3 0.8028 0.3568  8.3215 
0.7676 0.8678 
Y32←Y3 0.9437 0.6432  23.0442 
Z1←Z 0.8249 0.3605  15.0288 0.6575 0.8518 
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Direction Loading Weight T-value AVE CR 
Z2←Z 0.7577 0.2891  8.4912 
Z3←Z 0.8473 0.3504  18.2942 
Note:  
a: critical t-values for a two-tailed test are 1.65 (significance level = 10 percent), 1.96 
(significance level = 5 percent), and 2.58 (significance level = 1 percent); 
b: algorithm setting includes use of: (i) path weighting scheme (Hair et al., 2011; 2012); (ii) 
a uniform value of 1 as an initial value for each of the outer weights (Henseler et al., 
2009); and (iii) maximum number of iterations (Ringle et al., 2005); and 
c: the bootstrapping setting comprises: (i) use individual sign changes (Henseler et al., 
2009); and (ii) the number of bootstrap samples: 5000 (Hair et al., 2011; 2012).  
 
7.4.2 Evaluating hierarchical models 
Table 7.7 shows that all path coefficients for the hierarchical models are significant (t 
value>2.56). It is worth noting that the values of R
2
 are very high, indicating that the 
variance of second order constructs are fully explained by the first order constructs. 
This is because measurement items were repeated in the second order constructs (see 
Section 4.6.4.2) (Tenenhaus et al. 2005; Wetzels et al., 2009). The values of Q
2
 are 
greater than zero, indicating that the first order constructs are robust to predict the 
second order constructs. 
 
Table 7.7: Evaluation of hierarchical model results 





FM→PR 0.5160 7.4731 
0.9997 0.5381 
FA→ PR 0.6633 9.8456 
FL_CL→ FL 0.5086 9.4485 
0.9999 0.4356 FL_CS→FL 0.3889 7.8032 
FL_CT→FL 0.3493 7.9887 
HM_CL&CS→HM 0.3812 6.0061 
0.9999 0.4247 HM_CL&CT→HM 0.4369 8.2925 
HM_CS&CT→HM 0.4424 9.5957 
IS_CL&CS→ IS 0.5395 7.6868 
0.9998 0.3594 IS_CL&CT→ IS 0.4646 6.4309 
IS_CT&CS→IS 0.3308 5.4021 
RI_CL→RI 0.4448 9.9337 
0.9999 0.4087 RI_CS→RI 0.4514 12.3800 
RI_CT→RI 0.3457 9.3938 
TR_CL&CS→TR 0.4045 8.0625 
0.9998 0.484 TR_CL&CT→TR 0.4338 7.8216 
TR_CT&CS→TR 0.4369 9.7200 
Note: for the blindfolding setting, the omission distance d is 7 (Hair et al., 2011; 2012). 
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The validity of measurement and hierarchical models confirms that the constructs of 
network embeddedness theory, the theory Relational Contracts, relationship quality 
and outcomes in public project practices are correctly identified. The next step is to 
examine the hypothetical relationships among relational transactions (X), outcomes 
(Y) and relationship quality (Z).  
 
7.4.3 Evaluating structural model and hypothesis testing  
The proposed structural model to explain relational transactions (X), relationship 
quality (Z) and outcomes (Y) (see Figure 7.2) was validated through PLS-SEM. The 
results are presented in Table 7.8 and Figure 7.3. The discussion is provided in 
Section 7.5.  
 
The results in Table 7.8 show that 10 path coefficients have a t-value greater than 1.65, 
indicating they are statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Eight hypotheses (i.e., 
H2.4, H4.2, H5.1, H5.3, H6.3, H7.2, H9.2, and H9.3) are supported; two hypotheses 
(i.e., H1.2 and H8.2) are not supported in the hypothesized sign. 
 
Table 7.8: Hypothesis testing results 
Code Path Hypothesized sign Beta T-value Inferences 
H1.1 PS→Y1 + -0.1557 1.1317 n.s. 
H1.2 PS → Y2 + -0.2545 1.9380 not supported 
H1.3 PS → Y3 + -0.2603 1.5330 n.s. 
H1.4 PS → Z + 0.1861 1.5153 n.s. 
H2.1 IS → Y1 + -0.0551 0.4862 n.s. 
H2.2 IS→Y2 + -0.178 1.4252 n.s. 
H2.3 IS→Y3 + 0.1681 1.1407 n.s. 
H2.4 IS→ Z + 0.3912 2.2443 supported 
H3.1 TR→Y1 + -0.1331 1.0023 n.s. 
H3.2 TR→Y2 + 0.1487 1.0777 n.s. 
H3.3 TR→Y3 + -0.2506 1.5847 n.s. 
H3.4 TR→Y4 + -0.0302 0.2304 n.s. 
H4.1 SO→Y1 + -0.104 0.7830 n.s. 
H4.2 SO→Y2 + 0.4091 2.3215 supported 
H4.3 SO→Y3 + -0.0611 0.4980 n.s. 
H4.4 SO→Z + -0.0456 0.4266 n.s. 
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Code Path Hypothesized sign Beta T-value Inferences 
H5.1 PR→Y1 + 0.2943 1.7425 supported 
H5.2 PR→Y2 + -0.1092 0.9159 n.s. 
H5.3 PR→Y3 + 0.5065 3.1118 supported 
H5.4 PR→Z + -0.1949 1.4938 n.s. 
H6.1 HM →Y1 + -0.0152 0.1752 n.s. 
H6.2 HM→Y2 + -0.1033 0.8928 n.s. 
H6.3 HM →Y3 + 0.2177 1.6741 supported 
H6.4 HM→Z + 0.0981 0.9312 n.s. 
H7.1 FL→Y1 + 0.0103 0.1201 n.s. 
H7.2 FL→Y2 + 0.2089 1.6609 supported 
H7.3 FL→Y3 + -0.086 0.9415 n.s. 
H7.4 FL→Z + 0.0023 0.0270 n.s. 
H8.1 RI→Y1 + -0.0702 0.6947 n.s. 
H8.2 RI→Y2 + -0.3126 2.6317 not supported 
H8.3 RI→Y3 + -0.0294 0.3488 n.s. 
H8.4 RI→Z + 0.1395 1.2529 n.s. 
H9.1 Z→Y1 + 0.1985 1.4507 n.s. 
H9.2 Z→Y2 + 0.4455 3.5348 supported 
H9.3 Z→Y3 + 0.2873 2.5020 supported 
Note:  
a: n.s.: non-significant; not supported denotes that the hypothesis is not accepted in the 
hypothesized sign.  
b: critical t-values for a two-tailed test are 1.65 (significance level = 10 percent), 1.96 






























































Figure 7.3: Significant paths and quality of PLS-SEM results 
 
Objective 3 of this study is to examine whether relationship quality could give rise to 
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better project outcomes (see Section 1.3). The relevant hypotheses are set in Table 3.8 
(see H9.1, H9.2 and H9.3). The results in Table 7.8 show that relationship quality (Z) 
positively influences time performance (Y2) and satisfaction (Y3), confirming H 9.2 
and H 9.3. The discussion of this result is presented in Section 7.5.1. 
 
The first part of objective 4 is to explore the extent to which adopting relational 
transaction practices can lead to better project outcomes (see Section 1.3). The 
relevant hypotheses are set out in Table 3.8 (see Section 3.10). The results in Table 
7.8 show that: (i) propriety of means (PR) contributes to significantly better cost 
performance (Y1) and satisfaction (Y3), confirming H5.1 and H5.3; (ii) flexibility (FL) 
and contractual solidarity (SO) lead to better time performance (Y2), supporting H7.2 
and H4.2; and (iii) harmonization within the social matrix (HM) contributes to better 
satisfaction (Y3), confirming H6.3. Three equations related to Y1, Y2 and Y3 are 
shown below.  
 
Figure 7.3 shows that the coefficient of the path from propriety of means (PR) to cost 




0.073 is greater than zero 
predictive relevance (Q
2




=0.0636) (see Equation 
7.1). This indicates that Equation 7.1 lacks a robustness to predict cost performance 
through the extent to which propriety of means is adopted in public projects, although 
there is a significant association between them. The measurement items of the 
constructs and their weights are shown in Figure 7.4. 
(PR)2943.0Y1   (R
2
=0.0636)         Equation 7. 1 
Where:  
Y1=cost performance; and 




FM1 clarity of division of responsibilities 
FA1 clearly defined equitable risk sharing arrangement
















Figure 7.4: Relational transactions to achieve better cost performance 
 
Figure 7.3 also shows that the coefficients of the path from relations (Z), contractual 
solidarity (SO), flexibility (FL), problem solving (PS) and role integrity (RI) to time 
performance (Y2) are significant and the value of R
2





 of 0.2430 is greater than zero (see Equation 7.2). This indicates that Equation 
7.2 has an acceptable predict relevance (Tenenhuas et al., 2005). The measurement 
items of the constructs and their weights are shown in Figure 7.5. 
0.2545(PS)-0.2089(FL)0.4091(SO)0.3126(RI)-(Z)5540.4Y2    Equation 7. 2  
     (R
2
=0.2271)        
Where:  
Y2=time performance;  
RI=role integrity;  
PS=problem solving;  
FL=flexibility; 
SO=contractual solidarity; and 
Z=relationship quality.  
 
Figure 7.3 shows that the coefficients of the paths from harmonization within the 
social matrix (HM), propriety of means (PR) and relations (Z) to satisfaction (Y3) are 
significant, with an Q
2





Equation 7.3). This indicates that Equation 7.3 has an acceptable predict relevance 
(Tenenhuas et al., 2005). The measurement items of the constructs and their weights 
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=0.2307)    Equation 7. 3 
Where:  
Y3=satisfaction;  
HM=harmonization within the social matrix;  
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Figure 7.6: Relational transaction practices to achieve better satisfaction 
 
The second part of objective 4 of this study is to explore the extent to which adopting 
relational transaction practices can lead to better relationship quality (see Section 1.3). 
The relevant hypotheses are set out in Table 3.8. Figure 7.7 shows that the coefficient 
of the path from information sharing (IS) to relations (Z) is significant, with an 
acceptable predictive relevance (Q
2





This indicates that Equation 7.4 has an acceptable predict relevance (Tenenhuas et al., 




=0.2633)         Equation 7. 4 
Where:  
Z=relationship quality; and 
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Figure 7.7: Relational transaction practices to achieve better relationship quality 
 
7.5 Discussion  
7.5.1 Improving project outcomes by nurturing relationships (Z to Y) 
The results in Table 7.8 show that relationship quality (Z) positively influences time 
performance (Y2) and satisfaction (Y3) (see Section 7.4.3). Good relationships among 
contracting parties (Z) gives rise to a significant better time performance (Y2) because 
it acts as an informal controlling tool that enables contracting parties to coordinate 
with each other (Jones et al., 1997; Ebbers and Wijnberg, 2009) and helps them to 
adapt to contingencies in a timely and effective way (Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1997; Jones 
et al., 1997). The presence of good relationships indicates that the transaction has 
been embedded in the networks of contracting parties (Granovetter, 1985). The result 
is consistent with Uzzi (1997) who found that good relationship quality has a positive 
impact on time performance.  
 
The result also shows that good relationships among contracting parties (Z) bring 
about better satisfaction (Y3) (see Section 7.4.3). Parties that have good relationships 
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with each other have established trust and this helps to control fraud (Granovetter, 
1985), encourages commitment (Uzzi, 1996), and facilitates the exchange of 
knowledge (Chinowsky et al., 2008), leading to better project quality and client 
satisfaction. There is better satisfaction because close relationships can reduce the 
need for formal controls (Dekker and Abbeele, 2011).  
 
7.5.2 Nurturing good relationships through relational transaction practices (X 
to Z) 
The results in Table 7.8 show that information sharing (IS) helps to nurture 
relationships among the contracting parties (Z) (see Section 7.4.3). Information 
sharing entails having mutual understanding (IS1), open communication (IS2) and 
sharing project information (IS3). 
 
To build better relationships, mutual understanding among contracting parties is vital 
(IS1). Each party needs to know the objectives and requirements of all the other 
contracting parties and how these relate to his own role. This will help parties to work 
well together in pursuing a common goal. A basis for mutual understanding provides 
an effective means to address problems as each party understands the concerns and 
situations faced by the other parties. Having processes in place that lead to effective 
problem solving and fewer conflicts contribute to the building of better relationships.  
 
The results confirm that building close relationships requires maintaining open lines 
of communication (IS2) (Chen and Chen, 2007). An effective communication system 
plays an instrumental role in problem identification and conflict resolution (Chan et 
al., 2004), prevents problems from becoming disputes (Wong and Cheung, 2005), 
assists in avoiding misunderstanding, rework and delays (Love et al., 2010), enables a 
mutually acceptable solution to be developed (Chen and Chen, 2007), and resolves 
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differences efficiently and expeditiously (Wong and Cheung, 2005). These 
advantages serve to facilitate relationship development in the network.  
 
The results also confirm that good relationships require timely project information 
sharing (IS3) (Macneil., 1986b). The provision of accurate and unbiased information 
helps to increase the level of mutual trust. Besides reducing uncertainties, an effective 
flow of project information also gives all parties an accurate update of project 
progress. This will enable them to collectively identify any potential problems at an 
early stage and further strengthen ties.  
 
7.5.3 Enhancing project outcomes through relational transactions (X to Y) 
7.5.3.1 Improving cost performance (Y1) 
The results in Table 7.8 show that propriety of means (PR) leads to better cost 
performance (Y1) (see Section 7.4.3). To achieve optimal cost performance, the 
division of responsibilities (FM1) and the terms and conditions of the contract (FM2) 
should be spelt out as clearly as possible. One reason is that clear contracts promote 
cooperation by controlling the behaviors of individual parties and mitigate risks of the 
other party’s opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Another reason is that contracts 
provide a means to coordinate the works of different contracting parties (Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000; Mellewigt et al., 2007), such as defining and aligning expectations 
(Woolthuis et al., 2005). These help to avoid cost-related conflicts, thereby 
facilitating cost control.  
 
To manage cost, the agreement should be fair (FA1 and FA2). An equitable 
risk-sharing arrangement (FA1) would ensure that rewards to contracting parties 
commensurate with their performance. In a real gain-share/pain-share arrangement 
(FA2), no party can make extra profits (in the long term) by shifting costs to another 
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party (Love et al., 2010). This will motivate parties to work in a cooperative and 
integrative manner rather than focus on individual interests.  
 
7.5.3.2 Facilitating time performance (Y2) 
The results in Table 7.8 indicate that flexibility (FL) and contractual solidarity (SO) 
lead to better time performance (Y2) (see Section 7.4.3). On the other hand, it is 
surprising to find that the adoption of two practices (i.e., role integrity (RI) and joint 
problem solving (PS)) impedes optimal time performance.  
 
Contractual solidarity (SO) contributes significantly to better time performance (Y2). 
Using the accepted performance appraisal mechanism (SO1), individual performance 
can be assessed against the same criteria. This enables contracting parties to 
accomplish objectives in a collective way and avoid potential conflicts. The 
alignment of objectives (SO2) also plays a role in avoiding potential time-consuming 
conflicts arising from individual parties pursuing only their own objectives without 
any regard to the overall benefits. In the face of unexpected events, common goals 
also present a set of guiding principles in seeking solutions, which enables problem to 
be resolved quickly. In addition, contracting parties working with collective 
responsibilities (SO3) are more likely to recognize problems in a more timely and 
accurate manner and thereafter take joint steps to address these problems. These 
approaches would help to boost efficiency and enable projects to be completed in a 
timely manner.  
 
Joint coordination and planning (SO4) encourage a two-way communication among 
the contracting parties and helps to strengthen and preserve relationships over the 
course of the project. Should any conflict arise, this stability in relationships can help 
the different parties to resolve it more effectively, without affecting the progress of 
the project.  
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Flexibility (FL) contributes to significantly better time performance (Y2). As all 
projects face unforeseen risks and changes, if contracting parties practice sufficient 
flexibility (FL1), they can propose quick measures to cope with contingencies and 
resolve problems in a timely manner. Due to the incompleteness of contracts (Baker 
et al., 2002), the attitudes of contracting parties toward coming to a compromise on 
any unclear issues (FL2) are important to accelerate the problem-solving process, 
cause fewer disputes and thereby prevent project delays.  
 
Besides the practices leading to better time performance, the results show that role 
integrity (RI) and joint problem solving (PS) impede time performance (Y2) in public 
projects. Commitment to team work (RI3) means more time is needed to meet and 
discuss in order to achieve unity in interests and opinions among team members. In 
addition, joint problem solving (PS2) would also take contracting parties a long time 
to negotiate and find and reach a unanimous resolution. Since adjustable contracts 
(PS1) may imply a certain level of ambiguity, it would be a time-consuming process 
for contracting parties to reach a consensus when making the necessary adjustments. 
This would likely make the situation adversarial and impedes project progress.  
 
7.5.3.3 Enhancing satisfaction (Y3) 
The results in Table 7.8 show that two relational transaction practices – 
harmonization within the social matrix (HM) and propriety of means (PR) – 
contribute to a higher level of satisfaction (Y3) (see Section 7.4.3). Harmonization 
within the social matrix (HM) helps to achieve greater satisfaction (Y3) as previous 
relationships among contracting parties (HM1) can improve the level of satisfaction 
in the present project. One reason is that previous embedded relationships set the 
expectations of trust as well as bring resources into the new exchange, namely 
experience, knowledge access, and valuable information (Uzzi, 1996; Zahear and 
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Soda, 2009). The advantages from pre-existing resources facilitate quality 
management (Y31) and help to address client requirements, leading to higher client 
satisfaction (Y32).  
 
In ongoing social relationships (HM2), contracting parties are already familiar with 
each other and this helps to avoid misunderstandings. In addition, ongoing 
relationships represent a social strategy for control and coordination (Eisenhardt, 
1985), which can help to mitigate against opportunism. Contractors and consultants 
would thus provide high quality product/services to ensure the standard is acceptable, 
leading to higher satisfaction (Y3). 
 
The results also show that propriety of means (PR) leads to better satisfaction (Y3). 
Clarity in the terms and conditions of a contract (FM2) helps contracting parties to 
kick-start the trust cycle (Wong and Cheung, 2005), which is a vital prerequisite for 
achieving greater satisfaction. Furthermore, clarity with regard to the responsibilities 
among the different parties (FM1) can help to avoid any misunderstanding of who is 
responsible for what and reduce conflicts in the area of quality management. The 
detailed duties and work scope clearly spelt out for all contracting parties would 
provide them with effective guidelines for quality management, leading to higher 
satisfaction.  
 
Fairness in the form of clearly defined equitable risk sharing (FA1) and real 
gain-share/pain-share (FA2) also contribute to significantly higher satisfaction (Y3). 
Contracts written with clearly defined and equitable risk allocation/sharing 
arrangement enable contracting parties to act collectively rather than individually. 
Such provisions can increase competence-based trust, leading to an increased 
likelihood of continued collaboration (Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011). Trust and the 




7.6 Model Validation 
The model for boosting public project outcomes through relational transactions (see 
Figure 7.3) was validated using subject matter experts. Their views were sought on 
the appropriateness of statistically significant paths and the practicability of 
measurement models. Using purposive sampling method, eight experts who had been 
involved in public projects and did not participate in the first round fieldwork were 
targeted. The characteristics of the interviewees are shown in Table 7.9. There is a 
mix of contractors, consultants and public clients so that views of different parties are 
presented. Although more interviewees were from construction firms, the data 
collected would not affect the reliability of the validation exercise. This is because the 
unit of analysis in the validation stage was at the project level and the respondents 
were requested to comment on the final framework based on their observation of 
extent to which the relational practices were present in one public project they 
involved in.  
 
The data collection instrument is a set of semi-structured questions (see Appendix 3). 
The questions are based on the results in Figure 7.3. The data collection method was 
face-to-face interviews. Each interview lasted for at least one hour. During the 
interview, the results of the model (see Figure 7.3) were initially introduced to the 
interviewee. After that, he/she was requested to comment on the appropriateness of 
the measurement models and the resultant structural model. The interview with CT-4 
was carried out as a pilot study for the data collection instrument used at the 








Type of firms 
No. of interview 
hours 
CT-1 Project director 21 Contractor 1 
CT-2 Manager 20 Contractor 1 
CT-3 Project manager 20 Contractor 1.5 













CL-2 Project director 15 Client (Housing) 1 
CS-1 Project manager 25 Consultancy 1 
Note: the interview with CT-4 was a pilot study. 
 
Interviewees agreed that cost performance (Y1), time performance (Y2), quality 
performance (Y31) and client satisfaction (Y32) are key performance indicators of 
public projects. They also commented that it is reasonable to keep relationship quality 
(Z) separate from project outcome indicators (X). This is because good relationships 
are actually not a key performance indicator on public projects and no party need to 
account for that.  
 
The finalized framework (see Figure 7.3) was shown to the experts and they were 
asked to comment on the practicability of the framework. Interviewees offered a 
positive assessment of the practicability of the final framework. They commented that 
the framework could provide them valuable insights on ways to achieve better 
outcomes through relational transactions in public projects. Specific comments are 
elaborated below. 
 
All interviewees concurred with the finding that propriety of means (PR) has a 
positive influence on cost performance (Y1). They explained that clarity of 
contractual terms (FM2) and responsibility (FM1) is helpful to mitigate against 
opportunistic behaviors and reduce potential discrepancies. These could help to avoid 
cost related conflicts. Interviewee CL-1 commented that: 
Clients have to control the budget and cannot compromise on the cost 
 138 
issue. Contractors on the other hand hope to earn larger profits. A fair 
way is to guard each party’s interests using the agreed contractual 
provisions. Presence of clarity would therefore provide each party 
convincing justification for their behaviors. 
 
Most interviewees agreed that fairness (FA) is helpful to achieve cost objective (Y1). 
Interviewee CT-5 commented that it is still acceptable if there are minor deviations 
from fairness. However, interviewee CT-3 responded that the standard conditions of 
contract were designed by public clients and it was thus biased towards clients’ 
interests. This bias makes it difficult for contractors to rely on the contract to guard 
their interests. To achieve better cost performance, it is suggested that public clients 
should act fairly.  
 
Most interviewees agreed that close relationships (Z) could facilitate project progress 
(Y2). Four contractor interviewees believed that good relationships accelerate their 
partners’ responses if such relationships are based on trustworthy competency and 
personality of the contracting parties. Three interviewees (i.e., CL-1, CL-2 and CS-1) 
indicated that good relationships allow for open communication and effective 
dissemination of tacit knowledge and implicit information. It would help to accelerate 
problem recognition and resolving, and thereby help to improve the time performance 
(Y2). 
 
Interviewees agreed that flexibility (FL) contributes to time performance (Y2). 
Flexibility is critical to manage unforeseen situations which take place quite often in 
construction. Contractors who are interviewed shared that they would compromise on 
unclear issues (FL2). At the same time, they also hope that their partners would 
compensate them for their efforts.  
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Interviewees concurred with that contractual solidarity (SO) gives rise to better time 
performance (Y2). Interviewee CL-1 commented that joint planning and monitoring 
(SO4) could help contracting parties to manage risks more effectively. CL-1 
mentioned that: 
Some risks are very hard to identify in advance. If unexpected risky event 
arises, we will come together to find a solution. This is because if we 
could help them, they will trust us and support us. 
Interviewees confirmed that harmonization within the social matrix (HM) positively 
influences the satisfaction level (Y3). Interviewees from construction firms explained 
that the pre-existing working relationships (HM1) could enable them to know more 
about their partners’ management requirements. This can help them to address 
partners’ requirements more effectively. In addition, four contractor interviewees 
indicated that trust emerged from previous relationships (HM1) would speed up 
partners’ decision making and possibly lower the frequency of site inspections.  
 
Interviewees from the private sector indicated that previous relationships (HM1) with 
public clients would enable them to better understand clients’ systems, like the claim 
process, audit procedures and the specifications. Especially some requirements are 
fairly subjective, like the quality of workmanships. This tacit information is rather 
valuable, but cannot be explicitly documented. Understanding this information would 
assist them in addressing clients’ requirements more effectively and thereby enhance 
clients’ satisfaction (Y3). 
 
Eight interviewees concurred that propriety of means (PR) could contribute to better 
satisfaction (Y3). Interviewee CS-1 indicated that the clearly defined procedures 
could provide contracting parties an effective coordination guidance according to 
which contracting parties can work collectively as an integrated team. It would help 




Interviewees agreed that good relationships (Z) allow for better satisfaction (Y3). 
Interviewees from the contractor side commented that close relationships could help 
to reduce partner’s formal controls. It could also help to build a collective and flexible 
approach to cope with contingencies and problems. Another reason is that good 
relationships (Z) can lead to a higher level of commitment and encourage contracting 
parties to share knowledge and information, which is helpful for achieving higher 
level of satisfaction (Y3). For example, contractors are likely to share the root causes 
of the technical problems. In addition, four contractor interviewees indicated that 
their partners would be likely to accept contractors’ reasonable proposals if there 
exists trustworthy relationships. It would therefore give rise to better satisfaction.  
 
Eight interviewees reinforced that information sharing (IS) has a positive influence on 
relationship quality (Z). They viewed that effective communication is helpful to 
resolve conflicts. Interviewees CT-1 and CS-1 noted that the method of 
communication is an indication of the strength of relationship quality. When 
contracting parties have closer relationships, they would be more approachable 
towards each other.  
 
7.7 Model Application 
The finalized structural model (see Figure 7.3) was validated statistically using 
PLS-SEM (see Section 7.4) and qualitatively through eight subject matter experts 
(see Section 7.6). The model is sound to be valid and robust. The next step is to 
transform and elaborate this model for application. Table 7.10 presents the checklists. 
These checklists provide contracting parties with the information of strategies to 
fulfill desired project outcomes and the practices to achieve these strategies.  
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Since the application of the checklist shares the same methodology, the explanation of 
how to achieve better cost performance is provided. The first application is the main 
strategies that help to improve cost performance. Table 7.10 shows that propriety of 
means (PR) has a positive impact on cost performance (Y1). This informs contracting 
parties that the adoption of propriety of means is an effective way to realize the 
planned cost objective.  
 
The second application deals with adopting the suggested practices to achieve 
strategies. Table 7.10 shows that propriety of means (PR) is positively influenced by 
the level of formality (FM) and fairness (FA). Four practices under propriety of 
means (PR) are therefore suggested. There are to: divide responsibilities among 
contracting parties clearly (FM1); provide clear terms and conditions in contract 
(FM2); share risks equitably among contracting parties (FA1); and share real gains 
and pain among contracting parties (FA2). This finding reminds contracting parties to 
prioritize these four practices when they configure propriety of means in their 
projects.  
 
In order to apply the research findings to practice, some changes to current policy and 




Table 7.10: Checklist for improving project outcomes and relationships using relational transaction practices  
Desired 
outcome 











Divide responsibilities among contracting parties clearly  
Conduct face to face negotiation if the division of responsibility is 
ambiguous.   
Avoid outfoxing other parties to dodge responsibility. 
Provide clear terms and conditions in contract  
Conduct face to face negotiation if unclear terms and conditions are spotted. 
Avoid a strict reference to the contract.    
Share risks equitably among contracting parties  
Adopt a joint risk management approach  
Identify risks collectively and allocate the risks fairly 
Share real gains and pain among contracting parties  
Public clients act more fairly 







Be flexible when situations change   
Reduce public client’s organizational bureaucracy 
Public clients simplify procedures to grant approvals. 
Be ready to compromise on unclear issues 
Reasonably compensate partner’s efforts 







Agree and accept a performance appraisal mechanism for 
the project  
Devise a performance appraisal mechanism collectively.  
Monitor project progress against the agreed performance appraisal system 
Evaluate project performance jointly  
Align objectives of different contracting parties  
Share benefits with each other fairly. 
Understand partner’s strategic goals and project goals. 
Form a group comprising one person from each major 
party to have collective/combined responsibilities. 
Public clients take the initiative in assembling a group comprising one 
person from each major party. 
Resolve conflicts collectively and in a timely manner. 
Coordinate and monitor plans among contracting parties 
jointly 
Devise a project plan collectively.  
The project plan should: identify uncertainties; align objectives of different 








Select partners who have previous relationships among 
each other 
Assign the staff who had prior cooperative experiences with the project 
partner  
Cultivate ongoing social relationships among each other  
Adopt a relational, partnership and/or partnering mindset. 











Take steps to understand each other   
Understand partner’s responsibilities and goals in the project.  
Communicate with each other to understand each other’s concerns.  
Communicate openly and effectively among each other  
Provide continuity by having a designated person to deal with daily 
communications and attend regular meetings. 
Make use of IT tools for communication 
Share project information among each other  
Exchange project progress information in a timely manner. 
Shorten the path to transfer information by conducting face to face meetings.  
Acquire partner’s informal and tacit information about managing the project 
through  face-to-face interactions. 
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7.8 Summary  
This chapter deals with the identification of the interrelationships among relational 
transactions (X), outcomes (Y) and relationship quality (Z). The descriptive analysis 
of relational transactions show that five practices are not implemented to a significant 
extent, which are related to ongoing social relationships among contracting parties 
(i.e., HM2_CT&CS, HM2_CL&CS and HM2_CL&CT), pre-existing familiarity 
between contractors and consultants (HM1_CT&CS) and real gain-share/pain-share 
arrangement (FA2) (see Section 7.3.1).  
 
The PLS-SEM results show that relational transactions could contribute to public 
project outcomes. The results in Table 7.8 show that: (i) propriety of means (PR) 
contributes to significantly better cost performance (Y1) and satisfaction (Y3); (ii) 
flexibility (FL) and contractual solidarity (SO) lead to better time performance (Y2); 
and (iii) harmonization within the social matrix (HM) contributes to better 
satisfaction (Y3). The results in Table 7.8 show that relationship quality (Z) positively 
influences time performance (Y2) and satisfaction (Y3). It is also found that 
information sharing (IS) gives rise to better relationships (Z).  
 
The statistical results were furthermore qualitatively validated by eight interviews 
(see Section 7.6). The interviewees provided positive comments on the 
appropriateness of the finalized model. In the end, the checklist was prepared in order 
to apply the findings in public projects (see Table 7.10).  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
8.1 Summary  
The construction industry has received many criticisms for the adversarial 
relationships that exist within it (Latham, 1994; Egan, 1998). Such relationships are 
likely to lead to project failure (Ng et al., 2002). Past studies have found that 
relational transactions (i.e., RC norms and network strategies) could bring about good 
project outcomes (e.g., Chinowsky et al., 2008; 2010; Taylor et al., 2010; Ling and Li, 
2012; Greenwood and Wu, 2012). These empirical studies, however, mainly 
investigated projects in general, without differentiating project types (i.e., whether 
public or private projects). In reality, the scenario faced by contracting parties in 
public projects differs from that in private projects because close relationships 
between public officials and private contractors and consultants are frowned upon and 
because of the widespread practice of open and competitive tenders. Hitherto, the 
research on relational transactions in public projects is still piecemeal and anecdotal. 
This study therefore investigated the relational transaction practices that lead to better 
outcomes and the drivers of and barriers to relational transactions in public projects 
(see Section 1.3). 
 
From the literature review, it was found that Macneil’s theory of Relational Contracts 
(1983) and Granovetter’s (1985) theory of Network Embeddedness may be used to 
explain transactions that take place in projects (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4). Relational 
transactions are underpinned by three network strategies (see Section 2.4.4) and five 
RC norms (see Section 2.3.3). A literature review of the practices of relational 
transactions in construction led to a design of the conceptual framework for boosting 
public project outcomes through relational transactions (see Section 3.2, Figure 3.1).  
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Fieldwork was undertaken to test the conceptual framework. The research design was 
a questionnaire-survey (see Section 4.2). A specially designed questionnaire was used 
to collect data from public clients, private contractors and consultants who had been 
involved in public projects in Singapore (see Section 4.3). A total of 104 sets of 
public project data were collected (see Section 5.1). After the data were collected, the 
one sample t test and EFA were used to derive the critical barriers and drivers (see 
Sections 6.2.1 and 6.3.1); the unpaired t test was applied to compare different parties’ 
perception of the drivers and barriers (see Sections 6.2.2 and 6.3.2). PLS-SEM was 
used to identify the critical relational transaction practices that lead to better project 
outcomes and relationship quality (see Sections 7.2 to 7.5). The main statistical 
results were thereafter validated qualitatively by interviewing eight subject matter 
experts (see Section 7.6). 
 
8.2 Key Findings, Validation of Hypotheses and 
Recommendations  
8.2.1 Critical drivers of and barriers to relational transactions  
The first objective is to identify the critical drivers of and barriers to relational 
transactions (see Section 1.3). It was found that the adoption of relational transactions 
in public projects is significantly motivated by 21 drivers (see Section 6.2.1) and 
deterred by 15 barriers (see Section 6.3.1). The results support hypotheses H10 and 
H11 (see Section 3.10) and address the third knowledge gap (see Section 3.9). It is 
recommended that contracting parties in public projects should pay more attention to 
the list of 21 drivers and 15 barriers when attempting to adopt relational transactions.  
 
Parties are driven to adopt relational transactions if they need better value proposition, 
higher business competitiveness and better project time and cost performance (see 
Section 6.2.1). It is recommended that contracting parties in public projects identify 
 147 
and make known their expectations at the start of a project, and thereafter use these to 
anchor relational transaction practices. Another implication is that contracting parties 
could embed relational transaction practices into the framework of strategic 
management. 
 
From the 15 significant barriers, it can be deduced that parties are deterred from 
adopting relational transaction practices when they lack capabilities in relational 
transactions, are daunted by the ethos of public services, perceive a lack of continuity 
from project to project and face institutional constraints (see Section 6.3.1). It is 
recommended that public clients take a leading role in initiating relational transaction 
arrangements. They should encourage other contracting parties to organize more 
relational transactions related training courses or workshops. Public clients should 
also be pro-active in disseminating their successful relational transaction experiences 
to the whole construction industry.  
 
8.2.2 Comparison of different parties’ perception of drivers and barriers  
The second objective is to compare different parties’ perception of the drivers of and 
barriers to relational transactions (see Section 1.3). The results showed that the 21 
drivers can significantly motivate the three parties – public clients, private consultants 
and contractors – to adopt relational transactions and there is no significant difference 
in the three groups’ perception of the drivers (see Section 6.2.2). Hypotheses H12 is 
not supported (see Section 3.10).  
 
Among the 23 barriers, 14, eight and three of them significantly deter public clients, 
private consultants and contractors respectively from adopting relational transactions 
(see Section 6.3.2). The results further show that contracting parties’ perceptions are 
significantly different in face of the barriers D12, D16, D20 and D22 (see Section 
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6.3.2). Hence, H13 is supported (see Section 3.10). The results address the fourth 
knowledge gap (see Section 3.9). 
 
It is recommended that contracting parties in public projects refer to the list of 
significant drivers and barriers faced by each party (see Sections 6.2.2 and 6.3.2). 
Practitioners could leverage the significant drivers for adopting relational transactions, 
especially the topmost drivers, when persuading another party to adopt relational 
transaction practices. In addition, each party should ensure that their relational 
transaction behaviors would not raise concerns among the other parties. Otherwise, 
the other parties would face significant barriers and stop adopting relational 
transactions.  
 
Given that both public clients and private consultants encounter more constraints in 
adopting relational transactions than contractors, contractors should understand the 
differences in the various parties’ perception of the barriers and ensure that their 
relational behaviors do not create unnecessary problems for clients and consultants. 
For example, they should not expect continuity from one project to another because 
competition through open bidding is a basic public procurement. 
 
8.2.3 Effects of relationship quality on project outcomes 
The third objective is to determine the effect of relationship quality on project 
outcomes (see Section 1.3). This study found that good relationships have a 
significantly positive influence on time performance and satisfaction (see Section 
7.5.1). Hypotheses H9.2 and H9.3 are validated (see Table 7.8 and Section 7.4.3). 
This result can address knowledge gap one. It is recommended that contractors and 
consultants pay great attention to maintaining relationships with others. The frequent 
interaction enables them to understand other stakeholders, thereby giving good 
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service that leads to higher satisfaction. Good relationships enable parties to come 
together to solve problems, putting project goals ahead of personal goals, thereby 
ensuring that projects are completed in a timely manner.  
 
8.2.4 Critical relational transaction practices leading better relationships and 
outcomes  
The first part of the fourth objective is to identify the relational transaction practices 
that lead to better relationship quality. It was found that information sharing (IS) 
gives rise to significantly better relationships (Z) (see Section 7.5.2). This result can 
address the second knowledge gap (see Section 3.9) and validate the hypothesis H2.4 
(see Table 7.8, Section 7.4.3). It is recommended that contracting parties establish 
open and effective communication channels with each other. Workshops can be 
conducted during the relationship formation stage so that contracting parties could get 
to know each other better. A web-based database could also be set up for key 
contracting parties to share project information.  
 
The second part of objective four is to identify the relational transaction practices that 
lead to better project outcomes (see Section 1.3). The result can fill the first 
knowledge gap (see Section 3.9) and validate hypotheses H2.4, H4.2, H5.1, H5.3, 
H6.3 and H7.2 (see Section 7.4.3, Table 7.8). The findings indicate that public 
projects can indeed benefit from relational transactions. The main finding is that 
propriety of means (PR) significantly contributes to better cost performance (Y1) and 
a higher level of satisfaction (Y3) (see Sections 7.5.3.1 and 7.5.3.3). Harmonization 
within the social matrix (HM) leads to a significantly higher level of satisfaction (Y3) 
(see Section 7.5.3.3). The implication of this finding is that the terms and conditions 
of public contracts should clearly define each party’s responsibilities and obligations. 
For public projects to achieve good cost and quality outcomes, public officials should 
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not transfer all risks to other stakeholders or make them suffer losses. It is 
recommended that public clients should also design a mechanism for equitable risk 
sharing, and sharing of real pain and gains among contracting parties. To harmonize 
within the social matrix, it is recommended that contracting parties select partners 
who have previous relationships with then and cultivate ongoing social relationships 
among each other. Contracting parties should also seek more information on the way 
their partners go about doing things and to have a greater understanding of local 
customs. 
 
Another finding is that flexibility (FL) and contractual solidarity (SO) significantly 
lead to better time performance (Y2) (see Section 7.5.3.2). The implication of this 
finding is that contracting parties should agree on the performance appraisal method, 
align their objectives, implement collective responsibilities as well as plan and 
monitor the progress of the project collectively. It is suggested that contracting parties 
come to a compromise on unclear issues and be flexible when the situation changes.  
 
8.3 Contributions to Knowledge and Practices 
8.3.1 Contribution to knowledge 
Prior to this study, the behaviors of contracting parties are explained by Macneil’s 
(1978) Relational Contracts Theory. The existing literature also identified the 
importance of past, present and future relationships, as explained by Granovetter’s 
(1985) Network Embeddedness Theory. This study firstly contributes to knowledge 
by integrating both theories into a new framework (see Figure 7.1) and testing it 
empirically. The newly created model (see Figure 7.3) explains the associations 
between RC practices and network strategies with outcomes and relationships among 
contracting parties in public construction projects through four mathematical 
equations (see Equations 7.1 to 7.4 in Section 7.4.3). The findings are important 
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because relational transaction practices that can contribute to better outcomes and 
deeper relationships in public projects are identified (see Sections 7.5.2 and 7.5.3). 
 
The next contribution to knowledge is that this study empirically showed that 
relational transactions (X) do give rise to better outcomes (Y) and relationships (Z) in 
public projects (see Sections 7.5.2 and 7.5.3). In addition, better relationships (Z) are 
associated with better time performance (Y2) and higher satisfaction (Y3) (see Section 
7.5.1). The implication is that contracting parties should not strictly adopt only formal 
controls but also consider relational transactions to boost project outcomes. The 
importance of this new knowledge is that relational transactions are not regarded as 
an optimal factor in public projects, but something to be embraced for better 
management of public projects.  
 
Thirdly, this study contributes to knowledge by identifying the significant drivers of 
and barriers to relational transactions in public projects (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3). It 
found that the three parties – public sector clients, private sector consultants and 
contractors – regarded public sector accountability, bureaucracy and stringent rules, 
regulations and laws as the most serious barriers, which, however, are not 
significantly important in general projects (Kumaraswamy et al., 2005a). 
 
Lastly, the study identified the significant differences in the three parties’ perceptions 
(i.e., CL, CT and CS) of the factors motivating and deterring relational transactions 
(see Sections 6.2.2 and 6.3.2). Specifically, it found that the three parties’ perception 
of the drivers is not significantly different. The biggest challenge to adopting 
relational transactions stems from the public sector client, followed by the private 




8.3.2 Contribution to practices 
The study’s first contribution to practice is to help remove the concerns that 
contracting parties may have with regard to adopting relational transactions in public 
construction projects. It showed that the implementation of relational transactions 
does give rise to good relationships (see Section 7.5.2) and furthermore contribute to 
better project outcomes (see Section 7.5.3). The findings may therefore be used to 
support the adoption of relational transactions in public projects.  
 
This study’s second contribution to practice is that it provided a checklist of critical 
relational transaction practices that could lead to better outcomes and relationship 
quality (see Section 7.7, Table 7.10) as well as a series of recommendations to 
implement these critical relational transaction practices (see Section 7.7). The 
checklist shows how to improve cost performance and satisfaction through formality 
and fairness (propriety of means). It further provided strategies of harmonization to 
achieve higher satisfaction. It also provided actions to be adopted to improve time 
performance by being flexible and having contractual solidarity. The relative 
importance of these practices is also provided (see Section 7.4.3, Figures 7.4 to 7.7). 
By making good use of the checklist and the recommendations suggested by this 
study, different contracting parties may be able to customize their relational 
transactions to achieve good project outcomes.  
 
The study’s final contribution to practice is the identification of drivers and barriers 
that are applicable to individual party as well all contracting parties. 
Recommendations to leverage the drivers and to overcome the negative impacts of 
the barriers were provided (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3). Contracting parties should be 
aware of the significant drivers as this will give them an insight into their partners’ 
objectives in adopting relational transactions in public projects. The barriers would 
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enable them to understand the challenges faced by themselves and others in trying to 
implement relational transactions.  
 
8.4 Limitations of the study 
The first limitation is the exclusion of subcontractors and suppliers from this study. 
This study investigated the relational transactions of three major parties (i.e., public 
clients, main contractors and lead consultants), without considering suppliers and 
subcontractors. Subcontractors and suppliers were not included because these parties 
do not have direct interactions with public clients. Moreover, the relationships 
between subcontractors and main contractors may be regarded as a transaction 
occurring among private parties and this have been investigated (e.g., Kumaraswamy 
and Mattews, 2000; Zou and Lim, 2006; Unsal and Taylor, 2011). Nevertheless, it is 
realized that relational transactions require a holistic approach to examine all critical 
enveloping relations. Future studies incorporating all parties in relational transactions 
are thus recommended.  
 
The second limitation concerns the possible bias towards the responses elicited from 
self-evaluation. Although this manner is not uncommon in the construction research 
domain, the results should be read with caution. Besides, answering some questions, 
respondents were also asked to rate the practices of their partners, for example, 
contractors and consultants were asked to rate the satisfaction level of their clients. 
The respondents may not have rated some of their answers unbiasedly. This problem 
may not be widespread as respondents’ ratings cover a wide range and were not 
bundled up at certain score. Moreover, Anderson and Weitz (1992) found that one 
party's perception of the other party's commitment is positively related to the other's 
true level of commitment. Therefore, the data elicited from the assessment by other 
parties appears reliable.  
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The third limitation is in relation to the use of Likert scale. Although this method has 
been widely used, it is criticized that different respondents may assign different 
values to different points of the scale. In addition, there may be a gap between 
assumed knowledge and real knowledge of the respondents. This would weaken the 
reliability of the data gathered. To minimize this weakness, the present study used 
multiple measurement items to manifest one construct, which can assist in increasing 
the reliability of the constructs (see Section 7.4.1).  
 
The final limitation is the use of linear statistical methods such as EFA and PLS-SEM. 
In reality, the patterns of relational transactions may be more complex. A high level 
of embeddedness, for example, would possibly constrain information sharing (Maurer 
and Ebers 2006) and provide the opportunity for abuse through opportunism 
(Granovetter, 1985), indicating that the association among relationship quality, 
relational transactions and project outcomes may not be linear. Future studies using 
nonlinear statistical methods or qualitative data to triangulate the findings are thus 
recommended.  
 
8.5 Recommendations for Future Research  
Several recommendations for future research are made below.  
 
Section 8.4 indicates that the exclusion of suppliers and subcontractors. Therefore, 
future investigation may include both suppliers and subcontractors in the 
investigation.  
 
The findings of this study added to the extant literature by showing the patterns of 
relational transactions in public projects only. A comparative study using the same 
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data instruments could be carried out to determine the similarities and difference 
between public and private projects in the area of relational transactions.  
 
Despite the advantages of relational transactions, the strict rules and regulations 
governing public projects indicate that formal controlling tools will still be pervasive 
in public projects. A feasible way to advocate relational transactions is, therefore, to 
find a reasonable balance between relational transactions and formal controls, making 
it a complementary strategy in public project management. Thus, another possible 
future study could be done to determine the optimal combination of formal controls 
and relational transactions. 
 
This study examined the drivers of and barriers to relational transactions. It is 
acknowledged that the drivers and barriers may be correlated with each other. Hence, 
future studies could examine the inter-relationships between the drivers and barriers. 
In addition, future studies could also quantitatively examine the extent to which the 
drivers and barriers affect the contracting parties’ propensity to adopt relational 
transactions.  
 
The impact of this study varies from country to country. A comparison study 
undertaken by Ling et al. (2013) preliminarily supported this argument, which found 
that the drivers and barriers to relational transactions are influenced by distinctive 
cultures in China and Australia. Therefore, the type of market structure should be 
borne in mind when industry professionals and the government adopt relational 
transactions. It is also posited that the findings of this thesis may be of relevance to 
construction practitioners in other geographic areas which use similar procurement 
procedures that are transparent and fair. Nevertheless, it is recommended to conduct a 




Since the public sector has a strong concern of transparency in an attempt to adopt 
relational transactions, an examination of the relationship between the 
implementation of relational transactions and transparency in public projects seems 
imperative. Thus, future studies in this regard are recommended.  
 
Although this study did not explicitly measure safety performance, it is realized that 
project safety performance is an important consideration in client’s satisfaction (Y32). 
Nevertheless, future studies incorporating the safety performance into the project 
outcomes are recommended.  
 
It is found that information sharing has a positive impact on relationship quality (see 
Section 8.2.4). However, this study did not examine how different type of 
information would influence relationships. As network embeddedness theory states 
that within embedded networks contracting parties would share informal and holistic 
information, whereas arm’s length relationships only facilitate public information 
(Uzzi, 1997). Future studies on the impacts of different types of information on 
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SURVEY ON PRACTICES ADOPTED TO BOOST PUBLIC 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT OUTCOMES 
 
I am conducting a study on the practices adopted to boost the outcomes of public 
construction projects. This study involves a survey and your participation is very 
much needed and appreciated. Objectives of this survey include to evaluate the extent 
to which the relational practices were present, observed, practiced or emphasized in 
the project; and to assess the driving and impeding factors for adopting those 
practices. 
 
It will take you about 20 minutes to complete the enclosed questionnaire. Please be 
assured that the findings are for academic purposes only, and your identity will never 
be divulged to any other party. A self-addressed and stamped envelope is enclosed for 
your use. We are grateful for your cooperation and hope that you will return the 
completed questionnaire by <dd/mm/yyyy>. 
 
If you prefer to have the questionnaire completed by having me conduct a 
face-to-face interview with you, please contact Mr. Ning Yan at ningyan@nus.edu.sg, 
Mobile No. 81131931. I shall be pleased to meet you at your office, at a time that is 
convenient to you. 
 
If you would like a summary of the research findings, please tick the box below and 
send this page to us. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you soon. Thank you. 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Ning Yan, Mr. 
Department of Building, 












To: Ning Yan  Fax: 67755502 
Department of Building, 
National University of Singapore, 
4 Architecture Drive, Singapore 117566 
 
  Please let me have a summary of the research findings. 
  Please contact me to fix an interview. 
 
 
              





Appendix-2 Questionnaire  
SURVEY ON PRACTICES ADOPTED TO BOOST PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECT OUTCOMES 
1 Please answer the questions based on one specific completed public 
construction project which you have been involved in (eg. provision of 
architectural/ engineering/project management/quantity surveying 
(QS)/construction service or as a client). 
2 Contracting parties: client (client’s representative, public officer in charge 
of the project), main contractors, lead consultants. 
 
Section A: Characteristics of the Public Project/Facility 
Please answer the questions based on one specific completed public construction 
project. 
 
1 Type of facility:  
 Public Housing  Hospital  Office  School  Bridge  
Road 
 Power Plant   Water Plant  Others, please specify:     
2 Construction contract sum (approximate): S$    million 
Final construction cost (approximate): S$    million 
OR    % above/below contract sum (eg. +4% means 4% above; -2% 
means 2% below) 
3 Planned project duration:  months; Actual project duration:   months 
4 What role did your organization play in the development of this facility? 
(Select all that apply) 
 Client  Architect  Engineer  Main contractor  Subcontractor 
 Supplier  Supervisor  Others, please specify:        
5 Which of the following best describes the client? 
 One-off client (eg. has this project only)  On-off client (eg. periodically 
has a new project) 
 Ongoing client (eg. has many projects most of the time) 
6 How was the main contractor selected? 
 Open competitive bidding.  Number of firms involved:     
 Selective bidding.  Number of firms involved:      
 Negotiation.  Number of firms involved:     
 Others: (please specify)            
7 In selecting main contractor, the price/non-price (e.g. technical etc.) score 
ratio in tender evaluation was: (eg. 20:80)      
8 How was the main consultant (eg. architect, engineer) selected to provide the 
service? 
 Open competitive bidding.  Number of firms involved: 
 ____________ 
 Selective bidding.  Number of firms involved:      
 Negotiation.  Number of firms involved:     
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 Government in-house consultant 
 Others: (please specify)            
9 In selecting main consultant, the price/non-price score ratio was:     
10 Please rate the product/output quality of the facility/project: 
 Very dissatisfied  Dissatisfied   Neutral  Satisfied  
Very satisfied 
11 Please rate the client satisfaction with the contracting parties (service quality): 
 Very dissatisfied  Dissatisfied   Neutral  Satisfied  
Very satisfied 
12 What was the contractual arrangement between the main contractor and the 
client? 
 Traditional design-bid-build with bills of quantities 
 Traditional design-bid-build based on lump sum, drawings and 
specifications 
 Design and build 
 Others: (please specify, e.g Target Cost, GMP, …..)      
  
13 What was the form of contract used between the client and main contractor?  
 Public sector standard conditions of contract (PSSCOC) 
 Singapore Institute of Architects (SIA) form of contract 
 Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) form with contractors’ design 





Please rate the strengths of the Relationships among 
contracting parties 
NK=Not Known; 
1=Very bad; 3=Neutral; 
5=Very good 
a 
Extent of relationship between client and contractor at 
end of project 
N
K 
1 2 3 4 5 
b 
Extent of relationship between consultant and 
contractor at end of project 
N
K 
1 2 3 4 5 
c 
Extent of relationship between client and consultant 
at end of project 
N
K 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
15 Please rate the project complexity 
1=Very Low; 
3=Neutral; 5=Very High 
a 
Level of design complexity (eg. highly complex 
when designs incorporate or integrate cutting edge 
technology) 
1 2 3 4 5 
b 
Level of construction complexity (eg. highly 
complex when building on confined site or bad soil 
condition) 
1 2 3 4 5 
c 
Level of technological advancement (eg. highly 
complex when project involves new or emerging 
methods and processes, with no standard procedures 
to follow) 
1 2 3 4 5 




Level of integration required among contracting 
parties 
1 2 3 4 5 
Section B: Practices Present, Observed, Practiced, or Emphasized in the Specific 
Project identified in Part A 
Part B1 Practices by each contracting party 
Please answer all the questions by filling in a number on a 1-5 scale, where 1=Very 
Low; 3=Neutral; 5=Very High.  
N
o 
Please rate the extent to which each of these were 





1 Flexibility when situations change    
2 Commitment of resources to the project    
3 Long term commitment level    
4 Team working attitude    
5 Readiness to compromise on unclear issues    
6 Attitude to continuous improvement    
 
Part B2 Practices between two of the contracting parties 
Please answer all the questions by filling in a number on a 1-5 scale, where 1=Very 
Low; 3=Neutral; 5=Very High. 
N
o 
Please rate the extent to which each of 
these were present, observed, practiced 










   
2 Mutual trust between    
3 Mutual understanding between    
4 
Open and effective communication 
between 
   
5 
Level of inter-personal relations/cultural 
harmony (individual level) between 
   
6 Sharing of project information between    
7 
Ongoing social relationship (eg. 
“guanxi”, social ties and kinship outside 
of this project) between 
   
Part B3 Practices among the three main contracting parties: client, contractor, 
and consultant 
Please answer questions by circling the appropriate number 
N
o 
Please rate the extent to which each of these were present, 
observed, practiced or emphasized in the project 
1=Very Low; 3=Neutral; 
5=Very High 
1 
Clarity of division of responsibilities among contracting 
parties 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
Acceptance of performance appraisal mechanism for the 
project 




Please rate the extent to which each of these were present, 
observed, practiced or emphasized in the project 
1=Very Low; 3=Neutral; 
5=Very High 
3 Alignment of objectives of different contracting parties 1 2 3 4 5 
4 
Collective/combined responsibility by a pre-selected group 
comprising one person from each major party 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 
Joint coordination and monitoring plans among contracting 
parties 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
Clearly defined equitable risk sharing arrangement among 
contracting parties 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 Adjustable contracts to address uncertainties 1 2 3 4 5 
8 
Commitment level of contracting parties to joint problem 
solving 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 Presence of conducive learning climate/environment 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Acceptance of dispute resolution mechanism for the project 1 2 3 4 5 
11 
Clarity of contract conditions (eg. scope of contract, duties 
& responsibilities) 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 Real gain-share/pain-share among contracting parties 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Section C: Motives/Drivers to Adopt the relational transaction Practices  
No 
Please rate the motives/drivers to adopt the 
relational transaction practices  
1=Strongly disagree; 3=Neither; 
5=Strongly agree 
1 Reduce total project cost 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Reduce risks and/or mitigate their influence 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Reduce the cost of changing partner in projects 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Reduce time in delivering the project 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Reduce public client’s administration burden 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Improve the quality of project 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Improve the design 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Achieve better safety performance 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Maximize resource utilization 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Respond to collaborative culture in the project 1 2 3 4 5 
11 
Provide an integrated solution of efficiency 
improvement 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 Respond to public needs  1 2 3 4 5 
13 
Respond to competitors’ actions (enhance 
competitive position) 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 Improve your organization’s competency 1 2 3 4 5 
15 
Enhance your organization’s reputation in the 
industry 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 Reduce disputes during the project 1 2 3 4 5 
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No 
Please rate the motives/drivers to adopt the 
relational transaction practices  
1=Strongly disagree; 3=Neither; 
5=Strongly agree 
17 
Build up closer relationship with contracting 
parties 
1 2 3 4 5 
18 
Seize new market opportunities (eg. pursuing 
future relationships) 
1 2 3 4 5 
19 Achieve continuity with past/existing relationships 1 2 3 4 5 
20 Respond to technology changes 1 2 3 4 5 
21 Facilitate creative and innovative approaches 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Section D: Impeding Factors to Adopt the Practices Which You Rated Low in 
Section B 
No 
Please rate the reasons/barriers to impede/prevent the 
practices which you rated low (1 or 2) in section B from 




1 Lack of knowledge of relational approaches 1 2 3 4 5 
2 
Lack of training and guidance in the relational 
arrangement 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 Past negative experience of relational arrangement 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Misgiving about potential future relationships 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Lack of experience of relational arrangement 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Unenthusiastic participation of contracting parties 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Lack of top management support (each party) 1 2 3 4 5 
8 
Lack of acceptance by contracting parties of relational 
approaches as a long-term way of doing business 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 
Lack of client’s initiatives in relational contracting 
practice 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 Lack of common goals among contracting parties 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Inter-personal/cultural clash (individual level) 1 2 3 4 5 
12 
Concerns about opportunistic behavior of other 
contracting parties 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 
Incompatible organizational cultures in the contracting 
parties 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 High cost to adopt relational approaches 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Time required to develop relationship 1 2 3 4 5 
16 
Conservative industry culture inhibits changes and 
encourages preservation of the status quo 
1 2 3 4 5 
17 Lack of empowerment in the client's representatives 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Lack of trust among all contracting parties 1 2 3 4 5 
19 Client only has occasional need for project development 1 2 3 4 5 
20 Public sector accountability concerns  1 2 3 4 5 
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No 
Please rate the reasons/barriers to impede/prevent the 
practices which you rated low (1 or 2) in section B from 




21 Bureaucratic public client organization 1 2 3 4 5 
22 Stringent public rules, regulations and laws 1 2 3 4 5 
23 
Need to avoid possible allegations of corruption arising 
from close relationships between client and other 
contracting parties 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Section E: Other Suggestions and Comments on Implementing Relational 
Transaction Practices 
                   
 
Section F: General Information 
1 Number of years you have practiced in the construction industry:    
years. 
2 Your designation/job title:           
3 Your organization type: (please tick where applicable) 
  Government/statutory board/government owned enterprise/government 
linked enterprise 
  Engineering firm    Architectural firm    Quantity 
surveying firm 
  Contractor.  BCA workhead:     Financial grade:    
  
  Others: (please specify)           
4 Ownership of your organization: 
  Public    Private    Public-Private Joint Venture: 
 % public 
5 Size of your organization’s total workforce (approximate):     
employees 
End of the questionnaire. 
Thank you for your time and effort in responding to this questionnaire.
 188 
 





I have conducted a survey and constructed a model on boosting the outcomes of 
public construction projects through relational transactions.  
 
I am now at the stage of validating the survey findings. The validation process 
involves an interview and your participation is very much needed and appreciated to 
assess the appropriateness of the model and the suggested relational practices to 
improve project performance. 
 




Yan Ning (Mr) 
Department of Building, 







PRACTICES ADOPTED TO BOOST PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 
OUTCOMES 
VALIDATION OF FINDINGS 
 
Instructions: Section A and Table 1 show the survey results and suggested relational 
practices to boost project outcomes. Please answer the questions in Section B based 
on your experience in public sector projects in Singapore. 
 
Section A:  








































Table 1: Possible relational strategies to achieve better outcomes 
Project outcome Strategies  Practices  





Clarity of division of responsibilities among 
contracting parties   
Clarity of the terms and conditions in contract   
Clearly defined equitable risk-sharing 
arrangement among contracting parties   





Flexibility when situations change   





Acceptance of agreed performance appraisal 
mechanism for the project  
Alignment of objectives of different contracting 
parties   
Collective/combined responsibilities by a 
pre-selected group comprising one person from 
each major party   
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Project outcome Strategies  Practices  
Joint coordination and monitoring plans among 
contracting parties  
Satisfaction (Y3) (i.e., 






Previous relationships among each other   
Ongoing social relationships among each other   
Relationships (Z) (i.e., 
the relationship 
between client, main 




Mutual understanding among each other   
Open and effective communication among each 
other   
Sharing of project information among each other 
Time performance 
(Y2); 
Satisfaction (Y3) (i.e., 




Relationships between clients and contractors at 
the end of the project 
Relationships between consultants and 
contractors at the end of the project 
Relationships between clients and consultants at 
the end of the project 
 
Section B:  
Please answer the questions in Section B based on your experience in public sector 
projects in Singapore. Please comment on the appropriateness of the resultant model. 
 
1  Do you think time, cost, quality and client’s satisfaction are sufficient to 
represent the key performance indicators of a public project? If not, what should be 
added/omitted? 
 
2  In public projects, does propriety of means (PR) influence cost performance 
(Y1) and satisfaction (Y3)? Why? 
 
3  In public projects, does flexibility (FL) influence time performance (Y3)? 
Why? 
 
4  In public projects, does contractual solidarity (SO) influence time performance 
(Y2)? Why? 
 
5  In public projects, does harmonization within the social matrix (HM) influence 
satisfaction (Y3)? Why? 
 




7 In public projects, does relationship quality (Z) influence time performance (Y2) 
and satisfaction (Y3)? Why? 
 
8 Do you agree that the relational practices listed in Table 1 would give rise to the 
respective project outcomes?  Please go through each practice and explain the 
reason for your answer. 
 
Section C: General Information 
1 Number of years you have practiced in the construction industry:    
years. 
2 Your designation/job title:           
3 Your organization type: (please tick where applicable) 
  Government/statutory board/government owned enterprise/government 
linked enterprise 
  Engineering firm    Architectural firm    Quantity 
surveying firm 
  Contractor.    Others: (please specify)        
   
 
End of interview. 





Appendix-4 PLS-SEM results  
 
































Y1 Y2 Y3 Z 
FM 0.842  
                      
FL_CL 0.273  0.889  
                     
FL_CS 0.397  0.531  0.832  
                    
FL_CT 0.159  0.469  0.335  0.803  
                   
FA 0.429  0.407  0.344  0.358  0.879  
                  
HM_CL-CS 0.207  0.076  0.353  0.149  0.274  0.861  
                 
HM_CL-CT 0.169  0.225  0.018  0.406  0.432  0.331  0.849  
                
HM_CS-CT 0.098  0.270  0.391  0.249  0.395  0.433  0.547  0.839  
               
IS_CL-CS 0.384  0.325  0.379  0.148  0.311  0.485  0.121  0.431  0.910  
              
IS_CL-CT 0.223  0.407  0.168  0.372  0.396  0.183  0.640  0.387  0.345  0.840  
             
IS_CT-CS 0.181  0.170  0.411  0.350  0.306  0.332  0.154  0.511  0.355  0.273  0.795  
            
PS 0.611  0.479  0.337  0.314  0.672  0.267  0.384  0.259  0.354  0.417  0.234  0.793  
           
RI_CL 0.442  0.550  0.294  0.197  0.464  0.246  0.350  0.277  0.496  0.538  0.131  0.543  0.826  
          
RI_CS 0.340  0.245  0.626  0.244  0.405  0.392  0.106  0.458  0.510  0.170  0.521  0.299  0.505  0.828  
         
RI_CT 0.182  0.363  0.192  0.569  0.371  0.129  0.501  0.319  0.123  0.415  0.341  0.304  0.467  0.425  0.765  
        
SO 0.642  0.334  0.382  0.254  0.640  0.368  0.425  0.379  0.376  0.437  0.285  0.679  0.523  0.477  0.434  0.796  
       
TR_CL-CS 0.421  0.221  0.354  0.108  0.310  0.556  0.219  0.418  0.872  0.330  0.317  0.382  0.488  0.477  0.158  0.424  0.915  
      
TR_CL-CT 0.186  0.311  0.050  0.372  0.425  0.130  0.782  0.522  0.259  0.742  0.289  0.408  0.376  0.136  0.536  0.425  0.313  0.898  
     
TR_CT-CS 0.277  0.194  0.365  0.219  0.350  0.250  0.339  0.703  0.445  0.300  0.647  0.226  0.267  0.478  0.345  0.320  0.422  0.523  0.885  
    
Y1 0.108  -0.001  0.046  -0.144  -0.074  -0.043  -0.016  -0.163  -0.002  -0.048  -0.207  -0.064  -0.039  -0.093  -0.071  -0.077  -0.002  -0.171  -0.092  1.000  
   
Y2 -0.137  0.053  0.041  0.086  0.063  -0.062  0.120  0.012  -0.051  0.160  -0.025  -0.042  -0.080  -0.042  0.035  0.096  0.001  0.097  0.011  0.227  1.000  
  
Y3 0.203  0.086  0.123  0.142  0.309  0.030  0.340  0.263  0.078  0.385  0.166  0.163  0.150  0.181  0.175  0.231  0.053  0.241  0.199  0.344  0.276  0.876  
 
Z 0.076  0.249  0.175  0.243  0.251  0.326  0.244  0.278  0.405  0.381  0.248  0.281  0.311  0.305  0.254  0.248  0.353  0.277  0.304  0.083  0.333  0.329  0.811  
Note: Bolded numbers are square root of AVE 
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FM FA SO PS Y1 Y2 Y3 Z 
FL1_CL 0.893 0.561 0.336 0.484 0.300 0.302 0.175 0.216 0.357 0.291 0.274 0.212 0.380 0.373 0.197 0.235 0.378 0.354 0.468 -0.020 0.069 0.078 0.253 
FL2_CL 0.886 0.381 0.500 0.493 0.132 0.344 -0.043 0.184 0.120 0.100 0.279 0.132 0.195 0.351 0.105 0.251 0.346 0.238 0.382 0.019 0.026 0.074 0.189 
FL1_CS 0.516 0.852 0.232 0.315 0.529 0.140 0.302 0.093 0.480 0.384 0.124 0.427 0.471 0.264 0.356 0.348 0.310 0.306 0.312 0.044 0.072 0.174 0.198 
FL2_CS 0.360 0.811 0.331 0.167 0.513 0.182 0.286 -0.072 0.153 0.195 -0.050 0.165 0.142 0.001 0.326 0.310 0.260 0.332 0.245 0.032 -0.007 0.022 0.087 
FL1_CT 0.296 0.292 0.775 0.123 0.213 0.484 0.261 0.331 0.205 0.052 0.197 0.150 0.022 0.259 0.378 0.101 0.317 0.212 0.281 -0.087 0.202 0.220 0.159 
FL2_CT 0.449 0.250 0.830 0.190 0.182 0.434 -0.005 0.323 0.196 0.117 0.389 0.199 0.204 0.334 0.197 0.152 0.262 0.198 0.227 -0.142 -0.048 0.021 0.228 
RI1_CL 0.427 0.247 0.166 0.724 0.446 0.305 0.220 0.360 0.398 0.290 0.337 0.415 0.399 0.345 0.192 0.214 0.279 0.250 0.213 -0.145 -0.152 0.042 0.267 
RI2_CL 0.423 0.207 0.082 0.830 0.313 0.241 0.143 0.221 0.158 0.403 0.266 0.192 0.368 0.388 -0.025 0.419 0.339 0.348 0.449 -0.054 -0.090 0.012 0.094 
RI3_CL 0.512 0.273 0.133 0.856 0.366 0.455 0.247 0.269 0.189 0.451 0.334 0.161 0.453 0.550 0.105 0.362 0.394 0.510 0.509 0.067 0.003 0.219 0.367 
RI4_CL 0.452 0.244 0.247 0.885 0.519 0.498 0.198 0.304 0.185 0.452 0.306 0.142 0.414 0.477 0.143 0.451 0.492 0.574 0.586 -0.014 -0.043 0.188 0.277 
RI1_CS 0.139 0.480 0.105 0.459 0.762 0.190 0.270 -0.013 0.319 0.421 0.021 0.281 0.455 0.058 0.385 0.292 0.364 0.340 0.244 -0.049 -0.224 0.182 0.184 
RI2_CS 0.165 0.415 0.267 0.357 0.789 0.397 0.220 0.173 0.421 0.407 0.190 0.428 0.439 0.163 0.341 0.313 0.241 0.317 0.208 -0.137 -0.036 0.161 0.257 
RI3_CS 0.236 0.596 0.186 0.428 0.871 0.411 0.357 0.036 0.377 0.349 0.087 0.416 0.384 0.115 0.506 0.270 0.329 0.462 0.270 -0.064 0.037 0.060 0.276 
RI4_CS 0.260 0.572 0.245 0.432 0.885 0.394 0.435 0.150 0.400 0.412 0.148 0.446 0.424 0.218 0.482 0.260 0.407 0.447 0.267 -0.062 0.053 0.204 0.287 
RI1_CT 0.249 0.085 0.417 0.248 0.153 0.631 -0.048 0.349 0.222 0.085 0.403 0.071 0.071 0.225 0.139 0.026 0.226 0.188 0.217 -0.055 -0.078 0.132 0.133 
RI2_CT 0.257 0.050 0.470 0.329 0.306 0.693 0.076 0.415 0.308 0.156 0.369 0.361 0.160 0.281 0.183 0.189 0.247 0.224 0.174 -0.074 -0.024 0.181 0.238 
R3_CT 0.298 0.248 0.454 0.453 0.418 0.858 0.176 0.404 0.263 0.127 0.424 0.348 0.077 0.381 0.404 0.226 0.328 0.446 0.276 -0.073 0.037 0.091 0.228 
RI4_CT 0.305 0.167 0.421 0.365 0.369 0.853 0.131 0.378 0.196 0.116 0.458 0.228 0.078 0.355 0.262 0.084 0.319 0.408 0.259 -0.020 0.127 0.152 0.171 
HM1_CL_CS 0.114 0.326 0.159 0.352 0.445 0.151 0.831 0.186 0.359 0.604 0.080 0.283 0.539 0.130 0.323 0.197 0.268 0.313 0.236 -0.116 -0.092 -0.122 0.321 
HM2_CL_CS 0.025 0.288 0.103 0.098 0.250 0.078 0.889 0.368 0.386 0.378 0.138 0.160 0.320 0.181 0.256 0.163 0.210 0.321 0.226 0.028 -0.022 0.148 0.249 
HM1_CL_CT 0.196 0.062 0.383 0.387 0.125 0.512 0.219 0.840 0.494 0.122 0.708 0.292 0.008 0.573 0.099 0.087 0.429 0.389 0.316 -0.155 0.010 0.231 0.120 
HM2_CL_CT 0.187 -0.029 0.310 0.212 0.058 0.344 0.340 0.859 0.438 0.246 0.623 0.283 0.192 0.516 0.160 0.196 0.308 0.335 0.335 0.120 0.189 0.344 0.291 
HM1_CT_CS 0.174 0.281 0.290 0.194 0.447 0.413 0.304 0.534 0.844 0.271 0.506 0.610 0.263 0.227 0.480 0.067 0.344 0.324 0.151 -0.181 0.052 0.214 0.211 
HM2_CT_CS 0.281 0.376 0.125 0.271 0.320 0.117 0.425 0.382 0.833 0.432 0.367 0.569 0.462 0.424 0.376 0.097 0.319 0.312 0.284 -0.091 -0.033 0.228 0.255 
TR1_CL_CS 0.238 0.292 0.121 0.528 0.478 0.162 0.502 0.196 0.376 0.906 0.217 0.373 0.796 0.269 0.305 0.370 0.347 0.382 0.400 -0.037 -0.010 0.114 0.346 
TR2_CL_CS 0.171 0.354 0.078 0.373 0.399 0.130 0.516 0.204 0.389 0.924 0.349 0.399 0.800 0.331 0.277 0.400 0.226 0.394 0.305 0.030 0.011 -0.011 0.303 
TR1_CL_CT 0.307 0.014 0.376 0.341 0.158 0.510 0.102 0.723 0.559 0.222 0.890 0.457 0.203 0.629 0.256 -0.011 0.408 0.321 0.312 -0.262 0.115 0.242 0.297 
TR2_CL_CT 0.253 0.074 0.295 0.335 0.089 0.456 0.131 0.684 0.384 0.336 0.906 0.481 0.261 0.700 0.262 0.332 0.357 0.438 0.418 -0.052 0.060 0.192 0.203 
TR1_CT_CS 0.150 0.266 0.235 0.213 0.424 0.353 0.179 0.293 0.648 0.283 0.363 0.858 0.304 0.146 0.572 0.084 0.251 0.160 0.131 -0.066 -0.016 0.187 0.279 
TR2_CT_CS 0.190 0.370 0.161 0.256 0.424 0.269 0.256 0.307 0.605 0.448 0.545 0.911 0.468 0.364 0.576 0.375 0.359 0.384 0.256 -0.094 0.030 0.168 0.262 
IS1_CL_CS 0.352 0.327 0.151 0.507 0.496 0.147 0.456 0.171 0.493 0.831 0.295 0.475 0.947 0.346 0.322 0.350 0.321 0.376 0.364 -0.014 -0.076 0.120 0.410 
IS2_CL_CS 0.296 0.331 0.156 0.367 0.418 0.128 0.341 0.062 0.320 0.728 0.219 0.431 0.906 0.287 0.385 0.323 0.245 0.269 0.228 0.036 -0.063 0.036 0.341 
IS3_CL_CS 0.233 0.380 0.093 0.479 0.480 0.057 0.533 0.093 0.357 0.823 0.189 0.300 0.876 0.308 0.261 0.378 0.282 0.385 0.378 -0.028 0.003 0.053 0.354 
IS1_CL_CT 0.307 0.033 0.295 0.472 0.132 0.442 0.230 0.697 0.448 0.257 0.744 0.323 0.214 0.860 0.223 0.113 0.364 0.412 0.431 -0.060 0.125 0.325 0.446 
IS2_CL_CT 0.392 0.064 0.324 0.465 0.017 0.369 -0.059 0.471 0.153 0.250 0.619 0.242 0.275 0.814 0.180 0.187 0.214 0.274 0.292 0.083 0.130 0.263 0.204 
IS3_CL_CT 0.329 0.300 0.317 0.423 0.260 0.249 0.268 0.456 0.364 0.317 0.521 0.200 0.368 0.844 0.276 0.251 0.406 0.407 0.330 -0.129 0.147 0.375 0.309 
IS1_CT_CS 0.086 0.303 0.250 0.108 0.404 0.239 0.483 0.191 0.522 0.187 0.180 0.579 0.188 0.154 0.800 0.045 0.264 0.236 0.195 -0.242 -0.096 0.031 0.236 
IS2_CT_CS 0.121 0.232 0.329 0.035 0.309 0.378 0.134 0.126 0.266 0.166 0.278 0.583 0.237 0.248 0.815 0.139 0.184 0.231 0.086 -0.127 0.110 0.135 0.218 

































FM FA SO PS Y1 Y2 Y3 Z 
FM1 0.271 0.341 0.210 0.320 0.273 0.089 0.170 0.002 0.092 0.405 0.067 0.235 0.385 0.117 0.191 0.785 0.215 0.398 0.428 -0.010 -0.122 0.161 0.169 
FM2 0.204 0.334 0.081 0.416 0.300 0.202 0.180 0.245 0.077 0.324 0.223 0.235 0.284 0.240 0.127 0.895 0.472 0.651 0.585 0.164 -0.112 0.181 -0.011 
FA1 0.374 0.389 0.380 0.445 0.450 0.380 0.175 0.348 0.294 0.307 0.356 0.330 0.282 0.321 0.344 0.505 0.907 0.647 0.641 -0.052 0.021 0.236 0.159 
FA2 0.341 0.197 0.236 0.365 0.242 0.261 0.325 0.422 0.417 0.231 0.398 0.283 0.265 0.385 0.177 0.221 0.851 0.462 0.534 -0.082 0.098 0.318 0.299 
SO1 0.251 0.235 0.196 0.443 0.244 0.240 0.353 0.287 0.338 0.389 0.290 0.362 0.325 0.339 0.334 0.518 0.449 0.759 0.505 -0.037 0.124 0.157 0.259 
SO2 0.207 0.337 0.231 0.410 0.406 0.215 0.304 0.317 0.219 0.367 0.262 0.109 0.342 0.353 0.162 0.592 0.519 0.741 0.641 -0.142 -0.114 0.141 0.088 
SO3 0.370 0.420 0.182 0.405 0.450 0.389 0.226 0.369 0.372 0.220 0.386 0.238 0.245 0.315 0.145 0.465 0.495 0.822 0.446 -0.069 0.070 0.172 0.091 
SO4 0.252 0.295 0.214 0.415 0.457 0.475 0.282 0.385 0.275 0.356 0.394 0.239 0.299 0.382 0.213 0.512 0.581 0.859 0.599 -0.048 0.119 0.237 0.254 
PS1 0.427 0.370 0.239 0.412 0.235 0.187 0.234 0.252 0.248 0.248 0.278 0.146 0.170 0.296 0.185 0.422 0.551 0.457 0.789 -0.028 0.013 0.134 0.198 
PS2 0.339 0.322 0.246 0.489 0.284 0.194 0.285 0.365 0.212 0.351 0.362 0.208 0.310 0.357 0.206 0.586 0.568 0.626 0.911 -0.086 0.020 0.209 0.285 
PS3 0.398 0.256 0.261 0.402 0.326 0.337 0.072 0.263 0.212 0.409 0.372 0.299 0.348 0.329 0.317 0.559 0.550 0.572 0.723 -0.143 -0.077 0.048 0.117 
PS4 0.410 0.119 0.272 0.417 0.134 0.318 0.193 0.317 0.167 0.244 0.306 0.105 0.321 0.353 0.087 0.391 0.497 0.511 0.734 0.034 -0.129 0.073 0.243 
Y1 -0.001 0.046 -0.144 -0.039 -0.093 -0.071 -0.043 -0.016 -0.163 -0.002 -0.171 -0.092 -0.002 -0.048 -0.207 0.108 -0.074 -0.077 -0.064 1.000 0.227 0.344 0.083 
Y2 0.053 0.041 0.086 -0.080 -0.042 0.035 -0.062 0.120 0.012 0.001 0.097 0.011 -0.051 0.160 -0.025 -0.137 0.063 0.096 -0.042 0.227 1.000 0.276 0.333 
Y31 0.149 0.004 0.077 0.226 0.144 0.176 -0.079 0.225 0.171 0.035 0.225 0.193 0.082 0.346 0.145 0.232 0.173 0.127 0.146 0.365 0.091 0.803 0.185 
Y32 0.036 0.168 0.155 0.083 0.172 0.146 0.086 0.348 0.270 0.054 0.210 0.170 0.062 0.343 0.150 0.153 0.333 0.251 0.146 0.276 0.333 0.944 0.355 
Z1 0.205 0.045 0.109 0.277 0.111 0.280 0.087 0.278 0.182 0.148 0.310 0.206 0.193 0.442 0.037 0.033 0.144 0.209 0.206 0.112 0.309 0.391 0.825 
Z2 0.210 0.186 0.404 0.120 0.249 0.244 0.269 0.134 0.277 0.177 0.159 0.297 0.212 0.189 0.425 0.042 0.230 0.152 0.219 -0.046 0.243 0.227 0.758 
Z3 0.193 0.206 0.118 0.339 0.389 0.100 0.447 0.170 0.230 0.521 0.193 0.248 0.568 0.273 0.187 0.107 0.244 0.235 0.261 0.116 0.255 0.175 0.847 
 
